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PREFACE 
This monograph is about bargaining game theory, more precisely : about 
- what are often called - axiomatic models of bargaining. In these models 
the approach initiated by Nash in his 1950 paper, is followed. Roughly : So-
lutions for bargaining games are characterized by their properties, relations 
between such properties are studied. This bargaining game theory is a branch 
of game theory, more specifically, it belongs to the theory of cooperative 
games without side-payments. Game theory is a mathematical discipline which 
concerns itself with the study of mathematical models of situations where con-
flict is involved. It has applications in many fields, especially in econo-
mics and social sciences. 
An earlier monograph on the subject of the present work is Roth (1979) . 
Survey papers on the subject are Schmitz (1977), Kalai (1983), and Peters 
(1983) . 
General works on game theory are : (the seminal) von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944), Luce and Raiffa (1957), Vorobo'ev (1977), Rosenmuller (1981), 
Owen (1982), Shubik (1982). 
The reader will find a summary and the plan of this monograph in section 
* 
3 ), chapter 1, where these may fit in best, since, then, section 1 has al-
ready presented a first acquaintance with the bargaining problem. Readers 
who are in a hurry, may skip the first two chapters (Introduction and Utility 
Theory). Those who are not familiar with the von Neumann - Morgenstern uti-
lity theory, however, should read section 4 m chapter 2. 
) Sections are numbered consecutively throughout the monograph. E.g., the 
second chapter starts with section 4. 

CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter consists of three sections. In section 1, we 
present, in a more or less informal way, some examples of situations which may 
give rise to the existence of bargaining games. Section 2 contains some his­
torical remarks, and section 3 presents a summary and the plan of this mono­
graph . 
1. EXAMPLES OF SITUATIONS WHICH MAY LEAD TO BARGAINING GAMES 
We shall give a few examples of situations which may give rise to the 
existence of bargaining games. We use the word situation here, informally, in 
its everyday meaning (; in the next chapter a - formal - definition of a bargai­
ning situation will be given). Throughout this section, we shall maintain a 
more or less informal level of presentation : the ideas rather than their for­
malizations, are central here. 
For a story behind the first example, see, e.g. Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
Example 1.1. (Prisoner's Dilemma). Consider the bimatvix geme given by the 
following diagram : 
Player 2 
Player 1 
Τ 
В 
] 
(5 
.(6 
-J 
,5) 
,0) 
] 
(0 
(1 
* 
,6) 
,1) 
(In any of the four pairs, the first and second numbers are the payoffs to 
players 1 and 2, respectively.) Both player 1 and player 2 have two piœe 
strategies (top (T) and bottom (B) row, and left (L) and right (R) column, 
respectively), and an infinity of mixed strategies, e.g. for player 1 : play 
Τ with probability ρ and В with probability 1-p (where ρ £ [0,1]) . As an 
example, the payoffs to the players, if player 1 plays Τ with probability — 
2 1 3 
and В with probability — and player 2 plays L with probability — and R with 
1 2 
probability — , are the (expected) payoffs 
2 
1 
- (- . 5 + - . 0) + - (- . 6 + - . 1) = 3 - for player 1 and 
3 2 2 3 2 2 б 
I l 2 1 1 2 1 
— (— . 5 + — . 0) + — (— . 6 + — . 1) = 2 — for player 2. The unique Nash 
2 3 3 2 3 3 6 
equilibrivm (Nash (1951)) of this game is the pair of pure strategies (B,R) : 
no player gains by deviating, unilaterally, from this pair of strategies. 
Both players, however, strictly prefer the pair of payoffs (5,5) corresponding 
to the pair of strategies (T,L), to the payoff pair (1,1) corresponding to the 
Nash equilibrium of the game. The pair of payoffs (5,5) is unlikely to be the 
final outcome of the game unless the players have a way to make some binding 
agreement (e.g., sign a contract) to play (T,L). 
By using mixed strategies, the players can achieve any pair of payoffs in the 
shaded area S in Fig. 1.1. 
Figure 1.1. 
Let f : Ξ -» S be a map, and suppose that the players agree to obey the follow­
ing procedure : every player announces a mixed strategy, and the correspon­
ding payoff pair χ e S is calculated; and then a so-called correlated strategy 
is determined and carried out such that the corresponding pair of payoffs is 
2 
f (χ)- Such a correlated strategy has the form (ζ , ζ , ζ , ζ ) where, 
S TL TR BL BR 
e.g., ζ is the joint probability that player 1 has to play Τ and player 2 
has to play L. In this particular example, S is also the set of payoffs cor­
responding to correlated strategies. Suppose that f assigns to χ € S the (by 
both players) most preferred point in S on the 450-line through x. If, e.g., 
the players play the equilibrium pair of strategies (B,R), then χ = (1,1), 
f„(x) = (5,5), and f (χ) can be achieved by the correlated strategy (1,0,0,0). 
If we have, for every set Ξ of this kind, a prespecified map f as above and a 
point χ in S, then we can define a map φ which assigns to every S the point 
f (x ). The purpose of this monograph is to study properties of such maps φ. 
Example 1.2. (Battle of the sexes; see, e.g., Luce and Raiffa (1957)). 
Consider the following bimatrix game : 
Player 1 
Τ 
в 
(2 
_(0 
Player 
L 
,1) 
,0) 
2 
(0 
(1 
R 
,0)" 
,2) 
The shaded area in Fig. 1.2 is the set of payoffs attainable by mixed strate­
gies. The set of payoffs attainable by correlated strategies is 
conv{(0,0) ,(2.1) , (1,2) } =: Ξ. (We denote by "conv" the convex hull.) 
Figure 1.2. 
3 
For this game, there are three Nash equilibria : (T,L), (B,R), and (Μ,Ν), 
2 
where M means : play Τ w:th probability —, and N means : play R with probabi-
2 3 2 2 
lity —. The corresponding payoff pairs are (2,1), (1,2), and (—,—), respecti­
vely, and if f is as in Eample 1.1, then f (2,1) = (2,1), f (1,2) = (1,2), 
2 2 3 3 
and f (—,—) = (—,—) ; these payoffs can be achieved by the correlated strate-
3 3
 1 1 
gies (1,0,0,0), (0,0,0,1), and (^ -,0,0,—), respectively. The payoff pair 
3 3 (τ-,-г·) can only be obtained by a correlated strategy and not by a pair of mixed 
strategies; consequently, it can only be obtained by cooperation between the 
players since both of them have to consent to the use of the correlated stra­
tegy (y,0,0,-) . 
Ä bimatnx game is a noncooperative game, and the Nash equilibrium con-
cept a noncooperative solution concept; a map φ as introduced at the end of 
Example 1.1, is a cooperative solution concept, and we shall formally introdu­
ce it as a bargaining solution in the third chapter. Whether we call a game 
cooperative or not, depends on the rules of the game. An essential feature of 
cooperation is the possibility of binding agreements. 
Note that the game procedure, as a whole, of Examples 1.1 and 1.2, is of 
a noncooperative nature : once the players have agreed to the use of correla­
ted strategies and a "bargaining solution" φ, the final payoffs depend only on 
the strategies announced by the players. In literature, these games are call­
ed arbitration games, and they were introduced by Nash (1953) . See also 
Raiffa (1953), Luce and Raiffa (1957), and for a comprehensive study, see Ti]s 
and Jansen (1980, 1982), and Jansen (1981). 
if we use the word alternative instead of pair of pure strategies (m 
some bimatnx game) , lottery instead of correlated strategy, disagreement al­
ternative for some fixed pair of pure or mixed strategies, and utilities in­
stead of payoffs, then we have all the ingredients of a bargaining situation. 
In the ma^or part of this monograph we do not consider bargaining situations, 
but bargaining games : i.e. we consider utilities instead of alternatives. 
All these concepts will be formally introduced in the next chapters. 
We conclude this section with an example of a different nature than the 
previous examples. 
Example 1.3. Consider the situation where one dollar has to be divided 
4 
between two players 1 and 2. We suppose that the utility of receiving χ 
dollars is χ for player 1 and /x for player 2. (The concept of utility will 
be formally defined in the next chapter.) If the players reach an agreement 
on the division of the dollar, say χ for player 1 and y for player 2, with 
χ + y S 1, then player 1 receives utility χ and player 2 receives /y". Other­
wise, the game ends in disagreement, leaving each player with 0 dollars or 
utility payoff 0. Fig. 1.3 depicts the set S of possible utility payoffs for 
this game. 
Figure 1.3. 
Here the utility pair (-^ у) may be obtained by a money allocation (-^ι-τ) , lea­
ving one quarter of the dollar unallocated, but also by a lottery in which 
each player has a 50 percent chance of getting the dollar. 
By not cooperating, each player can secure himself of (at most) utility 0. 
The map f as in Example 1.1 would assign the point (— Jb - —, y /F - —) to 
(0,0) : we will later (section 15) recognize that point as the "Kalai - Smo-
rodinsky - solution of the bargaining game". 
5 
2. SOME HISTORICA! REMARKS 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) have proposed a "solution" for coope­
rative games with sidepayments : a similar solution for bargaining games would 
assign to a game the set of all Pareto optimal individually rational outcomes, 
for instance, to the game of Example 1.3, the set {(χ,/1-χ) : 0 £ χ й l ì . 
(Formal definitions follow in chapter 3.) A drawback of this "solution" lb 
its lack of uniqueness. 
Nash (1950) has proposed a solution concept which assigns exactly one 
point to each bargaining game. We will for the first time encounter that solu-
tion in section 11. Other stepping stones in the development of (axiomatic) 
bargaining game theory are : Raiffa (1953), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), 
Kalai (1977), Perles and Maschler (1981). In all these papers, new solution 
concepts were proposed or characterizations given, which have become more or 
less standard. Surveys are Schmitz (1977), Roth (1979), Peters (1983). 
Another survey-like paper is Thomson and Myerson (1980). 
So far, we have used the word axiomatio a few times, in conjunction with 
bargaining game theory. However, we prefer to use the word property instead 
of axiom in this monograph. Nevertheless, for historical reasons, we adopt 
the expression axiomatic bargaining game theory. 
There are other approaches to bargaining than the one offered by axioma-
tic bargaining game theory. For instance, there are noncooperative approaches: 
we mention Nash (1953), and, as a more recent contribution, Rubinstein (1982). 
A recent work containing many different approaches, was edited by Roth (1985). 
Of course, there are many works on bargaining which are less formal than game-
theoretical works; we mention Schelling (1960) and Raiffa (1982). 
3. SUMMARY AND PLAN OF THIS MONOGRAPH 
Chapter 2 discusses the elements of utility theory, needed in this mono-
graph : the von Neumann - Morgenstern utility theorem in section 4, risk aver-
sion in section 5, additive and multiplicative utility in sections 6 and 7, 
respectively. Section 4 contains groundwork for the whole monograph, section 
5 for chapter 8 and section 30, which both deal with risk properties of bar-
gaining solutions; and the results of sections 6 and 7 are used in chapter 6 
б 
(on additivity properties) and section 12 (on characterizations of so-called 
Nash solutions), respectively. 
Chapter 3 introduces the central concepts of this monograph : bargaining 
situations in section 8, bargaining games in section 9, and bargaining solu-
tions in section 10. 
Chapter 4 deals almost exclusively with the (2-person) Nash bargaining 
solution and its nonsymmetnc extensions. In section 11, the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives property is central, in section 12 two properties 
called independence of irrelevant expansions, and convention consistency are 
considered. All mentioned properties are used in characterizations. Section 
13 proposes a simple market model and gives relations between the (noncoopera-
tive) solution concept for this model, competitive equilibrium, and bargaining 
solutions, in particular Nash solutions. Section 14 studies another (noncoope-
rative) model which gives rise to nonsymmetnc Nash solutions; the presenta-
tion there is not completely rigorous. 
Chapter 5 gives a characterization of a family of nonsymmetnc extensions 
of the (2-person) Kalai - Smorodinsky solution in section 15, and of the 
(2-person) Kalai - Rosenthal solution in section 16. Individual monotomcity 
is the central property in section 15, global individual monotomcity in sec-
tion 16. 
Chapter 6 deals with additivity properties of 2-person bargaining solu-
tions. Section 17 provides a utility-theoretic foundation for the use of such 
properties, with the aid of the result of section 6. In section 18, a charac-
terization of the family of so-called proportional solutions is given which 
uses the (partial) super-additivity property; section 20 provides another cha-
racterization of the family of nonsymmetnc Nash solutions of chapter 4, with 
the aid of the restricted additivity property. Section 19 is an intermezzo on 
(Pareto-) continuity of bargaining solutions. 
Chapter 7 considers two other approaches to bargaining : multisolutions 
("multivalued bargaining solutions"), and probabilistic solutions. The latter 
assign a probability measure, instead of one fixed outcome, to every bargaining 
game. In section 21, (2-person) multisolutions with an independence of irrele-
vant alternatives property are considered and an extension is obtained of the 
main result of section 11, and also multisolutions with a restricted monotom-
city property are studied, which gives an extension of the characterization in 
section 15. Section 22 discusses two versions of an independence of irrelevant 
alternatives property for probabilistic solutions; again, an extension is 
7 
obtained of the characterization in section 11. 
Chapter θ studies risk properties and relations between risk properties 
and other properties for 2-person bargaining solutions. The groundwork for the 
definitions of these risk properties was done in section 5. Section 23 mainly 
discusses the risk sensitivity property and the worse alternative property, 
and section 24 the relations between these properties and other properties like 
independence of irrelevant alternatives and individual monotonicity. In sec­
tion 25, the twist sensitivity and slice properties are introduced, and a re­
lation with risk sensitivity established. Most results until section 26 hold 
for games where every Pareto optimal outcome is riskless : in section 26, the 
case where a Pareto optimal outcome may be attainable only by a lottery, is 
considered. Until section 27, the main question of chapter 8 is : which are 
the effects on the solution outcome if a player in a bargaining game is repla­
ced by a more risk averse player ? Section 27 briefly touches the strategical 
question whether it may be advantageous for a player to pretend to be more or 
less risk averse, if that is allowed by the rules of the game. The so-called 
b-monotonicity property, introduced in section 13, plays a central role here. 
Chapter 9 extends some of the results of chapters 4, 5, and θ, to 
the η-person case. In section 28, the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
property is considered, in section 29 the individual monotonicity property, and 
in section 30, risk properties for η-person bargaining solutions are studied. 
The concluding chapter 10 contains only one section (31), which gives, in some 
diagrams, an overview of the main relations between properties of bargaining 
solutions, as established in this monograph. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UTILITY THEORY 
We review and modify some results in utility theory needed elsewhere in 
this monograph. In section 4, we consider von Neumann - Morgenstern utility 
functions, in section 5 a measure of risk aversion which we need when we stu­
dy risk properties of bargaining solutions. The result of section 6 on addi­
tive utility will be applied in chapter 6, especially section 17; and the re­
sult of section 7 on multiplicative utility will be used in section 12. One 
may postpone reading sections 5 - 7 until reference is made to these sections. 
4. VON NEUMANN - MORGENSTERN UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Let L be an arbitrary nonempty set (of decisions, strategies, alternati­
ves, prospects, commodity bundles, . . . ) . A preference relation > on L is a 
binary relation on L which is complete, i.e. m > к or к > m for all к,m £ L, 
and transitive. We denote m > к if not к > m, and к » m if к > m and m > к, 
for all к,m € L. For m,к € L, we pronounce m > к as : к is not preferred to m; 
m > к as : m is preferred to k; m и к as : m and к are equivalent. (Indeed ra 
is an equivalence relation.) 
The situation prevailing in this monograph is that L = L(A) is the set of 
probability measures with finite support on a nonempty set A. A typical ele­
ment of L(A) is denoted 
1 ? n 
£ = [p,;a ,p0;a ,.,.,ρ ;a ] = [p ;a ] 
1 ¿ η 1 1=1 
η 
where η ε W, a £ A and ρ > 0 for every ι = l,2,...,n, Σ ρ = 1. Of cour­
se, Í. is the lottery which results with probability 
Σ ] ι ρ in a , for every ι = l,2,...,n. With Я as above, we shall also j:a - a j 
use the notation [...,q; £,...] for [...»qp-.-a ,qp ;a ,...,qp ;a , . . . ] . Fur-
ther, by writing [l;a] for a £ A, we have А с L(A). 
We call L(A) the lottery set of A. Elements of A are called riskless 
alternatives, elements of L(A)\A risky alternatives. 
Let U (A) denote the family of all functions u : A -»It. For 
î- = [p ;a ] 6 L(A) and u ε U(A) , we denote by Eu(¿) := Σ _ ρ u(a ) the ex­
pected utility of Í (under n). Let > be a preference relation on L(A). 
9 
Under certain conditions on >, it can be proved (see, e.g., Herstem and 
Milnor (1953)) that there exists a function u in U(A) such that 
(4.1) i > m *» EuOÜ.) > Eu(m) for all l,m E L(A) 
and moreover 
(4.2) if (4.1) is also satisfied with ν £ U(A) in the role of u, then there 
are α,β £ В with a > 0 such that v(a) = au(a) + β for all a £ A. 
A function u € U(A) satisfying (4.1) and (4.2) is called a von Neumann -
Morgenstern (vNM) utility function (for >, or : representing >). in this 
monograph, utility functions will, in most cases, be assumed to be of the 
vNM-type. 
We conclude this section with a simple example which links the present 
section to the following one. Let A = [0,1] с к , and let u £ U(A) be defined 
by u:x •* \Лх". Then 
и ф = ì \Л2" > j = Еи(фо,|;1]), 
so an individual with this vNM-utility function и prefers obtaining у (e.g., 
dollar) with certainty to a lottery in which he has a 50 % chance of obtaining 
0 and a 50 % chance of obtaining 1. This kind of preference is exhibited by 
a risii averse individual. In the following section we will discuss a related 
concept : the relation on U(A) called more risk averse than. 
5. RISK AVERSION 
Suppose, an individual may choose between receiving $ 5 for certain, and 
a lottery ticket which gives him $ 10 or nothing both with a fifty percent 
chance. An individual that is called risk averse (-neutral, -loving, respec­
tively) in literature, will prefer the dollars (be indifferent, prefer the 
lottery ticket, respectively). 
Here, we are not so much interested in some absolute measure of risk 
aversion of a decision maker, but rather we look for a way to compare the 
aversion to risk of two decision makers. We shall introduce a relation more 
risk averse, and derive a mathematical characterization of this relation. 
Pioneering work in the area of risk aversion was done by Arrow (see 
Arrow (1971)) and Pratt (1964). Other important contributions are Yaari 
(1969) and Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). 
We shall follow Yaan's approach with a minor - but for our purposes 
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important - modification. Further, our characterization theorem (characte-
rizing the relation more risk averse) is more general than the characteri-
zations usually found in the literature, since it does not need to assume 
any continuity or differentiability properties of the utility functions, and 
(hence) no topological or algebraic structure on the set of alternatives. 
In this section, A will always be a nonempty set of alternatives, with 
corresponding lottery set L(A). 
Definition 5.1. (i) For u Ç. U(A) and a £ A, we call the set 
Ρ (a) := U С L(A) : Eu(A) > u(a)} 
u 
the preference set of u with respect to a. 
(11) Let u,v £ U(A). We call (the decision maker with utility function) ν 
more risk averse than (the decision maker with utility function) u (notation : 
vMRu) if Ρ (а) с ρ (a) for every a 6 A. 
v u 
As to (i) of Def. 5.1, we note that for α,β € К with a > 0, we have 
Ρ „(a) = P (a) for every a £ A, so preference sets are independent of the 
au+¡3 u 
particular representation chosen (cf. (4.2)). Hence also the relation MR 
above is independent of the chosen representations u and v. Def. 5.1 (n) is 
a small modification of the definition proposed by Yaari (1969), who uses so-
called acceptance sets A (a) := {2 € L(A) : Еи(Л) Й u(a)} instead of preferen­
ce sets Ρ (a) . The reason for this modification is, that ( m ) of the follow­
ing lemma would not hold with acceptance sets instead of preference sets in 
the definition of MR. 
Lemma 5.2. Let u,v € U(A) with vMRu, and a,b £ A. Then : 
(i) if v(b) > v(a) , then u(b) > u(a), 
(ii) if u(a) á u(b), then v(a) i v(b) , 
(in) if u(a) = u(b), then v(a) = v(b) . 
Proof. Suppose v(b) > v(a) . Then b £ Ρ (a) <z Ρ (a) . So u(b) > u(a) . 
(n) follows immediately from (i) . For (in) , we note that (i) implies : if 
v(a) И v(b) , then u(a) φ u(b)." 
The following definition extends the concept of concavity of a function. 
11 
We need that extension in the characterization theorem of MR. 
о 
Definition 5.3. Let Τ be a nonempty subset of Η (ί. Ε Ν) . We call a function 
к : τ -» дк concave if 
for any convex combination Σ . ρ t of elements of Τ which is itself an 
1=1 ^ i 
element of T. 
Lemma 5.4. Let Τ с В, and к : Τ -» Ж nondecreasing and concave. Let 
Σ ρ t be a convex combination of elements of T, not necessarily in T, and 
let t € Τ be such that Σ ™ p ^ 1 S t. Then we have Σ ° ρ kit1) S k(t) . 
Proof. If t i t for every i, then the proof is finished by nondecreasingness 
of k. Otherwise, w.l.o.g. t > t. Take 0 < λ < 1 such that 
Xt + (1-λ)Σ _ ρ t = t. By concavity of к, we obtain 
k(t) i Aktt1) + (1-λ)Σ ™ p^ktt1). So 
Σ ° Pjkit1) < (kitì-Xki^ììd-X)'1, 
which implies Σ P.k(t ) й k(t) because, by nondecreasingness of k, 
kit1) > k(t) .• 
If vMRu for ν and u in U(A) , then, in view of Lemma 5.2 (in) , we can 
define the function к : u(A) -» R by k(u(a)) = v(a) for every a £ A. This 
fact will be used in the following theorem, which is the announced characteri-
zation theorem. 
Theorem 5.5. Let u,v € U(A). The following two assertions are equivalent : 
(i) vMRu 
(n) The function к : u(A) -» В with k(u(a)) = v(a) for every a £ A, is well-
defined, nondecreasing, and concave. 
Proof. (a) Suppose that (i) holds. Then the function к in (ii) is well-
defined and nondecreasing by ( m ) and (ii) , respectively, of Lemma 5.2. It 
remains to be shown that к is concave. Let u(a) be the convex combination 
Σ ρ u(a ) of u(a ),u(a ),...,u(a ) £ u(A). We have to prove that 
k(u(a)) Ì Σ m. ρ Mula1)) 1=1 r ι 
or that 
v(a) 2 Σ
ι
™ 1ρ ιν( 3
1) = Е ([р
і
;а
1]
і
°1), 
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If v(a) < Ev([p /a1] ), then [p ;a ] _ £ Ρ (а) с ρ (a), which implies the 
contradiction 
u(a) < Eu([p ;a ] _ ) = Σ ρ u(a ) = u(a) . 
So к is concave, and (11) holds. 
(b) Suppose that (11) holds. We want to show that 
Ρ (а) с Ρ (a) for every a £ A. Let a £ A and I = [p .-а1] Ш. ξ. L(A) . 
v u 1 і=1 
If we have Eu(i.) £ u(a), then, by Lemma 5.4, we also have 
Ev(Ä) = Σ ™ ρ vía1) = Σ "j ρ Muta1)) < k(u(a)) = v(a) . 
In other words, Л £ Ρ (а) •» Ι Ι Ρ (a) , or Ρ (а) с P
u
(a) . • 
In Peters and Tijs (19Θ1), Theorem 5.5 (see Theorem 3.2 there) was 
proved by using, in part (b) of the proof, an extension of the function к to 
conv(u(A)). This extension could easily be shown to exist since the set A 
was assumed to be a compact subset of It and attention was restricted to con­
tinuous elements of U(A). 
Theorem 5.5 states that if a utility function ν is more risk averse than 
a utility function u, then ν = к о u where к is a nondecreasing concave func­
tion on u(u). It will sometimes simplify presentation, in the sequel, if we 
have к defined on conv(u(A)) (= {EU(Î.) : % € L(A) }) . We shall prove that the 
function к : u(A) -» Ж can be extended to a function к : conv(u(A)) -+R, also 
without requiring compactness of A or continuity of u. This result will 
follow as a corollary of Lemma 5.6 below. (Actually, we do not need that lem­
ma in such a general form, since, in the sequel, we will nevertheless assume 
I 
compactness of А с Ж and continuity of u.) 
Lemma 5.6. Let Τ с Ж, Τ И 91 and let к : Τ -» Ж be a nondecreasing, concave, 
function. Then there exists a nondecreasing concave function к : conv(T) -» Ж 
л, 
such that k(t) = k(t) for all t £ T. 
Proof. Let M be the family of functions f : conv(T) -» Ж that are nondecreasing, 
concave, and have f(t) ä k(t) for every t Ç. T. For every t € Τ except the small­
est t (if that exists) we will construct a g € M with g (t) = k(t). Then we 
% t 
take for the function к the pointwise infimum of the functions in M, except for 
the smallest element t (if it exists) where we define k(t) := k(t). This func-
tion к has the required properties, as is elementarily verified. We still have 
to construct the functions g . 
If Τ has a maximum t, then g-(x) := k(t) for every χ £ conv(T). Let now t £ τ, 
such that there are s, s' in Τ with s < t < s' . Let f be the affine function 
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with f (s) = k(s) and f(t) = k(t). The concavity of к implies that f (ρ) ^ k(p) 
for every ρ in Τ with p ä t . Then let g be the affine function with 
g (t) = k(t) and with slope equal to the infimum of the slopes of all affine 
functions f which have f(t) = k(t) and f(ρ) ä к(ρ) for every ρ in Τ with 
ρ È t. (Such a function f exists, namely f = f, and also the mfimum exists 
because 0 is lower bound for all those slopes, in view of the nondecreasing-
ness of k.) Then by definition we have g (Ρ) ä k(p) for every ρ in Τ with 
ρ δ t.Suppose there is a Ρ < t with g (Ρ) < k(P). Let f be the affine func­
tion with f(P) = M P ) and f(t) = k(t). Then the slope of f is smaller than 
the slope of g whereas, by the concavity of k, f(ρ) ä к(ρ) for all ρ in Τ 
with P ä t . From this contradiction we conclude that g (Ρ) S k(p) also for 
all ρ in Τ with ρ < t, so g € M. • 
Corollary 5.7. For u € U(A) and к : u(A) -» TR nondecreasing and concave, there 
exists a k:conv(u(A)) -»Ж nondecreasing and concave, such that 
K(u(a)) = k(u(a)) for every a € A. 
6. ADDITIVE UTILITY 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 231), following Fishburn (1965), give a 
necessary and sufficient condition under which a von Neumann - Morgenstern 
utility function on the Cartesian product of two sets of alternatives, can be 
written as a scaled sum of coordinate utility functions. In this section, we 
shall modify this result for the case where these coordinate utility functions 
represent given preference relations. The motivation for including this re-
sult is, that it provides a utility-theoretic foundation for additivity pro-
perties of bargaining bolutions, in chapter 6. The result was published as 
Peters (19Θ5). 
In order to specify the problem we deal with in this section, let A and 
В be non-empty sets of alternatives, and let С := Α χ В be the Cartesian pro­
duct of these sets. L(A), L(B), and L(C) denote the corresponding lottery 
sets. Let > be a preference relation on L(C) representable by a vNM utility 
function w : С -*H.. Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 231) show that under the 
assumption of additive independence for > (see below) we can write 
w = k w . + к w_ where k. and к are positive constants and w„ and w_ are A A B B A B ^ A B 
14 
induced vNM utility functions on A and B. We shall modify this result for the 
case where w and w represent given preference relations on L(A) and L(B). 
Let now А, В and С be as above, and let >.*>„» and > be preference rela­
tions on L(A), L(B), and L(C), respectively. We assume : 
(6.1) Any preference relation occuring m this section is representable by a 
vNM utility function. 
We introduce a weaker version of the additive independence property 
(cf. Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 230)). Our version is weaker since we con­
sider only lotteries with probabilities —. 
(6.2) For all (a,b) and (a'jb') in C, we have : 
[j;(a,b),!-;(a\b·)] <*, 
(Additive independence) 
),!;( [j; (a,b ' ) ,|(а· ,b) ] . 
We shall show that a decision maker with an additively independent > is 
indifferent between a lottery over С in which he receives a £ A with proba­
bility ρ (i=l,2, ... ,οι) and, independently, b € В with probability 
ρ (]=1,2,...,m); and the simultaneous distribution in which he receives 
^ v.
1
, ....-г. w.w4i,t.. _ . . - r_ _ .,,
1
 W 3 M m _
 r
_ ,i ^ 1
ч 1 m (а\Ь х)] 
ι=Γ 
(a ,b ) with probabili y ρ : i.e., [ρ ρ ;(a ,b )] « [p ; 
(6.3) [р
і
;(а 1 /Ь
1)]
і
™ 1 
г 2 , 1 . 1. 2 , m m
 v
 1 1 .^ m m , 
= [p1 , (a ,b ) , . . . , p m ,-(a ,b ) »pj ΐ.^ р^ ; (a ,Ь ) , . .. /p m Σ^^ρ ; (a ,Ь )] 
г 2 , 1 . 1 , 2 , m , m4 rl 1 1 1 , 2 . 2V , 
= Lp1 ;(a ,b ) ,...,pm ; (a ,b ) ,2p1p2;L-; (a ,b ) ,j; (a ,b )], 
^ w* r 1 / 1 ι I4 1 / 3 , 3. τ _
л
 „ ri . 1 , 1 % 1 . m , m, Ί 2 р 1 Р 3 ! ^ І г ( а ' ' '"2 ; ( а ' )]f •••.2Р1Рш;[2-;(а ,b ) ,-·, (a ,b ) ] , 
2P2P3;[};(a
2
,b2),i;(a3,b3)] 2 ? ^ ^ ; [ì; (a"1"1 .Ъ^1) ,|; (am,bm) ] ] 
«
c
 [Ρ 2 ; (a1 .b1) , . .. , P
m
2
 ; (am,bm) , 2 ? ^ ; [{; (аЧь 2) ¿; (a 2^ 1) ], . . . , 
2 Pm-l Pm ; [2 ; C a ' b ) ' 2 ; ( a ' b ) ] ] 
- [P.P ; (aV)! In ,. 
In (6.3), the "га "-step follows from additive independence of > and (6.1) , 
and the other steps follow from elementary properties of lotteries. 
The second condition we need, relates > to > and > . 
C A B 
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(6.4) There exists a (a0,b0) £ С such that for all [p ;a ] and 
[q ;a 1] i" 1ln L(A) , and all [p î b 1 ] ^ and [qj^îb1]^^^ in L(B) , 
we have : 
г i, m ^
 r
 ^ і , η η , ι , о . m
 r
 ,^ι . ».ι η 
I pi' a ]i=l ^ i ' · ^ = 1 * [ p i ; ( a ' b ^ і ^ ^ Ч ' · * 3 ' b )]i=l 
and 
[ p i ; b Зі=1 > в [ ч і , Ь ]i=l"* [ p i ; ( a ' b ^ i V V 1 * ' b ) ]ι = Γ 
(f/eafe monotoniaity) 
The main result of this section is the following variation on Theorem 
5.1. in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
Theorem 6.1. Let A,B, and C=AxB, be sets of alternatives and > , > , and > , 
preference relations on the corresponding lottery sets, representable by vNM 
utility functions. Let A and В each contain at least two non-equivalent ele­
ments. Then the following two statements are equivalent. 
(i) > satisfies additive independence, and > , > , and > , satisfy weak 
monotomcity. 
(n) There are vNM utility functions u,v, and w, for > , > , and > , respec-
A В С 
tively, and positive constants к and к , such that w(a,b) = к u(a) + к v(b) 
u ν u ν 
for all (a,b) 6 C. 
Proof. The implication (n) — (i) is straightforward. For (i) •» (n) , let 
a" and b° be as in (6.4) , and take a € A and b € В such that a <¡i a" and 
b çà b". Choose vNM utility functions u,v, and w, for > , > , and > , respec-
tively, such that u(a0) = v(b°) = w(a°,b0) = 0 (cf. (4.2)). By weak monotom-
city, w(a,b°) and u(a) must have the same sign, so к := w(a,b°)u(a) > O.Also, 
- -1 u 
к := w(a0,b)v(b) > 0. By additive independence of > we have for every (a,b) EC 
|w(a,b) +-|w(a0,b°) = j w (a,b0) + | w (a» ,b) , hence w(a,b) = w(a,b0) + w(a0 ,b) . 
The proof is complete if we show : w(a,b0) = к u(a) and w(a°,b) = к v(b) for 
every а С A, b £ B. We only prove the first equality, we let a ε A, and dis­
tinguish three cases : (a0,b0)> (a,b0) and (a,b0)> (a,b0) ; 
(а,Ь°)>
с
(а,Ь°) and ( a ^ " » (а^Ь·) ; ( а ^ Ч м Д ц ; û,b°) , ( 1-μ) ; (a0 ,b°) ] fora 
(unique) 0 < μ < 1 (where such a y exists since > is representable by w ) . 
We only consider the third case, the other ones are similar. In that third 
case, (a,b0) «, [μ,· (a,b°) , ( l-μ) ; 
monotomcity, hence u(a) = yu(a), 
 1 (a" ,b°) ] implies a ra [μ;3, ( l-μ) ;a0] by weak 
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So w(a,b°) = Uwtajb") = u(a)u(a) w(a,b0) = к u(a), which we set out to prove. 
Remark 6.2. Of course, in view of (4.2), we can always rescale u and ν in 
Theorem 6.1 such that к - к = 1 . If, in particular, we would have 
u ν . 
u(a) = v(b) and (а,Ь0) и (a0,b) in the proof of Theorem 6.1, then к = к , 
and we may set к = к = 1. 
u ν 
Theorem 6.1 and Remark 6.2 will be used In chapter 6, section 17. 
MULTIPLICATIVE UTILITY 
As in section 6, let A,B, and С := Α χ В, be sets of alternatives, with 
corresponding lottery sets L(A), L(B) and L(C), respectively, and preference 
relations > , > , and > , on these lottery sets. In this section, we shall 
give necessary and sufficient conditions under which a vNM utility function 
for > can be written as a (multiplicative) product of vNM utility functions 
for > and > . Again, our result is a variation on a result obtained by 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976), namely their Theorem 5.2 (see also their section 
5.4.3); it was also presented, in a slightly different form, by Binmore (1982), 
and it will be used in section 12 where we give an extension of an axiomatic 
bargaining model presented in the last mentioned paper. 
Let A,B,C,... be as in the first paragraph. We again assume that > , 
>, and > , are representable by vNM utility functions. We formulate two con-
B С 
ditions for > ,> , and > . 
А В С 
(7.1) If [ р ^ а 1 ] ^ «
д
 t ^ . - a 1 ] ^ in L(A) , and 
[ r ^ - b 1 ] ^ raB [s ;b
1] 1f 1 In L(B), then 
[p i V(a ,b
])] i = b D = 1« c [q^Ha ,b J ] ^ ^ «HO. 
(Weak utility independence) 
Condition (7.1) is a weaker version of the "Utility Independence" proper­
ty in Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 224). 
(7.2) There exist a £ A and b £ В such that, for all 3,3' € A and bfb' € B, 
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we have : a >,a, b > Ь , (a,b) sa (a,b'), and (a,b) и (а',Ь) . Further­
more, there exist a* € A and b* £ В such that a* > â, b* > b, and 
(a*,b*) > c (¡,b). 
The first part of (7.2) requires that A and В both have "worst" alterna­
tives, which make all combinations in С in which they occur, equivalent. The 
"furthermore"-part of (7.2) serves to avoid tnvality. 
With these conditions, we can state and prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.1. With notations as in the first paragraph of this section, and 
under the assumption of the second paragraph, the following two statements 
are equivalent. 
(i) (7.1) and (7.2) hold. 
(n) There exist vNM utility functions w,u, and v, for > , > , and > , respec­
tively, and a,a* € A, b,b* £ B, such that for all a € A and b £ В we have : 
w(a,b) = u(a)v(b)> 0, u(ä)=v(b)= 0, u(a*)> 0, v(b*)> 0. 
Proof. The implication (n) -» d) is straightforward. For (i) •» (n) , let 
a,b,a*,b* be as in (7.2). Let w,u,v be vNM utility functions for > , > , > , 
such that : u(ä) = v(b) = w(ä,b) = 0, and w(a*,b*) = u(a*)v(b*) > 0. Let 
a £ A, b £ B. The proof is finished if we show : w(a,b) = u(a)v(b). 
We first calculate w(a,b*). There are two cases : a sa [y;a,(l-μ);a*] for some 
0 £ μ £ 1; and a* » [μ;3,(l-μ);a] for some 0 < μ < 1. We only consider the 
first case, the second one is similar. In that case, by (7.1), we have 
w(a,b*) = Ew([y;(ä,b*),(1-μ);(а*,Ь*)]), so in view of (7.2) : 
w(a,b*) = (l-p)w(a*,b*) = ( 1-U)u(a*) v(b*) =u(a)v(b*). 
Finally, we calculate w(a,b). Again : either b » [y;b,(l-μ);b*] for some 
В 
0 ¿ μ S 1; or b* « [μ,-Ε, (l-μ) ;b] for some 0 < μ < 1. And again, we only con-
В 
sider the first case. Then, by (7.1), we have 
w(a,b) = Ew(U; (a,b) , (l-μ) ,- (a,b*) ]) , so 
w(a,b) = (l-u)w(a,b*) = ( l-μ) u (a) v(b*) =u(a)v(b)." 
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CHAPTER 3 
BARGAINING SITUATIONS, GAMES, SOLUTIONS 
This chapter introduces three basic concepts : bargaining situations (in 
section 8), bargaining games (in section 9), and bargaining solutions (in sec­
tion 10). These concepts will be defined for the general η-person case. 
8. BARGAINING SITUATIONS 
Bargaining situations may arise in case of a conflict between several 
parties, such that unanimity is required in order to solve the conflict. In 
what follows, η € M with η ä 2, always denotes the number of such parties 
(players) . 
Definition 8.1. An n-person Ьагдагпгпд situation is an (n+2)-tuple 
I := < A,a,u ,u ,...,u > 
where 
(8.1) A is a compact subset of К , for some m Ε К, 
(8.2) for every ι = 1,2,...,n, u is a continuous element of U(A), 
(8.3) а С A such that u (a) = 0, and there exists an Í. € L(A) with 
EuNil) > 0, for all ι = l,2,...,n. 
As before, A is called the set of riskless alternatives. Compactness of 
A and continuity of the u are required for the convenience of u(A) being a 
compact subset of Ж : cf. the next section. Here, we denote by u the n-tuple 
(u ,u , .. . ,u ) , so u (A) = { (u (a) ,u (a) , . . . ,u (a) ) : a € A } . The element a 
is called the disagreement alternative. 
The game-theoretic interpretation of an η-person bargaining situation 
Г = <A,a,u ,u ,...,u > is as follows. There are η players or bargainers, 
called 1,2,...,n, bargaining over the lottery set L(A). They may either reach 
an agreement I € L(A) , giving utility Eu ( Î.) to player i, or fail to do so, 
which is the case if no unanimous decision on some lottery can be attained : 
in other words, each player has a veto right. In the latter case, the bargai-
ning situation ends in the disagreement (or status quo) alternative a, giving 
utility 0 = u (a) to player i. Every u is considered to be a von Neumann -
Morgenstern utility function (for some preference relation on L(A)) normalized 
such that u (a) = 0 (cf. section 4, esp. (4.2)). The second part of condition 
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(Θ.3) is included to give each player an incentive to cooperate. 
We collect a few useful notations in : 
Definition 8.2. By BS , we denote the family of all η-person bargaining 
2 
situations. We shall often use BS instead of BS . Finally, we denote by N 
the set of players {l,2,...,n}. 
We conclude this section with a few examples. 
Example .З. Two players are bargaining over a bottle of wine which must 
remain closed, that is, divisions of the content of the bottle are not allowed. 
To each player, [not] obtaining the bottle represents a utility of l[0]. 
Disagreement means, that no player gets the bottle. This situation can be 
- 1 2 
modelled as a 2-person bargaining situation Γ = <A,a,u ,u > where : 
A = {(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)} with (1,0) [(0,1)] the alternative that player l[2] 
1 - 2 -
gets the bottle; a = (0,0) the disagreement alternative; u (a) = u (a) = 
^((0,1)) = u2((l,0)) = 0 and ^((1,0)) = u2((0,l)) = 1. 
Example 8.4. We consider the same situation as in Example 8.3, but now with 
any division of the content of the bottle of wine allowed. Each player's 
utility is assumed to be proportional to the amount of wine that player obtains. 
- 1 2 
So this situation can be described by Γ = "¿Α,α,α ,u > € BS where : 
A = {a} U {(x,l-x):x£ [0,1]} with (x,l-x) meaning that player 1 (respectively 
1 - 2 -
2) gets lOOx(respectively 100-100x) percent of the wine; u (a) = u (a) = 0 and 
1 2 
u ((x,l-x)) = u ((l-x,x)) = χ for every χ ζ [0,1]. 
Example 8.5. We consider the same situation as in Example 8.4, but with the 
1 - 2 - 1 
players' utility functions now satisfying : u (a) = u (a) = 0, u ((x,l-x)) = χ 
9 
and u ((l-x,x)) = fx for every χ € [0,1]. 
Examples 8.3 - 8.5 will return in the following section. 
BARGAINING GAMES 
For a non-empty set S e n , we call 
com(S) := {x £ Ю : χ £ s for some s £ s} 
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the comprehensive hull of S. We call S comprehensive if S = com(S). Further, 
comv(S) := com(conv(S)) is called the comprehensive convex hull of S. (It is 
not hard to prove that com (conv(S)) = conv(com(S)).) 
A "bargaining game" may arise as the comprehensive hull of the image in 
expected utility space of the set of lotteries in a bargaining situation, or, 
equivalently, as the comprehensive convex hull of the image in utility space 
of the set of nskless alternatives in a bargaining situation. First, however, 
we give the general definition. As before, η ξ. U, η ä 2. 
Definition 9.1. An η-person bargaining game S is a convex closed comprehensive 
subset of К which has a strictly positive element and for which maxi s : s € s} 
exists for every ι £ U. 
Elements of S are called outcomes, and 0 is called the disagreement out­
come or disagreement point. The game-theoretic interpretation of a bargaining 
game S is similar to the interpretation of a bargaining situation in the pre­
vious section. Closedness and comprehensiveness of S are required mainly for 
mathematical convenience; comprehensiveness, moreover, can be interpreted as 
the possibility of free disposal of utility. An explanation of the convexity 
of S is given by the possibility of an underlying bargaining situation, as will 
become clear in what follows. 
As in Nash (1950), where bargaining games were introduced, it is often 
assumed in the bargaining literature, that Ξ is compact. For most of the re­
sults in this monograph, it would not make any essential difference if compact­
ness of a bargaining game were required instead of comprehensiveness; if, ne­
vertheless, that does make an important difference, then we will explicitly 
ijiention it. 
Another deviation from the standard definition of a bargaining game is, 
that we always take the origin as disagreement outcome; the reason for this 
will become clear in the next section, where we discuss bargaining solutions. 
Definition 9.2. By В we denote the family of all η-person bargaining games. 
2 
We will often write В instead of В . 
The following definition assigns a bargaining game to each bargaining 
situation. 
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Definition 9.3. Let I = <A,a,u ,u , . . . ,u > € ΒΞ . We call 
S
r
 := com(Eu(L(A))) = comv(u(A)) the bargaining game corresponding to Γ. 
(Recall that u = (u ,u ,...,u ).) 
Note that, indeed, S- £ В (since, in particular, u(A) CB. is compact) . 
Conversely, for each bargaining game there is a bargaining situation to which 
it correponds, as the next example shows. First, we give a few definitions. 
Definition 9.4. For every ι £ N, the function π : К -» В is defined by 
π (x) := χ for each χ £ Ж . So ir is the projection on the i-th coordinate. 
Definition 9.5. For every non-empty set S e n , we denote by 
P(S) := {s £ S : if χ £ S and χ > s, then χ = s} 
the Pareto optimal subset of S. 
(Note that, if S £ В , then P(S) is bounded because maxis : s £ s} exists for 
every ι £ N.) 
Example 9.6. Let S £ В . The trivial bargaining situation corresponding to S 
is the bargaining situation Г = <A,a,u ,u ,. . . ,u > where 
A := {0} UcUP(S)), 5 = 0 En", u1(a) = тг^а) = a for every ι £ N and a £ A. 
ι 
(By "cl" we denote (topological) closure.) 
The following three examples correspond to Examples 8.3 - 8.5. 
Example 9.7. Consider the 2-person bargaining situation Г as defined in 
Example 8.3. Then S- = comv({(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)}). 
Example 9.8. Consider Г £ BS as in Example 8.4. Then 
Sr = comv({(0,0),(l,0),(0,l)}). 
Example 9.9. Consider Г £ BS as m Example 8.5. Then 
Sp = com({(x/ 1-х) : 0 S χ û l}) . 
Definition 9.10. Let S £ в". We call 
3S = W(S) := {s £ S : there is no χ £ S with X > s} 
the boundary or weakly Pareto optimal subset of s. We call g(s) £ H n with 
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g (S) := maxís : s € s} for every ι € Ν, the global utopia point of S. We 
denote S := com(S П F ), and call h(S) := g(S ) the utopia point of S. By 
В , we denote the family of η-person bargaining games S with S = S . We write 
2 
also В instead of В . 
+ + 
Definition 9.11. For every ι Ç. N, the function π : К -» К is defined by 
χ μ
* (Х./Х.,,...,* . , χ . , . , . , χ ) . 
1 ¿ 1-1 1+1 η 
Definition 9.12. Let S G В . For every ι € Ν, the Pareto function 
fq : ^- (s> = ^77- t s' : s £ S} -»В is defined by 
π (s) ι-> maxi χ :(s.,S-,...,s .,χ ,s .,...,s ) € Ξ } . 
-ι ι 1 2 i-l ι i+l η 
Some properties of Pareto functions are collected in the following lemma, 
the proof of which is elementary and left to the reader. 
Lemma 9.13. Let S € В . Then : 
(ι) For every ι € N, f is a concave function. 
(n) The union of the graphs of the functions f is equal to 3s = W(S). 
(in) The intersection of the graphs of the functions f is equal to P(S). 
1 2 (iv) If n=2, then f and f are nonmcreasing functions. 
10. BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 
In the bargaining literature, an η-person bargaining game S € В is 
sometimes called a "bargaining problem", see for instance Nash (1950) (for 
n=2). Let us use the expression "bargaining problem" for the following pro­
blem : which agreement (outcome) will or should the players in a bargaining 
game S reach, if any ? Nash (1950) proposed to consider not each bargaining 
game separately, but to look at the family of all bargaining games (2-person, 
in his case). Formally : 
Definition 10.1. Let С с вп, η ^  2. An (η-person) bargaining solution for 
(or : on) С is a map φ : С -»E with φ (S) € S for every S € С . 
As far as the context allows and confusion is unlikely we will use the 
expressions : η-person bargaining solution, bargaining solution, (n-person) 
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solution, and omit "for С " whenever it is clear which class is meant. 
We always - by definition - take the origin as disagreement outcome of a 
bargaining game. Alternatively, we could have considered only "translation 
invariant" bargaining solutions in this monograph. This "translation inva­
riance" property is part of a property often called "independence of equivalent 
utility transformations (IEUT)" (see, e.g. Roth (1979)); the latter property 
reflects (4.2) in case the use of vNM utility functions is assumed. The other 
part of "IEUT" is the so-called "scale transformation invariance" property 
(see Def. 10.5 below), which will frequently be used in this monograph. 
Definition 10.2. Let С с: в . We denote by CS с BS the family of bargaining 
situations Г in BS such that S
r
 € С . For instance, if С = Β , then 
B
+
s
n
 = {r e Bs n : s
r
 e в^}. 
Definition 10.3. Let φ be a solution for С с В . We call the map φ : CS -»Ж 
defined by ф(Г) := ф(З
г
), the bargaining situation solution corresponding to φ. 
Mostly, we write φ instead of φ. We further denote, for 
Γ = <A,a,u ,u ,...,u > £ CS : 
(10.1) а Ш ф , Г ) := il £ L(A) : EuU) = ф(Г)} 
and we call this set the set of ^-alternatives of Г. 
Thus, we let a bargaining situation solution depend exclusively on the 
bargaining game corresponding to a bargaining situation. In the larger part 
of this monograph, we only consider bargaining games. Bargaining situations 
become important especially when we study risk properties of solutions, in 
chapter 8 and in section 30. Abstracting from underlying bargaining situations 
a. 
as is done in the definition of φ above, may lead to "paradoxes" : we refer, 
in particular, to Shapley (1969). As a final remark concerning Def. 10.3, we 
note that the set of φ-alternatives of Γ may be empty, which is due to the fact 
that Sp is the comprehensive hull of (and hence, larger than) Eu(L(A)). 
In this monograph, we will be mainly concerned with the study of relations 
between properties of bargaining solutions. Some of these properties are fair­
ly standard and frequently used. Therefore we introduce them already here. 
For x,y E H and Τ с К , we denote xy := (x.y, ,x.y-, . .. ,x у ) € Η and 
1 1 2 2 η η 
XT := {xy : у £ Τ}. 
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Definition 10.4. We call a bargaining solution φ : Β -»Η homogeneous if 
Φ(λ3) = λφ(3) for every λ £ R with \ > Ω and every S € ВП. 
(Homogeneity : HOM) 
Definition 10.5. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -» R scale transforma­
tion invariant if ф(а5) = аф(3) for every S С В and every a € Ж . (In this 
context, we call such an a € R a scale transformation .) 
(Scale transformation invariance : STI) 
The STI-property has been mentioned before (see after Def. 10.1) and is a 
natural consequence of the use of vNM utility functions in case underlying bar-
gaining situations are assumed. Homogeneity is implied by scale transforma-
tion invariance. 
Definition 10.6. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -» R weakly Pareto 
optimal if ф(3) e W(S) , Faveto optimal if ф(5) £ P(S) , individually rational 
if φ(3) δ 0, and strongly individually rational if φ(3) > 0, for every S ξ. В . 
(Weak Pareto optimality : WPO; Pareto optimality : PO; individual rationality : 
IR; strong individual rationality : SIR). 
The properties in Def. 10.6 need no further explanation. The final two 
properties we introduce, require a bargaining solution to be independent of 
the identities of the players, in two senses to be specified. Some notations : 
for χ £ R , Τ C R , and a permutation π : Ν -» Ν, we denote 
π χ : = (χ
π(1)'χπ(2) χ π ( η ) ) 3 η α π Τ : = ί π χ : x € τ } · 
Definition 10.7. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -» R anonymous if 
φ (17(3)) = πφ(3) for every S 6 В and every permutation TT of N. We call φ 
syrmetric if φ. (S) = φ.(S) = ... = φ (S) for every symmetric S in Β , i.e. 
1 ¿ η 
every S with S = тг(3) for every permutation IT of N. 
(Anonymity : AN; symmetry : SYM) 
SYM is weaker than AN : 
2 
Example 10.8. Let the 2 -person solution φ : В -» R be defined by : 
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the point in P(S)n Ю where the product x.x, is maximized, if 
+ 1 ¿
 2 
φ(5) := . S £ В is such that aS is symmetric for some a £ R 
2 
the point in Р(3)ПВ with maximal first coordinate, otherwise. 
This φ satisfies IR, PO, STI, SYM, but not AN. 
Nonsymmetric solutions play an important role in this monograph. An 
advantage of the consideration of nonsymmetric solutions is, that, whenever 
external factors exist which enable us to distinguish between the identities 
of the players, we have a theory for such cases at hand. An example of this 
is the market model in section 13. 
All properties in this section are stated for solutions on В . Of course, 
the same properties can, in general, be defined for the restrictions of such 
solutions to subclasses of Β , or for solutions defined only for such sub­
classes. If no ambiguities are likely to arise, we will omit such definitions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES 
AND RELATED PROPERTIES 
Axiomatic bargaining theory started with the paper of Nash (1950) . 
His (2-person) solution concept was later (Harsanyi and Selten (1972)) extend­
ed to a family of nonsymmetnc solutions. In the first section of this chap­
ter (section 11) we shall give a further extension of these results. 
Section 12 provides two other characterizations of the same family of solutions. 
In section 13, a market model is proposed, which, m particular, accounts for 
the nonsymmetry of solutions in this family. The remaining section 14 in this 
chapter gives another model which gives rise to Nash solutions, and briefly 
mentions some literature. 
11. INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES 
Nash (1950) has proposed the following property for 2-person bargaining 
solutions. 
2 
Definition 11.1. We call a 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -+ К independent 
of irrelevant alternatives if for all Ξ and Τ in В with S с τ and φ(Τ) ε S, we 
have φ (S) = φ (Τ) . 
(Independence of irrelevant alternives : IIA) 
Another way to formulate the IIA-property is : if a bargaining game S is 
enlarged to T, then either the solution outcome remains the same, or it becomes 
one of the newly added outcomes. There has been much discussion on this pro­
perty in the literature, some of which has led to the proposal of a new pro­
perty : see section 15. 
Definition 11.2. For S £ В, we denote by p(S) the point in P(S ) with maximal 
first coordinate, and by p(S) the point in P(S ) with maximal second coordinate. 
2 + 
(Note that P(S ) = PÍSJDF .) 
t 2 
Definition 11.3. For every 0 á t á 1, we define the solution N : В -> В as 
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follows. If 0 < t < 1, then, for every S £ Β, N (S) is the unique point of 
P(S ) where the product χ χ is maximized. N (S) and N (S) are the points 
+
 0 -
in P(S ) where χ and χ , respectively, are maximized. So N (S) = p(S) and 
1 + 1 2 1 
N (S) = p(S) for every Ξ € В. We also use the notations D and D for N and 
N , respectively, and call these solutions the player 1 and player 2 dictator 
solutions, respectively. Every solution N is called a {nonsymmetric) Nash 
solution, and the solution N , also denoted N, is called the (symmetrie) Nash 
solution. 
The Nash solution was introduced in Nash (1950). Nash proved the follow­
ing theorem. 
2 
Theorem 11.4. The solution N : В -» К is the unique 2-person bargaining solu­
tion with the properties WPO, STI, SYM, and IIA. 
Of course, in this theorem, the WPO property may be replaced by the 
stronger PO property. The solutions N (t £ (0,1)) were introduced in 
Harsanyi and Selten (1972). 
A proof of the following theorem can be found, e.g., in Roth (1979) . 
2 
Theorem 11.5. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -» H has the properties 
SIR,STI, and IIA, if and only if φ = N for some 0 < t < 1. 
An immediate consequence of Theorem 11.5 is, that SIR, STI, and IIA, 
together imply PO. The following lemma gives a direct proof of this fact. 
2 
Lemma 11.6. Let the solution φ : В -» Ж have the properties SIR, STI, and 
IIA. Then φ is Pareto optimal. 
2 
Proof. Let S € Β,χ E S,χ 2, ф(Б) . Let а € К be such that ax = ф(5) . Such an 
a exists by SIR. Then a £ (1,1) , so aS с S; since ф(5) € aS, we obtain by IIA 
ф(а5) = ф(5), so by STI : a = (1,1). Hence χ = φ(5), from which we conclude 
that φ is Pareto optimal. • 
A consequence of Lemma 11.6 is, that in Theorem 11.4, the WPO property 
may be replaced by SIR. Roth (1977) shows, that if we replace, in Theorem 
11.4, WPO by IR, than there are exactly two solutions satisfying the four 
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properties, namely Ν, and the solution given by the following definition. 
Definition 11.7. The disagreement solution D assigns to every S 6 В the 
disagreement outcome 0. 
More variations on this theme are possible. In chapter 7, we will study 
weakly Pareto optimal (multi)solutions , and also "probabilistic solutions", 
which satisfy some version of the IIA property. In this chapter, we confine 
further attention to the family of solutions characterized in the following 
theorem (cf. de Koster et al. (1983)). 
Theorem 11.8. { Ν : 0 S t i l} is the family of all 2-person bargaining 
solutions for В with the properties IR, PO, STI, and IIA. 
2 t 
Proof. (See Fig. 11.1.) Let φ : В -> В be a 2-person solution. If φ = Ν 
for some 0 S t á 1, then it is straightforward to verify that φ has the four 
properties in the theorem. 
Suppose, now, that φ has these four properties. If φ = N for some 
0 < t < 1, then the proof is finished. So suppose this is not the case, then 
it follows from Theorem 11.5 that φ cannot satisfy SIR. Hence, there must be 
a game S € В such that φ(Ξ) = p(S) with ρ (S) = 0 or φ(5) = p(S) with p,(S) = 0. 
Figure 11.1. 
29 
W.l.o.g. suppose the former is the case (the other case is similar, leading 
to φ = N ). Take χ e S with χ = 0 and χ > 0, and let V := comv({p(S),x}). 
By Н А , ф( ) = p(S) . By STI then, φ(Δ) = (0,1) where Δ := comv({ (1,0) , (0,1) }) ζ В. 
Suppose there exists Τ with φ(Τ) fi ρ (Τ) = Ν (Τ). We derive a contradiction 
and may conclude then that φ = N . Since φ(Τ) / ρ(Τ), we have that 
φ (Τ) < ρ (Τ). Let ζ be the point of intersection with the utility axis for 
player 1 of the straight line through φ(Τ) and (0,p (T)). Let 
W := comv({(0,p2(T)),z}). Then, by STI and φ(Δ) = (0,1), we obtain 
φ(νί) = (0,p2(T)), and hence, by IIA, φ (comv({ (0,p2 (Τ) ) ,φ (Τ) } )) = (Ο,ρ (Τ)). 
On the other hand, also by IIA, φ(comv({(Ο,ρ (Τ)),φ(Τ)})) = φ(Τ), a contradiction 
since φ (Τ) < ρ (Τ). • 
The next section provides two other characterizations of the family of 
nonsymmetric Nash solutions; in each one of them, some other property replaces 
IIA. 
12. INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT EXPANSIONS AND CONVENTION CONSISTENCY 
This section consists of two parts. In the first part, part A, we give 
a characterization of the family of nonsymmetric Nash solutions 
jy := ÍN : 0 Û t й l}, with the aid of a property called "Independence of 
irrelevant expansions". Thereby we extend a result of Thomson (1981). 
In the second part, part B, we give another characterization of W with 
the aid of a property called "Convention consistency" : here, we extend a 
result of Binmore (1982), and apply Theorem 7.1. 
Before starting with part A, we give a lemma which gives a geometric 
characterization of a solution N , for 0 < t < 1. 
Lemma 12.1. Let S ε В, t ξ. (0,1) , ζ e Ρ(Ξ) . Then Ν (S) = ζ if and only if 
the straight line with equation — χ + χ = 1 is a supporting line of S 
at z. 
Proof. Firstly, let N (S) = z. Then ζ is the (unique) point of intersection 
of S and the set H := {x £ R : x. x. Ì z z } (uniqueness of ζ was pre-
assumed, but follows of course from the convexity of S and the strict convexi­
ty of H). So there exists a straight line through ζ separating S and H. The 
equation of this line can be found by implicit differentiation, with the aid of 
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the equation of Эн. 
Secondly, suppose that at some ζ £ Ρ(S) we have a supporting line of S 
with equation as in the lemma. Then, again by differentiating, it follows 
that this line also supports H at z, which implies that χ χ is maximal 
2 t 
on S Π Ж in ζ, and hence ζ = N (S). • 
Shapley (1969) offers an interpretation of the (symmetric) Nash solution 
N = N in termb of a compromise between "maximization of social welfare" and 
"sharing of social profit", which is based on the geometric characterization 
in Lemma 12.1, for t = —. 
Part A : Independence of irrelevant expansions 
For x,y £ К , we denote by x.y the inner product Σ χ у . 
2 
Definition 12.2. (Cf. Fig. 12.1.) We call a solution φ : В -» F independent 
2 
of irrelevant expansions if for every S € В there exists a ρ € F with 
ρ + ρ = 1 such that : 
(ι) p.x = р.ф(З) is the equation of a supporting line of S at ф(3), 
(ii) for all Τ € В with S c Τ and p.x S p.φ(S) for all χ Ε Τ, we have 
φ (Τ) > φ (S). 
(Independence of irrelevant expansions : HE) 
Figure 12.1. 
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We call an Ξ ε В smooth at χ € Эз if S has a unique supporting line at x. 
2 
Lemma 12.3. Let φ : В -»Ж satisfy H E , let S be smooth at ф(3), and let 
Τ £ В with Е С Т and φ(S) € P(T). Then φ(Τ) = φ(3). 
Proof. Because ф(Б) € P(T), the proof is complete if we have shown that (11) 
of Def. 12.2 holds, with p.χ = р.ф(З), where ρ й 0 and ρ + ρ = 1, being the 
equation of the unique supporting line of S at φ(3). Suppose, contrary to 
what we want to prove, that p.t > р.ф(З) for some t ε T. Since t ÇL S and 
φ(Ξ) € P(T), we may suppose w.l.o.g. : t < φ (S), t > φ (S). Let q è О, 
with q + q = 1, such that q.t = q^(S) . Then q > ρ and q < ρ , because 
q2(t2-(^(S)) = д 1(ф 1(8)-і 1) whereas р2(і2-ф(3)) > Pj (ф1 (S) - tj ) . 
A similar argument gives : if χ € Б with χ < φ (S), χ > Ф9(Б) , and 
q.x > д.ф(5), then p.χ > ρ.φ(Ξ), so χ £ S. Hence, if s £ S with q.s > д.ф(8), 
then s > φ (Ξ) and s < φ.(S). Take such an s, say s : this s exists since 
q.x = д.ф(5) cannot be the equation of a supporting line of S. Then there is 
an α > 0 such that as + (l-a)t > ф(5), a contradiction since ф(3) G P(T) and 
as + (l-a)t £ T. • 
Lemma 12.3 shows that, under the additional smoothness assumption, there 
is a close relationship between the formulations of H E and H A . The main 
result of the present part A of this section will be that m Theorem 11.8, 
H E can replace HA. (Thomson (1981) shows the same for Theorem 11.4.) The 
remainder of part A is devoted to the proof of this assertion. We will use 
the notation р(ф,3) for ρ in Def. 12.2. 
2 
Lemma 12.4. Let v,w € Ж with ν ,w > 0 and ν ,w < 0 and such that 0 € int(V) 
where V := comv({v,w}) . Let φ : В -»В be a solution satisfying IR, PO, STI, 
and H E , and such that φ (V) > 0. Let ζ ξ. P(V) , ζ è 0, ζ < φ (V) , and 
у £ int(V) with w < у < 0 and ζ < у . Finally, let Τ := comv({v,z,y}), 
and W := comv({v,u}) where u € P(V) with u. = у . Then ф(Т) = ф( ) = φ (W) . 
Proof. (See Fig. 12.2.) First we show that φ(Τ) = ф( ). 
Suppose that φ (Τ) á ζ . If φ (Τ) < ζ , then, necessarily, ρ (φ,Τ) < ρ.ίφ,ν), 
and if φ(Τ) = ζ, then also ρ (φ,Τ) < ρ (ф, ), since otherwise we would contra-
2 diet H E applied to Τ с v. Now perform the scale transformation а С Ж on V 
such that р(ф,а ) = ρ(φ,Τ) and ζ £ P(aV). It follows that a < 1, and Τ с aV. 
Further, р(ф,Т).х = р(ф,а ).х £ р(ф,а ).ф(Т) for all χ € aV. So by H E , 
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ф(а ) £ ф(Т), hence by STI, аф( ) ä ф(Т), which contradicts a < 1 and 
Ф2( ) < Φ 2(τ). 
So we must have φ (Τ) > ζ , and hence by Lemma 12.3 applied to 
Τ С V : φ(Τ) = ф( ). 
Finally, by Lemma 12.3 applied to Τ с W, we obtain ф(Т) = ф(Я). • 
Figure 12.2. 
Theorem 12.5. Let φ : В -» H be a 2-person bargaining solution. Then φ 
satisfies IR, PO, STI, and HE, if and only if φ € N. 
Proof. First, suppose φ € N. By Theorem 11.8, φ satisfies IR, PO, and STI. 
Take S G B . If φ = Ν , then φ satisfies HE with ρ(φ,5) = (1,0) if N (S) > О 
and with for р(ф,3), e.g., the vector with maximal first coordinate among all 
normal vectors of length 1 of supporting lines of S at N (S), otherwise. 
Analogously for φ = N . If φ = N for some t £ (0,1), then, as a consequence 
of Lemma 12.1, φ satisfies HE with ρ(φ,3) being a multiple of the vector 
(tNjOr^a-tJN^S)" 1). 
Secondly, suppose φ satisfies IR, PO, STI, and HE. In view of Theorem 11.8, 
the proof is complete if we show that φ satisfies HA. So let now S and Τ in 
В with S с τ and φ (Τ) Ç. S. We have to prove : 
(12.1) φ(Ξ) = φ(Τ). 
S u p p o s e , t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t φ(3) ¿ φ ( Τ ) . W . l . o . g . assume φ (S) < φ ( Τ ) . 
We d i s t i n g u i s h two c a s e s : (a) ρ ( φ , Τ ) = ( 1 , 0 ) ; (b) ρ ( φ , Τ ) > 0 ( ρ ( φ , Τ ) = (0 ,1) 
i s e x c l u d e d by P O ) . 
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(a) ρ(φ,Τ) = (1,0). Note that ρ(φ,3) / (1,0). If ρ(φ,3) = (0,1), then take 
x,y £ Ю
+ +
 with x 2 = ф2(5) and φ (S) < x1 < Φ1 (Τ) , y1 - φ^Τ) and 
Φ-, (Τ) < у < φ (S) . (Cf. Fig. 12.3(a).) Then S с comv({x,y} ) . By HE and 
PO applied to Ξ с comv({x,y}), we obtain φ(comv({χ,у})) = χ, hence 
φ (comv({x,y})) < φ (Τ). On the other hand, we can perform a scalp transfor-
mation (l,a ) £ I* with a > 1 on comv({x,y}) such that Τ с ( 1,3.) comv({x,y}) 
and, then, by HE, φ ( ( 1 ,a ) comv({x,y}) ) ä Φ(Τ), contradicting, by STI, 
φ (comv{x,y}) < φ (Τ). 
Next, let ρ(φ,3) > 0. (Cf. Fig. 12.3(b).) Denote by I the straight line 
with equation ρ(φ,3).χ = ρ(φ,5). φ(3), and take points ν and w on this line as 
in Lemma 12.4, and such that S c= V := comv({v,w}) . By HE, ф( ) = ф(3). 
By Lemma 12.4 (interchanging there the roles of the players), we then obtain 
ф(И) = ф( ) = ф(3) where W := comv({w,x}) and χ e A with φ (S) < χ and χ > 0. 
-1 2 
Apply a scale transformation (χ φ (Τ),β.) 6 К on W with a > 1 such that 
Τ с (χ" φ (Τ),a )W. By H E and STI, 
x" φ (Т)ф (W) ä φ. (Τ), hence φ. (W) Ì χ , and so φ (S) ä χ , a contradiction. 
So for the case ρ(φ,Τ) = (1,0), we have proved (12.1). 
(l,a2)x 
(l.a2)y 
Figure 12.3(a) : 
ρ(φ,3) = (0,1) 
Figure 12.3(b) : 
ρ(φ,3) > 0 
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(b) ρ(φ,Τ) > 0. Let now i be the straight line with equation 
ρ(φ,Τ).χ = ρ(φ,Τ). φ(Τ), and choose points ν and w on this Ixne as m Lemma 
12.4, such that Τ с comv({v,w}) =: v. By H E , we obtain ф( ) = ф(Т). 
If ρ(φ,S) = (0,1), then let u be the point of intersection of Я with the straight 
line x 2 = Ф 2(5). (Cf. Fig. 12.4(a).) Then, by H E applied to S с comv({v,u}), 
we obtain φ(comv({v,u})) = u, but this contradicts Lemma 12.4. 
Finally, if ρ(φ,8) > 0, then let ζ be the point of intersection of Í with 
the straight line m with equation ρ(φ,5).χ = ρ(φ,Ξ).φ(3). (Cf. Fig. 12.4(b).) 
Note that ζ < φ (V). Choose y G m as in Lemma 12.4, with y so large that 
S с comv({v,z,y}) (if necessary, we have to rechoose w in order to find an 
appropriate y) . By H E , ф(3) = φ (comv({v,z,y}) ) , so by Lemma 12.4, 
ф(5) = ф( ) = φ (Τ) . 
So also for the case р(ф,Т) > 0, we have proved (12.1). • 
Figure 12.4(a) : ρ(φ,3) = (0,1) Figure 12.4(b) : ρ(φ,3) > 0 
Part В : Convention consistency 
In this part, we show that the IIA-property in Theorem 11.θ (or the IIE-
property in Theorem 12.5) can be replaced by the property of Def. 12.6, below. 
2 
For V,W с ж , we denote by VW the set {vw : ν € V, w £ w} . For S,T Ç. B, we 
2 2 denote by Ξ * Τ the set com( (S П Ж ) (Τ Г) К ) ) . Note that, if S * Τ e В, then 
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s * τ e в . 
2 
De f mit ion 12.6. A bargaining solution φ : В -• К is called аоп епіЪОП 
consistent if φ(S * Τ) = φ(S)φ(Τ) for all S,Τ € В with S * Τ € В . 
(Convention consistency : CC) 
At the end of the present section, we will give an interpretation of this 
property with the aid of the result of section 7. But first we prove the follow­
ing theorem. 
2 
Theorem 12.7. Let φ : В -» Ж be a 2-person bargaining solution. Then φ is 
Pareto optimal and convention consistent, if and only if φ £ N. 
The proof of this theorem is given after the following lemmas. 
2 
Lemma 12.8. Let the bargaining solution φ : В -» H satisfy PO and CC. Then 
φ satisfies IR and STI, and φ(S) = φ(S ) for every S £ В. 
2 
Proof. Let S £ В and a £ Η . Let π
 :
= comv({(1,1)}) € В . Then, by CC and 
PO, ф(аЗ) = ф(аЗ)ф(П) = ф(аБ * О) = ф(з * аР) = аф(5). So STI holds, and fur­
ther, by taking a = (1,1), we obtain ф(3) = ф(3 * •) = ф(з ) : this also im­
plies IR. • 
Lemma 12.9. Let S £ В with h(S) = (1,1). Then there exists a Τ £ В with h(T) = 
(1,1) and S * Τ = comv({(l,0) ,(0,1)}) . 
Proof. Denote by Δ £ В the game comv({(1,0),(0,1)}). Let 
2 
V := {y £ Ж : x.y S 1 for all χ £ S, χ Ì θ}. Then V is convex, V is bounded 
(for every y € V, (1,0).y S 1 and (0,1).y < 1 imply y û (1,1)), and closed 
(V = n x e s x È 0{y £]R^ : x.y < 1}). Further : (1,0),(0,1) £ V, and (α,Ο),(Ο,α) t V 
if α > 1, so Τ := com(V) £ В with h(T) = (1,1). By definition of V, we have 
S * Τ с Δ. We still have to sho* : Δ e s * T. Since (1,0),(0,1) £ S Π Τ, we 
have (1,0),(0,1) £ S * Τ. Let (t,l-t) £ Ρ(Δ) with 0 < t < 1. Then 
(t,l-t) = (ζ,,zi (- ,-^) £ S * Τ where ζ = Nt(S) and (- ,—-) £ Τ in view of 
1 2 Zl Z2 Zl Z2 
Lemma 12.1. So Δ c: S * T. • 
Proof of Theorem 12.7. If φ £ Ν, then one immediately verifies that, besides 
PO, φ satisfies CC. Now suppose φ satisfies PO and CC. Let S £ B. Because 
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φ satisfies STI (Lemma 12.6), we suppose w.l.o.g. that h(S) = (1,1). Then let 
Τ £ В be as in Lemma 12.9, and Δ := comv({(1,0),(0,1)}). If φ(Δ) = (1,0) then 
by CC, φ (3)φ (Τ) = 1, so φ (S) = 1 and hence φ(5) = N (S). Similarly, 
φ(Δ) = (0,1) implies φ(5) = N (S). Let now φ(Δ) = (t,l-t) with 0 < t < 1. If 
χ € S and χ φ N (S), then 
х ^ х ^ Ф ^ Т ^ ф ^ Т ) 1 " * 1 < (Nj(S)N^(T))t(N2(S)N2(T))1"t, hence 
χφ(Τ) Φ (t,l-t) = Νϋ(Λ) = φ(Δ) = φ(5)φ(Τ) (by CC). We conclude that 
φ(Ξ) = N t(S). • 
Remark 12.10. Α φ £ N is determined by φ(Δ)where, as in the foregoing proofs, 
Δ := comv({ (1,0) , (0,1)}) : if φ(Δ) = (t,l-t) f or 0 S t S 1, then φ = м \ 
The last part of this section is devoted to a utility-theoretic founda-
- 1 2 
tion for the convention consistency property. Let Г = < A,a,u ,u > and 
- 1 2 
Г, = <B,b,v ,v > be 2-person bargaining situations,i.e. elements of BS. Let 
- 1 2 
Г = < Ax B, c,w ,w > be a 2-person bargaining situation, such that conditions 
(7.1) and (7.2) hold with the ä and b of (7.2) indeed the ä and b of Г and 
Г , respectively, and with с = (a,b). So, in view of Theorem 7.1, we may 
1 1 1 2 2 2 
assume : w (a,b) = u (a)v (b) and w (a,b) = u (a)v (b) for all a € A and 
b e B. 
Let φ be a bargaining solution. If, for every A 6 L(A χ Β), there are 
A £ L(A) and А б L(B) such that (Ew1 (A) ,Ew2 ( A) ) = 
1 1 2 2 (Eu (A )Ev (A ),Eu (A )Ev (A )), then the CC-property requires that the same 
equality holds for A £ а1Мф,Г), A 6 а Ш ф , Г ), and A £ alt(φ,Γ ). Suppose 
к ~\ 
now, that A results in a £ A with probability ρ , A in b £ В with proba­
bility q , then, for ι = 1,2, Eu (A )Ev (A ) is the expected utility Ew of 
к τ 
the lottery in L(A χ В) which results with probability ρ q in (a ,b ). So, 
к D 
according to the CC-property, each player is indifferent between this lottery 
and the lottery A; hence, the CC- property may be interpreted as requiring 
each player to be indifferent between either playing Г and Г (ending in 
к ] (a ,b ) with probability ρ q ) or playing Γ (ending in the lottery A). 
к ] 
The expression "convention consistency" is used in Binmore (19Θ2) : that 
is the reason why we also use it. Our presentation differs from the presen­
tation in that paper, and our result (Theorem 12.7) is more general since it 
0 1 
also includes the solutions N and N . 
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13. NASH SOLUTIONS AND PRICE EQUILIBRIUM IN A SIMPLE MARKET MODEL 
In this section, we shall introduce a simple market model, where two 
buyers, each endowed with an amount of money, together buy a continuum of 
goods. Of course, these buyers have certain preferences for these goods. We 
shall describe all competitive equilibria of such a market model, and show 
that Nash solutions N with 0 < t < 1 give rise to special kinds of equilibria; 
one of the results is an interpretation of the weight t of a Nash solution N 
in terms of money. Other possible merits and future research directions are 
discussed at the end of the section. 
In the following, λ denotes the (restriction to [0,1] of the) Lebesgue 
measure, M denotes the σ-algebra of (Lebesgue-) measurable subsets of [0,1], 
and M с M denotes the collection of sets of measure 0. 
1 2 
Definition 13.1. A simple market is a triple E = < u ,u ,b> such that : 
(13.1) u is a continuous nonmcreasing function : [0,1] -» [0,°°). 
2 
(13.2) u is a continuous nondecreasing function : [0,1] -» [0,°°). 
1 2 
(13.3) There i s a t £ (0,1) such t h a t u (t) / 0 and u (t) ^ 0. 
(13 .4) b e ΤΆ2++, b 1 + b 2 = 1. 
(Note that, with these properties, u and u are Lebesgue - as well as Riemann -
integrable, with positive Integrals in view of especially (13.3).) 
1 2 
The interpretation of a simple market E = <u ,u ,b> is as follows. There 
are two buyers or players, called 1 and 2. Each buyer ι € {1,2} has an amount 
of money b > 0. The buyers may purchase the continuum of goods [0,1] (every 
t С [0,1] is called a good) which costs 1 = b + b , provided they can reach 
some agreement on the division of the goods in [0,1]. We call u the marginal 
utility function of buyer i; for M e M, the Lebesgue-integral ƒ u dX is well-
defined. It is called the utility of M for i. 
The monotonicity properties in (13.1) and (13.2) can be interpreted, roughly, 
as saying that buyer 1 [2] likes best the goods close to good 0 [l]. Condi-
tion (13.3) as well as continuity of the u , are required mainly for mathema-
tical convenience. 
Example 13.2. Let the buyers be two broadcasting companies who want to buy 
the time between seven (=0) and eight (=1) in the evening for broadcasting. 
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Their preferences are given by marginal utility functions u which satisfy 
(13.1) - (13.3); in particular, the monotomcity properties in (13.1) and 
(13.2) reflect the facts that broadcasting company nr. 1 aims especially at 
very young children, whereas the other broadcasting company's programme is 
unsuited for young children. 
Further, we suppose that only the whole hour between seven and eight is for 
sale, and not parts of it; in this case, the two broadcasting companies may 
decide to buy the hour together - none of them is interested in buying the 
whole hour - provided they can reach some agreement on the division of the 
time, afterwards; the amounts of money b are fixed, may be for budgetary 
reasons. 
A topic of future research may be the case where the investment decisions 
b depend on the corresponding divisions of the hour of time, given some di­
vision rule depending on the amounts b . 
We let E denote the family of all simple markets. We propose the follow­
ing solution concept for a simple market. 
1 2 
Definition 13.3. Let E = <u ,u ,b> 6 E. A сомреЬъЫ е equilibrbim (c.e.) 
for E is a triple <M,N,'iï> where : 
(13.5) M,N € M and Μ Π Ν € M ; 
(13.6) π is a price funation, i.e. a strictly positive continuous 
function on [0,1] with ƒ TTdX = 1; 
[0,1] 
(13.7) ƒ Ήάλ = b , ƒ TTdA = b ; 
Μ N 
(13.8) ƒ uläX > ƒ u^X for all Μ' Ε M with ƒ πάλ < b ; 
M M' M' 
(13.9) ƒ u d\ i ƒ u2dÀ for ail N' € M with ƒ πάλ < b . 
Ν Ν' Ν' 
Note that, from the definition of a c.e. <Μ,Ν,π>, it follows that 
[0,1] \ (M U Ν) has measure 0. 
In a c.e. <Μ,Ν,π>, player l[2] gets M[N] , which is the best he can get 
for his money b [b ] at prices given by IT; of course, we call ƒ TrdX the pince 
of M, for M e M. M 
We shall describe all c.e.'s of a simple market E, and single out special 
ones with the aid of bargaining solutions. For that reason, we shall associate 
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bargaining games with simple markets. However, we f i r s t give some p repa ra to -
ry d e f i n i t i o n s and lemmas. 
Def ini t ion 13.4. By A, we denote the family of a l l allocation problems, i . e . 
1 2 1 2 
pa i r s A = < u ,u > where u and u s a t i s fy (13.1) - (13 .3 ) . For an 
1 2 1 2 
E = <u ,u , b> £ E, we c a l l A(E) := <u ,u > £ A the allocation problem 
corresponding to E. We denote by U (t) := ƒ u dX the u t i l i t y of [ 0 , t ] for 
p layer 1, and by U2 (t) := ƒ u2dÄ the ^ 0 ' 
[ t , l ] 
u t i l i t y of [ t , l ] for p layer 2. 
1 2 1 2 
Lemma 13 .5 . Let A € A , A = < U ,u >. Then U and U are continuous and con-
1 2 
cave functions on [ 0 , 1 ] . Fur ther , U i s nondecreasing and U i s nonincreasing, 
1 2 1 2 
U (0) = U (1) = 0. F ina l ly , U and U are d i f f e r e n t i a b l e on (0,1) with d e n -
1 2 
va t ives u and -u , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Proof. Elementary. • 
1 2 Lemma 13.6. Let M,N £ M with M П N e M , and l e t < u ,u > e A. Then a 
t б [0,1] e x i s t s with U1 (t) > ƒ u^X and U2(t) È ƒ u d\. 
Μ N 
Proof. Since U is continuous (Lemma 13.5), there exists a t £ [0,1] with 
U (t) = ƒ u dX, so ƒ u dX = ƒ u dX + ƒ u dX. From this it follows that 
M M [0,t]\M [o,t]nM 
J u dX = ƒ u dX. Hence, in view of (13.1) , we obtain 
МП [t,l] [0,t]\M 
X([0,t]\M) < Х(МП [t,l]) , so X(M) г X([0,t]) = t. From this, we have 
X(N) á 1-t, and hence, by a reversed argument using (13.2), we obtain 
ƒ u2dX < U2(t) . • 
1 2 
Lemma 13.7. Let E = < u , u , b > £ E and let <Μ,Ν,π> and <Μ,,Ν,/ΤΓ> be c.e.'s 
for E. Then : 
(i) ƒ u^X = ƒ u^X, ƒ u2dX = ƒ u2dX. 
Μ Μ' Ν Ν' 
(il) There exists a t £ [0,1] such that also <[0,t], [t,l],7l> is a c.e. 
Proof, (i) Straightforward from the definition of a c.e. (n) . Take t € [0,1] 
such that ƒ TrdX = b , ƒ ïïdX = b (cf. (13.6)). By similar arguments as 
[0,t] 1 [t,l] 2 
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used in the proof of Lemma 13.6, we derive from ƒ u dX È ƒ u dÀ and 
[0,t] M 
ƒ u dA < ƒ u dX, the facts X(M) > t and λ(Ν) Ì 1-t, so λ(M) = t, λ(Ν) = 1-t, 
[t,l] Ν 
1 1 ? ? 
ƒ u dX = ƒ u dX, and ƒ u dX = ƒ u dX. 
[0,t] M [t,l] N 
Hence < [0,t],[t, 1] ,π > is a c.e. • 
Lemma 13.6 expresses the fact that, in an allocation problem, allocations 
of the form [0,t] for player 1 and [t,l] for player 2, are "Pareto optimal". 
Lemma 13.7 expresses the strongly related fact that, in a simple market, every 
c.e. <Μ,Ν,π> is "utility-equivalent" to a c.e. of the form <[0 ,t] , [t, 1 ] ,π >. 
1 2 
Lemma 13.8. Let A = <u ,u > € A. Let 
9 1 
s := 0 v supít £ [0,1] : u (t) = θ} and s := 1 л inf{t € [0,1] : u (t) = θ}. 
Then : 
(l) 0 S s S s S 1, 
(il) S(A) := com({(o,U2» (U1)"1 (a) : U^s) < a < U (s)}) € B, 
(in) P(S(A)) = {(a,u2o (u1)-1«*)) : lAs) < a < U^i)}. 
Proof, (ι) Follows, in particular, from (13.3). (il) U о (U )~ : [u (s),U (s)]-» 
[0,») is concave and strictly decreasing, by Lemma 13.5 and the choice of s 
and s. In view of (13.3), χ > 0 for some χ £ S(A). We conclude that S(A) £ B. 
( m ) See the proof of (n). • 
In view of Lemma 13.Θ, we may call, for each allocation problem A, the 
game S(A) the bargaining game eorresponding to A. Also, for E £ E with 
A(E) = A, we call S(E) := s(A) the bargaining game corresponding to E. 
For an A £ A, the corresponding bargaining game Ξ(A) has the property 
that for every χ £ Ρ(S(A)) with χ > 0 there is a unique supporting line of 
S(A) at x, i.e. S (A) is smooth at every χ £ P(S(A)), χ > 0 (cf. section 12, 
after Def. 12.2). This is a consequence of the last statement in Lemma 13.5. 
Further, S(A) £ В by definition. Let В с в denote the subfamily of В 
consisting of all bargaining games with the mentioned property ("s" from 
"smooth"). Then not only we have S(A) £ В for every A £ A, but also : 
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Lemma 13.9. Let S Ε В . Then there exists an A € A with S(A) = S. 
1 2 proof. For t € [0,1], let (U (t),U (t)) be the point of intersection of W(S) 
and the straight line through the point h(S)(t,l-t) with slope h (S)h (S) 
In this way, the functions U ,U : [0,l] -» [0,°°) are determined. Let now, 
on (0,1) , u1 := (U1) ' and u 2 := -(U2) ' , and let for ι = 1,2, u 1 : [0,1] -• [0,«) 
be the continuous extension of u : (0,1) -» [0,°°). We leave it to the reader 
1 2 
to verify that A := <u ,u > e A and S (A) = S. • 
The now following theorem gives a characterization of all competitive 
equilibria of the form <[0,t],[t,1],π> in a simple market. Cf. Lemma 13.7. 
1 2 
Theorem 13.10. Let E = < u , u , b > € E and t £ [0,1]. Then the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
(a) <[0,t] ,[t,l] ,π> is a c e . of E. 
(b) (i) For every s £ [0,t], we have — > — , and for every s € [t,l], 
, u (s)
 < u (t) we have —;—:— S —;—;— . 
π(Ξ) 7T(t) 
(il) For every s € [0,t], we have —-—-— £ ——-— , and for every s £ [t,l], 
η η i l i o / il IL· J 
u (s)
 > u (t) we have —;—;— ¿ —τ—.— . 
TT(S) 1T(t) 
( m ) π is a price function with ƒ παλ = b (and ƒ πάλ = b.) . 
[0,t] 1 [t,l] 
Proof. We first show the implication (b) -» (a) . Assume (b) and let M £ M 
with ƒ παλ Sb.. We want to show that ƒ u dX £ ƒ u dA. 
M M [0,t] 
This is obviously true, in view of (13.1), if u (t) = 0. Otherwise we have, 
with the aid of (b) (i) : 
ƒ u^S^ItL/ ndX < HÎltL
 (b - ƒ ^λ,-Η^Ι/ π
ά
λ 
Mn[t,i] 1T(t) Mn[t,i] 1TCt) 1 Mn[o,t] 1T(t) [0,t]\M 
á ƒ u dX. Hence ƒ u dX й J u dX. Similarly, one shows that 
[0,t]\M M [0,t] 
ƒ u dX S ƒ u dX for any N € M with ƒ παλ S b . We conlude that (a) holds. 
N [t,l] N 
Now the implication (a) * (b). Assume (a), then we still have to show (i) and 
(n) of (b) . We only show (i) . Since (i) is obviously true if u (t) = 0, we 
suppose u (t) ^ 0. As to the first inequality in (ι), suppose to the contra­
ry that TT(s) = (1 + ε) π u (s) for some s £ [0,t) (note that t И 0,1 by 
u (t) 
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(a), in particular since b > 0) and ε > 0. Since TT and u are continuous, 
we can find γ,δ > 0 small enough to give ƒ irdX = ƒ irdX and 
[s,s+Y] [t
r
t+6] 
TT(s) > (1 + — ) —-—- u (s) for all s with s S s £ s+γ whereas 
u (t) 
ïï(s) < (1 + |·) π u (s) for all s with t й s й t+б. Hence 
u (t) 
ƒ u(s)ds< ƒ u(s)ds which means that buyer a can improve his 
[S,S+Y] [t,t+6] 
allocation without violating his budget restriction, in contradiction with (a) 
We have proved the first inequality of (i). Secondly and similarly, if the 
second inequality in (i) would not hold, then bargainer 1 could improve his 
allocation by bying, instead of (t-ζ,ί] for a small ζ > 0, an equally expen­
sive interval [Ξ',Ξ'+Π) allocated to bargainer 2 in the given c.e. • 
Theorem 13.10 shows what a c.e. <[0,t] , [t, 1] ,ττ > for a simple market 
<u ,u ,b> looks like (cf. Fig. 13.1) : for ι = 1,2, if u1(t) ^ 0, then mul-
1T(t) 
tiply u by α 
uNt) 
> 0, so a u (t) = TTit) ; then, if u (t) ^ 0, we have 
π(Ξ) á α u (s) for ail s £ [0,t], whereas Tr(s) > α u (s) for ail s e [t,l]; 
2 2 2 
and, if u (t) ^ 0 , then we have π(s) S a u (s) for all s € [0,t] whereas 
2 2 1 2 
TTts) S a u (s) for all s € [t,l]. So, if both u (t) and u (t) are positive, 
1 1 2 2 
then the graph of π lies in between the graphs of α u and α u everywhere. 
Figure 13.1, 
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1 2 
Corollary 13.11. Let E = <u ,u ,b> be a simple market. Then : 
(i) There exists a c.e. <[0 ,t] , [t, 1 ] ,11 > for E. 
1 2 1 2 
(n) If t £ [0,1] is such that (U (t) ,U (t)) i b(U (1),U (0)), then there 
exists a price function IT such that <[0,t] tt,l],'lT> is a c.e. for E. 
(ill) If <[0,t],[t,l],ir> is a c.e. for E, then (U1 (t) ,U2 (t) ) i bfU1 ( 1) ,U2 (0) ) . 
Proof. (i) follows (n) since a point t as in (n) always exists : take 
1 1 1 2 2 
t = b , then U (t) ¿ b.U (1) since u is nonincreasing and U (t) ä b U (0) since 
2 1 
u is nondecreasing. Now let t be as in (n) . If u (t) = 0, then 
2 1 2 
u (t) ^  0 in view of (13.3) and the monotonicity properties of u and u ; then 
take a strictly positive continuous function ρ : [0,1] -»В such that 
p(t) = u2(t), ƒ pdX ( ƒ pdX) - 1- b , and p(s) £ u2(s) for all 0 й s £ t 
[t,l] [0,1] 2 
whereas p(s) S u (s) for all t £ s S 1. Take ir(s) := p(s) ( ƒ pdA ) for 
[0,1] 
every s E [0,l], then it follows from Theorem 13.10 that 
2 1 
<[0,t] ,[t,l] ,'ГГ> is a c.e. Similarly if u (t) = 0 . If u (t) И 0 and 
2 1 2 
u (t) ^  0, then let α > 0 be such that au (t) = u (t), and take ρ and π as 
above, such that, additionally, the graph of ρ lies in between the graphs of 
1 2 
au and u everywhere. Then, again by Theorem 13.10, <[0#t],[trl],TT> is a c.e. 
We have shown ( (i) and) (n) . Statement (in) is straightforward from Theorem 
13.10. • 
Before studying the relations between bargaining solutions and competi­
tive equilibria, we need a few additional definitions. 
2 2 
Definition 13.12. Let b £ K
+
 with b + b = 1, and let φ : В -> Ж be a bar­
gaining solution. We call φ Ъ-monotonia if φ(3) ä bh(S) for every S € В. We 
call φ syrwnetriaally monotonia if φ(3) δ ih(S) for every S £ В (cf. Sobel 
(1981)). 
We shall use the b-monotonicity property not only in this section : it 
will reappear in section 27. 
1 2 
Definition 13.13. Let E = <u ,u ,b>. If M,N £ M, we call the pair <M,N> 
an equilibrium allocation for E if <Μ,Ν,π> is a c.e. for E, for some price 
2 
function π. Further, we call (a,3) E H a pair of equilibrium utilities for 
E if an equilibrium allocation <M,N> for E exists with ƒ u dX = α and 
M 
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ƒ u2dX = β. 
Ν 
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 13.6 and 
13.9, and Corollary 13.11 (n) , (in) . 
2 2 
Theorem 13.14. Let φ : В -+Ю be a bargaining solution, and let b £ B with 
b + b = 1. The following two assertions are equivalent. 
(i) For every S £ Β , φ(S) is an equilibrium utility allocation for every 
E = <.,.,b> £ E such that S = S(E). 
(ii) φ is b-monotonic and weakly Pareto optimal on В . 
Remark 13.15. In section 27 we will see that many bargaining solutions 
appearing in this monograph, satisfy b-monotonicity for some b. So Theorem 
13.14 often applies. Theorem 13.14 provides an interpretation of the para­
meter b in the b-monotomcity property in terms of money. Similarly, the 
now following theorem gives an interpretation of the parameter q of a non-
q 
symmetric Nash solution N (0 < q < 1). This has been the motivation for us 
to give the present section the place it has in this monograph. 
2 
Theorem 13.16. Let φ : В -» К. be a bargaining solution, and let 0 < q < 1. 
The following two assertions are equivalent. 
(ι) ф(Б) = Nq(S) for every S £ BS. 
s 1+ 2 
(ii) For every S € В and E = <u ,u ,(q,l-q) > e E with S(E) = S, ф(3) is the 
pair of equilibrium utilities corresponding to the c.e. <[0,t],[t,1],π> where 
IT is a price function such that irfs) = —-— u (s) if s € [0,t] and 
vis) . ψ - u2(s) if s e [t,l]. U ( t ) 
u (t) 
s 1 2 
Proof. (i) =* (ii). Assume (i) , and let S £ в and E = <u ,u ,(q,l-q)> € E 
with S(E) = S. Then ф(3) = Nq(S) = (U (t),U (t)) where t £ [0,l] maximizes 
the expression U (s) U (s) . A necessary and sufficient condition for this 
d 1 q 2 l-q is — U (t) 4 U (t) ^ = 0, or equivalently : 
(13.io) - a - . ^ W ^ . 
~
4
 U (t)u (t) 
We have to show that <[0 ,t], [t, l] ,ιτ > with π as in the theorem, is a c.e.; in 
view of Theorem 13.10, it is sufficient to show that 
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ƒ TTdÀ 
[0,t] ч 
ƒ πάλ 1-q 
[t,l] 
and this follows straightforwardly from (13.10). 
The implication (11) -» (i) follows by reversing the above argument. • 
Thus, for an equilibrium allocation determined by a nonsymmetnc Nash 
solution N with 0 < q < 1 there is a price function proportional for each 
one of the bargainers to the marginal utilities of the goods belonging to 
that bargainer's share. Two other special cases are summarized in the follow­
ing theorem, a proof of which can be given with the aid of Theorem 13.10 
again, and is omitted. 
2 2 
Theorem 13.17. Let φ : В -» К be a bargaining solution, and let b £ Ж with 
b + b = 1. The following two assertions are equivalent : 
(ι) φ is weakly Pareto optimal on В , with ф.(5) = b.h (S) 
[φ (Ξ) = b h (S), respectively] for every S £ В . 
s 1 2 
(il) For every S £ В and E = < u ,u , b > £ E with S(E) = S, φ(Ξ) is the pair 
of equilibrium utilities corresponding to the c.e. <[0,t] , [t, 1] ,ττ > where IT 
is a price function such that π(3) = — τ — u (s) [π(Ξ) = —— u (s), resp.J 
for ail s £ [0,1]. U ( t ) U ( t ) 
We conclude with some discussion. The concept of a simple market may 
be generalized into several directions : higher dimension of the continuum of 
goods, more than two buyers; or relaxation, within the present model, of con­
ditions (13.1) and (13.2). As to the last point : it is not difficult to see 
that Theorem 13.10 does not hold anymore if the continuity requirements in 
(13.1) or (13.2) are dropped. (E.g. let u (s) = 2 if 0 < s < - , u (s) = - - s 
if | < s S | , u^s) = 1 if -i < s á 1, u2(s) = | for all 0 < s < 1, IT (s) = | 
if 0 < s < | , ïï(s) = | - s if | < s < | , ir(s) = 1 if | < s S 1; and let 
27 37 1 2 b. = -z-7 , b„ = ττ· Then E = < u ,u ,b> satisfies all conditions for a simple 1 64 2 64 
market except continuity of u , <[0,—] , [—, 1 ] ,ττ > satisfies the conditions for 
о о 
a c e . ; but (b) d ) of Theorem 13.10 does not hold.) Perhaps, dropping the 
continuity requirements in (13.1) and (13.2) must be matched by dropping the 
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continuity condition for a price function IT. 
The monotomcity conditions in (13.1) and (13.2) are quite restrictive : 
we conjecture, however, that these can be dropped without excluding a result 
in the same spirit as Theorem 13.10. 
Another line of research is to seek for possible relations between com-
petitive equilibria in a simple market, and other bargaining solutions than 
the ones occurmg in Theorems 13.16 and 13.17. 
Our final points are made in the following two remarks. 
1 2 1 2 
Remark 13.18. Let A = <u ,u > € A , which means that u and u satisfy con-
ditions (13.1) - (13.3). Without altering the definition of such an alloca-
tion problem, we may give it a different interpretation, as follows. There 
is one unit of a perfectly divisible good (e.g., one litre of wine). And a 
"division" t £ [0,1] means : buyer 1 gets t, whereas buyer 2 gets 1-t. With 
this interpretation, only the integrals ƒ u dA = U (t) and ƒ u dX = U (t) 
[0,t] [t,l] 
are relevant, and interpreted as the utilities of 100 t percent and 100(1-t) 
percent of the good for buyers 1 and 2, respectively. 
5 
Remark 13.19. In (n) of Theorem 13.14, we may replace В by В if φ is con­
tinuous or Pareto-continuous : the latter properties are introduced in section 
19. 
First versions of the results in this section were given in Peters (1985a) 
14. OTHER MODELS FOR NASH SOLUTIONS 
Let S £ в, η ,n7 £ U, and consider the following 2-pei'Son game in normal 
form, which we can associate with the triple S, η , and η . Each player 
2 
ι £ {1,2} has the strategy space P(S) Π В . If player 1 plays χ and player 
2 plays y, then the payoff to player 1 is given by : 
/• 
X if χ á у 
Kjíx^) χ if χ. > у and R(x) £ R(y) 
у if Xj > γ
ι
 and R(x) < R(y) 
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ni í nl + n2' η 2 ( η ΐ + η 2 ' Here, R(Z) := ζ ζ .Similarly, the payoff to player 2 
is given by 
к2(х,у) 
y 2 if y 2 < x 2 
У 2 if У 2 > x 2 and R(y) > R(x) 
x 2 if У 2 > x 2 and R(y) Í R(x) . 
A Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for such a game is a pair of strate-
gies (x,y) satisfying К (x,y) à Κ (χ,y) for every strategy χ and 
K9(x,y) £ Κ (χ,у) for every strategy y. The reader will probably not be sur­
prised by the following lemma. 
Lemma 14.1. In the game described above, the unique pair of utilities corres­
ponding to a Nash equilibrium, is 
η (η +n J - 1 
N (S). 
Proof. Straightforward. • 
The above model is a "noncooperative implementation" of the nonsymmetric 
Nash-solution N 1 1 2 . One may think of the players' strategies as of 
proposals in a round of actual bargaining. 
In the model as it is, the parameters η and η , as well as the function 
R, are left unaccounted for. However, we shall remedy this defect below : 
this will occupy the larger part of the present section, which we will con­
clude by mentioning some other models in literature that are somehow related 
to Nash solutions. 
Zeuthen (1930), avant la lettre, derived the (symmetric) Nash solution 
by means of describing a negotiation process. This fact was first recognized 
by Harsanyi (1956). Kalai (1977a) derived nonsymmetric Nash solutions by 
considering certain replications of 2-person bargaining games. We now pre­
sent a model which also leads to nonsymmetric Nash solutions, and which is a 
mixture of the ideas of Harsanyi - Zeuthen and Kalai. 
We describe this model without attempting to attain a ngourous forma­
lism. We want to discover a set of assumptions under which a bargaining 
process may take the form of the normal-form game described at the beginning 
of this section. 
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Let S E В be a 2-person bargaining game, and let 0 < t < 1. Let n. and η 
-1 be positive integers, and let t = η (η + η ) . Our model will lead to the 
nonsymmetric Nash solution N (, where t is a rational number, of course; we 
t q 
note that N (S) for t irrational can be approximated by N (S) with q rational) . 
We suppose that there is a family 1 of η players of type 1 and a family 2 of 
η players of type 2, and that each family chooses one of its members as its 
representative, say P. and Ρ respectively, who play the bargaining game S 
on behalf of their respective families. We assume that all the players of 
one type (i.e., in one family) are "replicas" of each other, which concept 
we take to be defined by assumptions (14.1) - (14.3) below. These assumptions 
are intended to justify the calculations to be made below. 
(14.1) If decisions are to be made, all the members of a family decide inde-
pedently of each other. 
(14.2) Any decision of a family to comply to some proposal of the opposite 
family, must be unanimous. 
(14.3) That family, which is less willing to risk a conflict, will be the 
first to comply to some proposal of the opposite family. As a measure of 
"willingness to risk a conflict", we take the maximum value, for which it is 
still worthwhile to stick to one's proposal, of the subjective probability 
that also the representative of the opposing family will stick to his proposal. 
Assumption (14.3) which is analogous to Zeuthen's central assumption, 
certainly has some intuitive appeal. See also Harsanyi (1956), or Roth (1979) 
We proceed with the actual description of the game. There is only one 
round, in which the representative Ρ of each family ι makes a proposal. A 
2 1 
proposal is an element of P(S) П К . Suppose χ = (χ ,χ ) is the proposal of 
Ρ , meaning that he proposes family ι to obtain utility-payoff χ (ι=1,2). 
Suppose, similarly, that у = (у ,y ) is the proposal of Ρ . Then (by some 
legal institution) an outcome in ÍO,x,y,(x ,y ),(y ,x )} is enforced as the 
final outcome of the game, as follows. The final outcome is:(x ,y ) if 
*« = Уі ' Ύ ι »
х
э) if хі > У« ancì both representatives are willing to concede 
to each other's proposals; χ if χ > у and Ρ concedes to Ρ 's proposal, 
whereas Ρ does not concede to Ρ 's proposal; y if χ > y and Ρ concedes to 
Ρ 's proposal, whereas Ρ does not concede to Ρ 's proposal; and 0 if χ > y 
and no one is willing to concede. 
Now suppose Ρ (and, in fact, every member of family 1) assesses a sub­
jective probability q that P. (and thus, any member of family 2) will not 
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concede to proposal χ, where we presume that χ > y , that is, χ and y are 
incompatible. According to the assumptions (14.1) and (14.2), Ρ calculates 
the expected utility for family 1 of not conceding to y as 
1 n2 n2 
(14.4) E (x,y) = (1-q) x 1 + (l-(l-q) ).0 
Not conceding to y is strictly better for family 1 than conceding if and only 
if 
(14.5) E^x.y) > yj. 
Combining (14.4) and (14.5), we find that not conceding to y is strictly better 
for family 1 than conceding if and only if 
-1 
-1 n2 
(14.6) q < 1 - (y^j ) 
Similarly if we let r be the subjective probability, as assessed by Ρ , that 
Ρ (and thus, any member of family 1) will not concede to proposal y, we find 
that not conceding to χ is strictly better for family 2 if and only if 
-1 
-1 "l 
(14.7) r < 1 - (x2y2 ) 
According to assumption (14.3), we conclude from (14.6) and (14.7) that Ρ or, 
equivalently, family 1 will concede to proposal у if and only if 
-1 -1 
-1 n2 -1 "i 
1 - (Y,*, ) < 1 - (X2y2 ' ' Х'е' l f a n d О П І у l f 
t 1-t t 1-t 
C1 X2 < ^1^2 · 
In other words, family 1 concedes to у if and only if in χ the "Nash product 
with weight t" has a lower value than in y. If we adopt the convention that 
family 2 concedes to χ if x.x, = Y.Y7 , then the described bargaining 
process reduces to the normal-form game of Lemma 14.1. 
Within the limits set by assumptions (14.1) - (14.3), this model gives -
again, see section 13, especially Remark 13.15 and Theorem 13.16 - an inter­
pretation of the weight t of a nonsymmetric Nash solution N (0 < t < 1). 
Remark 14.2. Some other references in which the Nash solution or nonsymmetric 
Nash solutions play important or central roles, are : Anbar and Kalai (1978), 
Aumann and Kurz (1977), Roth (1978), van Damme (1984), Nakayama (1983). Still 
another characterization of the family N will be given in section 20. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES 
In a paper on arbitration games, Raiffa (1953) has proposed some 
(2-person) arbitration schemes or bargaining solutions. One of these is 
Nash's solution, and another one will be studied in this chapter, section 15. 
The latter solution was characterized axiomatically by Kalai and Smorodinsky 
(1975), who replaced, in Nash's result, the IIA-property by a property called 
"individual monotonicity" here. We shall extend this result in section 15. 
In section 16, we shall characterize a family of 2-person bargaining solutions 
satisfying a related monotonicity property called "global individual monoto­
nicity". Thereby we extend a result of Kalai and Rosenthal (197Θ). Several 
other monotonicity properties have been proposed in literature : see, e.g. 
Thomson and Myerson (1980). See also Rosenthal (1976), for a solution, clo­
sely related to the above mentioned bargaining solution of Raiffa (or Kalai 
and Smorodinsky). 
15. INDIVIDUAL MONOTONICITY 
In a discussion of the Nash bargaining model, Kalai and Smorodinsky 
(1975) raised an ob]ection against the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
property. To illustrate their objection, they gave the following example. 
Example 15.1. (Cf. Fig. 15.1.) Let S := comv({(1,0),(0,1),(j,j) }) and 
Τ := comv ({(1,0) ,(0,1) ,(l,-j^ ·)}) . Then, for any - » < λ < 1, 
fg(X) й φ λ ) (cf. Def. 9.12). Yet N(S) = (|-,|) and N(T) = ( 1 ,-^) , so player 
Figure 15.1. 
Kalai and Smorodinsky gave the following alternative for the IIA-property. 
They called their property "Axiom of Monotonicity". In this property, the 
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utopia point h(S) of a game S € В plays a crucial role (see Def. 9.10). 
Definition 15.2. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -» 3R is called 
•individually monotonia if, for all i,] € {1,2} with ι И 3 and s,T £ В 
with S с τ and h (S) = h (Τ) , we have φ (S) < φ (Τ) . 
(Individual monotonicity : IM) 
The following 2-person bargaining solution was proposed by Raiffa (1953). 
Definition 15.3. To every S 6 В, the 2-person bargaining solution KS assigns 
the (unique) point of intersection of P(S) wjth the straight line through 0 
and h(S). We call KS the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution. 
We call this solution the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution in view of the 
following theorem, which was derived in Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) - in a 
slightly weaker form : they used PO and AN instead of WPO and SYM, respecti­
vely -, and which differs from Theorem 11.4 in that IIA is replaced by IM. 
Its proof is readily derived from Kalai and Smorodinsky's proof. 
2 
Theorem 15.4. The solution KS : В -» H is the unique 2-person bargaining 
solution with the properties WPO, STI, SYM, and IM. 
The main purpose of this section is an extension of Theorem 15.4, to be 
obtained by the dropping of SYM. On the other hand, we strengthen WPO to PO. 
See the following example, which shows that, in order to guarantee (strong) 
Pareto optimality, it is in this context not sufficient to require WPO. 
2 
Example 15.5. Let φ : В -• Ж be the 2-person bargaining solution which 
2 
assigns (0,f (0)) to every S € В. Then φ satisfies IR,STI,IM, and WPO but not 
PO. 
Remark 15.β. If we consider solutions defined on a class of "bargaining 
games" which are compact instead of comprehensive, then, in the presence of 
IM, it can be proved that WPO implies PO. See Peters and Ti]s (1985a) , on 
which this chapter is based. 
We will not need to require IR explicitly : 
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Lemma 15.7. If φ : В -» Ж is individually monotonie and Pareto optimal, then 
it is individually rational. 
2 
Proof. Let φ : В -*Ж satisfy IM and PO. Let S € В. Then Ξ с: S (cf. Def. 
9.10) and h(S ) = h(S). By applying IM twice, we have ф(5) Ì ф(3 ), hence 
φ(S) SO since φ(S ) ä 0 by PO. • 
It will be convenient to introduce the following monotomcity property, 
which is related to, but weaker than IM (cf. Roth (1979,p.101)). 
2 
Definition 15.8. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В •* В is called 
restlñatedty monotonie if, for all S,T e В with S с τ and h (S) = h (Τ) , we 
have φ(Τ) ä φ(S) . 
(Restricted monotomcity : RM) 
2 
Lemma 15.9. Let φ : В -* Ж be a bargaining solution satisfying PO and IM or 
RM. Then ф(5) = ф(5 ) for any S £ В. 
Proof. Straightforward (cf. the proof of Lemma 15.7). • 
2 
Lemma 15.10. Let φ : В -* К be a bargaining solution satisfying PO and STI. 
Then φ satisfies RM if and only if it satisfies IM. 
Proof. If φ satisfies IM, then, obviously, φ satisfies also RM. Suppose now 
that φ satisfies RM, and let S,T £ В with S <= Τ and h (S) = h (Τ) . (Cf. Fig. 
15.2.) We shall prove 
(15.1) φ^Τ) > ф^З) . 
In view of Lemma 15.9 we may assume S = S and Τ = Τ . 
Let V := {χ € Τ : χ S h (S) } e В. Then h(V) = h(S) and S <=. V, hence, by RM, 
we obtain 
(15.2) ф( ) г ф(5). 
Let α := h^TJh^S)" 1. By STI, φ ( (α, 1) V) = (αφ1 (V) ,φ2 (V) ) . Since 
h(T) = h((a,l)V) and Τ с (a,l)V, we have by RM : ф((а,1) ) £ ф(Т), hence 
(15.3) ф2( ) > Ф2(Т). 
Since ф( ) € Р(Т) and ф(Т) € Р(Т), (15.3) implies 
(15.4) ф^ ) < ф^Т). 
Now we obtain (15.1) from combining (15.2) and (15.4). • 
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Figure 15.2. 
We next define a family of 2-person bargaining solutions, and we shall 
prove that this family is the family of all solutions satisfying PO, STI, and 
IM. 
Definition 15.11. A monotonia curve is a map λ : [1,2] -» conv{ (1,0) ,(0,1) ,(1,1)} 
which has the following property : 
(15.5) For all s,t 6 [1,2] with s i t we have X(s) i X(t) and λ (s) + λ (s) = s. 
By Λ, we denote the family of all monotonie curves. 
Note that λ £ Λ is a continuous map : for s,t € [1,2], and 
I«!I + |x2l for χ G К , we have || X(s) - X(t) IXjfs) - Xjtt) I + 
" " 1 ' 1 ' ' 2 ' ' " " 1 
|X2(s) - X2(t) | = I (Xjts) + X2(s)) - (X^t) + X2(t)) | = |s - t| . Note further 
that, for every S ε В, the set P(S) Π {X(t) : t ε [1,2]} contains exactly one 
point, which renders the following definition correct. 
λ 2 
Definition 15.12. For every λ ε Λ, the 2-person bargaining solution π : В -» К 
is defined by : 
{π (S)} := Ρ(S) Π {X(t) : t ε [1,2]} for every S with h(S) = (1,1), and 
ττ (S) := Μ3)π ((h (S)" ,h (Sj'Ss) otherwise. 
54 
we call π the solution corresponding to (the monotonia curve) λ. 
Proposition 15.13. For every λ ξ. Λ, π satisfies PO, STI, and RM. 
Proof. π satisfies PO and STI by definition. Let Ξ,Τ € В with S с Τ and 
h(S) = h(T) =: h. Let s,t £ [1,2] be such that π (Ξ) = hX(S) and π (Τ) = hX(t) 
If s > t, then by (15.5) : 
hX(s) ä hX(t) and hX(s) Φ hX(t), in contradiction with S с Τ and PO of π . 
So s S t and π (S) = hX(s) S hX(t) < π (τ) . So ττ satisfies RM. • 
Note that the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution KS corresponds to the curve 
1 1 1 
λ € Λ with X(t) = (-r-t, —t) for each t £ [1,2]; the dictator solutions D and 
2 
D correspond to the curves λ1 and λ 1 1 m Λ with A'Ct) = (l,t-l) and 
A'Mt) = (t-1,1) for every t € [1,2]. 
We now prove the converse of Proposition 15.13. 
2 
Proposition 15.14. Let φ : В -» В be a 2-person bargaining solution satis­
fying PO, STI and RM. Then φ = TT for some λ £ Λ. 
Proof. (Cf. Fig. 15.3.) We first construct a curve λ € Λ with the aid of φ. 
To this end, let for every t £ [1,2] 
V(t) := comv{ (1,0) , (0,1) , (l,t-l) , (t-1,1)} £ B. Define λ : [1,2] -» R by 
X(t) := φ(ν(ί)) for every t 6 [1,2]. For 1 £ s < t S 2 we have 
A(s) = ф( (з)) < φ(ν(0) = X(t) by RM. Further, for each t Ç. [1,2], 
X(t) £ P(V(t)) = conv({(l,t-l) ,(t-1,1)}) , so λ (t) + λ (t) = t. Hence 
λ € Λ, and 
(15.6) 0(V(t)) = IT (V(t)) for every t € [1,2]. 
We want to prove that φ = IT . Let S £ В with h(S) = (1,1) . In view of 
STI, it is sufficient to show ф(5) = TT (S) for such an S. Let now 
s := π (S) + π (S) . Let W := comv({(0,l) ,(1,0) ,π (S)}). Then 
(15.7) π (S) = π (W) = π (V(s)) = ф( (з)) e P(S) П PÍW) П P(V(s)), where the 
last equality follows from (15.6). Since W с v(s), andh(W) =h(V(s)) = (1,1), 
we obtain by RM, PO and (15.7) : 
(15.8) ф( (з)) = ф( ») . 
Since W C S and h(W) = h (S), we have by (15.8), (15.7), and RM : 
(15.9) φ(ί») = φ(5) . 
Combining (15.7) - (15.9), we conclude that φ(3) = π (S). • 
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(0,1) 
a = π (S) 
Figure 15.3. 
We can now readily prove : 
2 
Theorem 15.15. Let φ : В -» H be a 2-person bargaining solution. Then φ 
satisfies PO, STI, and IM, if and only if φ = IT for some λ € Λ. 
Proof. Follows from Lemma 15.10 and Propositions 15.13 and 15.14. • 
Note that Theorem 15.4 follows from Theorem 15.15. In the following 
corollary, we link Theorem 15.15 and Theorem 11.8. 
Corollary 15.16. There are exactly two solutions on В satisfying PO, STI, IM, 
1 2 
and IIA, namely the dictator solutions D and D . 
Proof. Theorem 29.17 for the case n=2. • 
We might view Corollary 15.16 as a kind of impossibility result, namely 
if we regard PO, STI, IM and IIA as desirable properties for a 2-person bar­
gaining solution to have, and if we also wish to rule out dictatorial solu­
tions. 
In section 21 we shall prove a more general result (a characterization 
of a family of individually monotonie "multisolutions") which implies Theorem 
15.15. Thomson (1984) accounts for the nonsymmetry of solutions in a family 
of IM-solutions which is related to the family in Theorem 15.15, by considering 
replications of 2-person bargaining games. Finally, we remark that the Kalai -
\ * , A / 
(1,0) 
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Smorodinsky solution also shows up in experiments, see Crott (1971). 
16. GLOBftL INDIVIDUAL MONOTONICITY 
In the previous section, we have characterized a family of individually 
monotonie solutions : these solutions depend for a given bargaining game on 
two important points - reference points -, namely the disagreement outcome and 
the utopia point. With some modifications, similar techniques can be used to 
characterize "monotonie" solutions, w.r.t. other reference points. In this 
section, we will show this for a family of solutions depending on the global 
utopia point : see Def. 9.10. Thereby we extend a result of Kalai and 
Rosenthal (1978). 
2 
Definition 16.1. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -» Η is called globally 
individually monotonie if, for all 1,3 € {1,2} with 1 ^ 3 and S,T e В with 
Ξ (Ζ Τ and g (S) = g (T) , we have φ (S) < φ (Τ) . 
ι ι 2 J 
(Global individual monotonicity : GIM) 
2 
Example 16.2. Let the solution φ : В -» Ж be equal to the solution φ in 
2 
Example 15.5. Let the solution ψ : В -» К be defined by : ψ(3) Ε Ρ (S) has 
maximal second coordinate, for every S e В. Then φ satisfies IR, WPO, STI, 
and GIM, but not PO; ψ satisfies PO, STI, GIM, but not IR. 
We wish to restrict attention to (STI,GIM) solutions which are (strongly) 
Pareto optimal and individually rational; Example 16.2 shows that IR is not 
implied by PO, nor PO by IR, in the presence of STI and GIM. (We note, 
however, that Remark 15.6 still applies if we replace IM by GIM.) The follow­
ing two lemmas correspond to Lemmas 15.9 and 15.10 in the previous section. 
2 
Lemma 16.3. Let φ : В -» К be a 2-person bargaining solution satisfying 
PO, IR, and GIM. Then ф(5) = ф(Т) for any S and Τ in В with g(S) = g(T) and 
S = Τ . 
+ + 
Proof. Choose a E Ж so small that (a,g (S)) = (a,g (Τ)) € S Π Τ, and choose 
β £ К so small that (g (S),ß) = (g (Τ),3) £ S П T. Let 
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V := comv({(a,g2(S)),(g (S),3)} U S + ) , then б В , V e s , V c T , g(V) = g(S) = 
g(T), and V = S = Τ . By applying IR, PO, and GIM twice, wc find that 
ф( ) = φ(Ξ). Similarly, ф( ) = ф(Т). So ф(3) = ф(Т). • 
2 
Lemma 16.4. Let φ : В -» К be a 2-person bargaining solution satisfying PO, 
IR, and STI. Then φ satisfies GIM if and only if φ(5) S φ(Τ) for all Ξ and Τ 
in В with Ξ с Τ and g(Ξ) = g(T). 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 15.10; we note that, whereas there we 
needed Lemma 15.9, here we do not need Lemma 16.3. • 
2 
We want to describe all 2-person bargaining solutions φ : В -* H which 
have the properties IR, PO, STI, and GIM. Therefore we introduce a family of 
curves resembling the family Л in the previous section. 
Definition 16.5. By 0, we denote the family of maps 
θ : [0,2] -• conv({ (0,0) ,(1,0) , (0,1) , (1,1)}) which satisfy 
(16.1) For all s,t € [0,2] : (з) S 9(t) if s S t, and θ (s) + θ,(s) = s. 
Similarly as in section 15 for λ € Λ, it follows from (16.1) that θ € 0 
is a continuous map. And note that, for every S 6 В, the set 
P(S) Π {9(t) : t 6 [0,2]} contains exactly one element. 
Definition 16.6. For θ 6 0, the solution ψ : В -» Ж is defined by : 
for every S € В with g(S) = (1,1), {ψ (S)} := P(S) П {e(t) : t € [0,2]}, and 
ψ
θ(Ξ) :=
 9(Ξ)ψ
θ(( 5 ι 
corresponding to Θ. 
ν
 д(3)ф ((g (S)" ,g (s)" ) S) otherwise. We call ψ υ the solution 
Proposition 16.7. For every θ £ θ, ψ satisfies IR, PO, STI, and GIM. 
Proof. ψ satisfies IR, PO, and STI, by definition. GIM follows easily with 
the aid of Lemma 16.4. • 
2 
Proposition 16.8. Let φ : В -» H be a 2-person bargaining solution satisfying 
η 
IR, PO, STI, and GIM. Then φ = ψ for some θ € Θ. 
Proof. The proof is very much like the proof of Proposition 15.14. First, we 
construct a map θ with the aid of φ. To this end, let, for each t £ (0,1), 
L(t) := comv({(-l,l),(0,t),(t,0) ,( 1 ,-1)}), and let, for each t £ [1,2], 
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L(t) := Comv(í(t-1,1),(l,t-l)}). Define θ : [0,2] -HR2 by θ(0) := (0,0) and 
9(t) := φ(L(t)) if t G (0,2]. Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 15.14, 
now using Lemma 16.4, we have Θ Ε Ο and 
(16.2) ф(Ь(Ъ)) = ifie(L(t)) for each t £ (0,2]. 
Let S € В. We shall prove 
(16.3) φ(3) = ψ θ(5). 
0 ,θ 
In view of STI, we may suppose g(S) = (1,1). Let s := ψ.(S) + ψ (S). 
θ 
By definition of s and of ψ , and by PO, we have 
(16.4) ψθ(3) = ψ9α(3)) e p(s) η P(L(S)) С P(S η us)). 
In view of Lemma 16.4, ф(Цз)) δ φ(5 Π L(s)). In view of PO, (16.2) and 
(16.4), we obtain ф(Ь(5)) = φ(5 Π L(s)). By Lemma 16.4 again, 
φ(3) ä φ(3 Π L(s)) = ф(Цз)), hence 
(16.5) ф(5) = ф(Цз)) , 
since ф(Ц8)) £ P(S) by (16.2) and (16.4). 
Now (16.3) follows if we combine (16.2), (16.4), and (16.5). • 
Propositions 16.7 and 16.θ now lead to the main result of this section. 
2 
Theorem 16.9. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж satisfies IR, PO, 
STI, and GIM, if and only if φ = ψ for some 0 £ 0. 
2 
We call the solution KR : В -* К which corresponds to θ £ 0 with 
Q{t) := (-r-t.yt) for each t € [0,2], the KaZai - Rosenthal solution, since 
this solution was proposed as an arbitration scheme in Kalai and Rosenthal 
(1978). It is the unique symmetric member of {ψ : θ £ 0}. 
1 2 
Note further that the dictator solutions D and D correspond to θ' and θ'' 
in 0, respectively, where e'ft) = (t,0) and O'^t) = (0,t) for each 
t € [0,1], and θ·(ί) = (l,t-l) and 9"(t) = (t-1,1) for each t £ [1,2]. 
We conclude with the following corollary of the Theorems 11.θ and 16.9, 
and Corollary 15.16. 
2 
Corollary 16.10. Let φ : В -> К be a 2-person bargaining solution satisfying 
1 2 
IR, PO, and STI. Then φ £ ÍD ,D } if and only if φ has at least two of the 
three properties IIA, IM, and GIM. 
1 2 
Proof. If φ = D or φ = D , then φ satisfies IIA, IM, and GIM (e.g.. Corollary 
15.16 and Theorem 16.9). Let now φ satisfy IR, PO, and STI. If φ satisfies 
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IIA as well as IM, then φ = D or φ = D by Corollary 15.16. 
Suppose φ satisfies IIA and GIM. Let 0 Û t á 1 with (t,l-t) = φ(Δ). 
(Cf. Remark 12.10.) By STI, φ(λΔ) = (Xt,X(l-t)) for every λ £ Κ, λ > 0. 
So by PO, IR, and IIA applied to λΔ cz comv{ (λ-1,1) ,( 1 ,λ-1) } , we have 
ф(сот {(λ-1,1),(1,λ-1)}) = (Xt,X(l-t)) for every λ € Κ, λ > 0. 
This means, in view of Theorem 16.9, that φ corresponds to a curve θ € 0 with 
(16.6) Θ(Ξ) = (ts,(l-t)s) for 0 S s S 1. 
Consider V := comv({ (-1,1) , ( 1,0) }) . By IR, PO, STI, and H A applied to 
(1,-)Лс= V, we obtain φ (V) = t. By (16.6), we have φ (V) = ^- . So either 
t=l or t=0, which, in view of Theorem 11.8, implies 
1 2 
φ = D or φ = D , respectively. 
Finally, suppose φ satisfies IM and GIM. Let again φ(Δ) = (t,l-t) for some 
0 £ t й 1. In the same way as in the previous part of the proof (replace H A 
by IM everywhere) we have that either t=l or t=0. But then it follows with 
1 2 
the aid of Theorem 16.9, that ф = 0 о г ф = 0 . · 
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CHAPTER 6 
ADDITIVITY PROPERTIES 
The so-called Super-Additivity property of 2-person bargaining solutions 
was proposed by Perles and Maschler (1981). They used the property to charac-
terize a, by that time new, solution. Under a different name, it also occurs 
in Myerson (1981) . 
In this chapter, we shall consider the so-called (weak) super-additivity 
and restricted additivity properties. As main results, we obtain new charac-
terizations of the (extended) family of proportional solutions of Kalai 
(Kalai (1977)), and of the family of Nash solutions N; further, we give an 
interpretation of the use of additivity properties, which is different from 
the interpretation of the super-additivity property provided by the authors 
mentioned in the first paragraph. Our interpretation rests on the possibility 
that, sometimes, simultaneous bargaining over more than one issue has advan-
tages for both bargainers over dealing with these issues separately. In this 
setting, we shall see that the result of section 6 provides a utility-theore-
tic foundation for the use of additivity properties. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In section 17, a relation between 
simultaneity of issues and additivity in bargaining is established. 
Section 18 characterizes the above mentioned family of proportional solutions 
with the aid of the so-called partial super-additivity property. Section 20 
provides a new characterization of the family of Nash solutions M with the aid 
of the so-called restricted additivity property, and is preceded by a short 
section (19) on continuity properties of solutions. This chapter closely 
follows Peters (1985 ,1986). 
17. SIMULTANEITY OF ISSUES AND ADDITIVITY IN BARGAINING 
Suppose, two parties are facing several (separate) bargaining situations, 
on (possibly quite) different issues. Handling these situations one by one 
may yield both parties only small profits. Bargaining, however, over these 
issues simultaneously, may yield both parties larger total profits, thus 
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reflecting more properly their perhaps strong interests in some of these 
issues. The following simple example illustrates this. 
Mr. X and his wife each have a ticket for a magnificent movie, but, 
unfortunately, these tickets are not valid for the same show (there are two 
shows which take place on different evenings). Now, for each of the two 
shows for which one of the tickets is valid, there are three alternatives : 
(a) the ticket-holder watches the movie leaving his/her partner at home, 
which gives him/her б units of utility and his/her partner -2 units; (b) they 
both stay at home, but with the ticket-holder grudging the whole evening : 
0 utility for both (the disagreement alternative); (c) they both stay at home 
and play some card-game : 0 utility for the ticket-holder and 1 unit of 
utility for the partner. If we suppose for a moment that these utilities are 
additive, then Mr. X as well as his wife do very well by each one using his/ 
her ticket and receiving a net utility of 4. 
Modelling the above example with the aid of bargaining games, we may call 
Mr. X player 1 and Mrs. X player 2. There are two bargaining games to be 
played, corresponding to the two evenings on which the shows take place. If 
we suppose that Mr. X's ticket іь valid for the first show, then on this first 
evening Mr. X and his wife play a bargaining game S = coinvi (6,-2) , (0,0) , (0,1) } £ В 
where these three points correspond to the alternatives (a), (b), and (c) in 
the previous paragraph and where we assume that lotteries between these alter­
natives are possible. Similarly, on the second evening they play 
Τ = comv{(-2,6),(0,0),(1,0)} £ В. Suppose further that Mr. X and his wife 
agree to let some individually rational, Pareto optimal and symmetric bar-
2 
gaining solution φ : В -» К solve their conflicts. Then note that 
φ (S) + φ (Τ) S 3 for ι € {1,2}, whereas ф({з + t : s £ S, t £ τ}) = (4,4) . 
So it is clearly advantageous for both players to play both games simultaneous­
ly, provided we can find a way to let { s + t : s £ S , t £ T } £ B represent 
the simultaneous bargaining game; to this end, we use the additive utility 
model of section 6, as follows. 
Let Σ с BS be a family of 2-person bargaining situations, such that, for 
- 1 2 1 2 
any Г = <A,a,u ,u > and I' = <B,b,v ,v > in L, both players have preference 
relations (representable by vNM utility functions) also on L(A χ В), and such 
that conditions (6.2) and (6.4) hold, with a and b for a° and b", respectively, 
in (6.4), and such that Remark 6.2 applies. Then Theorem 6.1 and Remark 6.2 
tell us that the players' preference relations on L(A χ В) are representable 
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by vNM utility functions w with w (a,b) = u (a) + ν (b) for each 
ι б {1,2}, all a £ A, and all b € B. 
- - 1 2 
For Γ, Γ' as above, we call Γ χ Γ' :=<A χ B,(a,b),w ,w > the corres­
ponding simultaneous bargaining situation. Note that 
Γ χ I' £ BS. The following condition expresses that simultaneous bargaining 
may be more profitable for both bargainers than separate bargaining, given a 
2 
bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж 
(17.1) If £ € а Ш ф , Г ) , m e а Ш ф . Г ' ) , and η £ а Ш ф , Г χ Γ'), then, for 
1 = 1,2, w1(n) í u1(í,) + v1(m) . 
Equivalently : 
(17.2) Φ(3
Ι
 p,) ä Φ(Ξρ) + φ(3ρ,) . 
In view of the additivity of the utility functions, we may write, instead of 
(17.2) : 
(17.3) φ(8
Γ
+3
Γ
,) ä φ(Ξρ) + φ(Ξ
Γ
,). 
к к 
(In general, for S,Τ <= Ж , we denote S + T : = { s + t e B : s 6 Ξ, t £ τ}.) 
More generally, we formulate the following property. 
2 
Definition 17.1. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -» R super-additive if 
φ(Ξ + Τ) ä φ(Ξ) + φ(Τ) for all S, Τ £ В. 
(Super-additivity : SA) 
Remark 17.2. Actually, we can find Σ as above such that for every S £ В 
there is Г £ Σ with S = S„ : namely, let Σ consist of all trivial bargaining 
situations corresponding to bargaining games in В (cf. Example 9.6), with the 
sets of riskless alternatives extended with (-1,-1), for instance, to 
guarantee that Remark 6.2 holds. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall concern ourselves with 
studying solutions satisfying the super-additivity property or variations on 
it. Perles and Maschler (1981) have shown that there exists a unique bargai­
ning solution having, besides some other properties, the super-additivity 
property. There are two main differences between their approach and ours. 
First, they provide an interpretation of the use of the SA property which is 
different from ours, and which is given by the following observation. 
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Observation 17.3. Let φ : В -» R be a two-person bargaining solution satis­
fying SA and HOM (see Def. 10.4) . For any game consisting of a lottery on 
two games R and S in B, players who obey φ will prefer to reach an agreement 
before the outcome of the lottery is available. 
Proof. Let (p,l-p) be the distribution of the lottery, w.l.o.g. 0 < ρ < 1. 
If the players reach an agreement immediately, it must be φ(Τ), where 
Τ = pR + (l-p)S. By HOM and SA, 
(17.4) φ(Τ) > ρφ(Κ) + (І-р)ф(З). 
The right hand side of (17.4) is the expectation of the players from a 
delayed agreement. • 
Secondly, Perles and Maschler restrict their attention to games in the 
class В (cf. Definition 9.10) where no player can commit himself to a 
feasible outcome which is not individually rational for the other player (i.e. 
an outcome with at least one coordinate negative). Indeed, if one feels that 
one is actually dealing with noncooperative Nash bargaining games (Perles and 
Maschler (1981), p.167), then this restriction to В is justified. Recall 
the example of Mr. X and his wife at the beginning of this section. The out­
come, there, of the sumgame, (4,4), can only be achieved by the sum 
(6,-2) + (-2,6). This means that in one game player 1 can commit himself to 
(6,-2), whereas in the other game player 2 can commit himself to (-2,6). In 
a noncooperative setting, such commitments would be impossible : we are 
stuck in a prisoner's dilemma (cf. Example 1.1). Yet in a cooperative setting, 
where binding agreements are possible, these commitments lead to a net utility 
profit of 4 for both players. We shall assume such a cooperative setting. 
Perles and Maschler have already indicated that their solution cannot be exten­
ded to B. This will also follow as a corollary of the results in the next 
section. 
18. (PARTIAL) SUPER-ADDITIVITY 
In this section, we single out a family of super-additive solutions 
(cf. Definition 17.1) with the aid of the properties weak Pareto optimality, 
homogeneity, and the following property. 
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Definition 18.1. We call the 2-person bargaining solution partially super-
additive if <j>(S + T) Ì φ(Ξ) and φ(3 + T) £ φ(Τ) for all S, Τ Ε В. 
(Partial super-additivity : PSA) 
We prefer the adjective "partial" to "weak" since PSA is not implied by 
SA alone. However, 
2 
Lemma 18.2. If φ : В -» F satisfies IR and SA, then it also satisfies PSA. 
Proof. Straightforward. • 
We next define a family of bargaining solutions which, for strictly 
positive weight vectors, were introduced in Kalai (1977) . 
2 
Definition 18.3. For every ρ £ » with ρ + ρ = 1, the bargaining solution 
Ρ 2 E : В -» TR is defined by 
{ E P ( S ) } = W(S) Π {αρ : α ЕЖ, а > θ} for every S € В. 
E" IS called the egalitarian or proportional solution with weight vector p. 
Our main result in this section is the following theorem. 
2 
Theorem 18.4. Let φ : В -» Ж be a bargaining solution. Then φ satisfies 
WPO, HOM, and PSA, if and only if it is proportional. 
The proof of this theorem will make use of the following three lemmas. 
2 
Lemma 18.5. Let φ : В -» » be a solution satisfying HOM and PSA, let S £ B, 
2 
and let r € IR . Then 
++ 
(i) if r € int(S), then ф(3) S ф(сот{г}), 
(ii) ф(сот{г}) > 0. 
Proof. (ι) Ξ = com{r} + {χ - г : χ £ s}, so, if г € int(S) , we have by 
PSA : ф(3) ä ф(сот{г}) . 
(ii) By HOM : ф(сот{—г}) = — ф(сот{г}) , and, since — г € int(com{r}), 
by (i) : ф(сот{г}) i ф(сот{—г}). So ф(сот{—г}) ä — φ (сот{—г}) . Hence 
ф(сот{г}) = 2ф(сот{-г}) ä 0. 
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Corollary 18.6. Every homogeneous and partially super-additive bargaining 
2 
solution : В -» Ж is individually rational. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 18.5. • 
2 
Let now L be the set { p e n : ρ + ρ = l}. 
2 
Lemma 18.7. Let φ : В -» TR be a solution satisfying HOM, PSA, and WPO. 
Then : Either (i) ф(сот{р}) - ρ for some ρ £ L, or (n) φ (com{p}) < p. for 
all ρ € L, or ( m ) φ (comíp}) < ρ for all ρ £ L. 
Proof. Suppose (ι) does not hold. Let L := {p £ L : φ (com{p}) < p.}, 
2 1 2 
L .= {p £ L : φ (com{p}) < ρ }, and suppose that L ^ 0, L = 0 . 
1 1 2 2 
Let ρ € L , ρ € L . We show 
(18.1) p| > pj. 
1 2 1 2 2 
Suppose (18.1) does not hold, i.e. ρ < ρ and ρ > ρ . Let then q £ К be 
defined by q := — (p + φ (comíp })) , q := — (p| + φ (comíp })). 
Then q £ intícomíp }) , so by Lemma 18.5 (ι.) , φ (comíp }) ä φ (comíq}) . 
2 
Similarly, φ (comíp }) ä φ (comíq}). Altogether we obtain q > ф(соп^}), in 
contradiction with WPO. So (18.1) must hold. 
1 2 
From our assumptions : (i) does not hold, L И 0, L И 0, we conclude, with 
the aid of (18.1) , that there exists a ρ £ L such that for all ρ £ L with 
- 2 - 1 
ρ < ρ we have ρ £ L , and for all ρ £ L with ρ > ρ we have ρ £ L . 
The proof of the lemma is finished, by contradiction, if we show 
(18.2) φ(οοιηίρ}) = p. 
For any 0 < χ < ρ with x.x, < P.P, , we have, by HOM, WPO, and the fact 
2 
that αχ £ L for some a > 0, that φ (comix}) = χ . Similarly, 
φ (comíy}) = у for any 0 < у < ρ with У.У, > P-tPn · S o by Lemma 18.5 (i) 
we conclude that (18.2) holds. • 
2 
Lemma 18.8. Let φ : В -» В be a solution satisfying HOM, PSA, and WPO. Let 
ρ £ L such that ф(сотір}) = ρ if (ι) in Lemma 18.7 holds, let ρ = (0,1) if 
(in) there holds, and let ρ = (1,0) if (n) there holds. 
Then φ = Έ?. 
Proof. Let S £ В. First suppose EP(S) £ P(S). If ρ > 0, 
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ф(3) й ф(сот{ (1-ε)ΕΡ(3)}) = (1-ε)ΕΡ(3) for 1 > ε > Ο by Lemma 18.5 (ι) and 
HOM, so the proof is finished by letting ε approach 0. If ρ = (1,0), then 
take a sequence r ,r ,... in int(S) flR converging to E (S) . Then again 
φ(3) > ф(сот {г }) for each i = 1,2,..., so φ (S) ä φ (com{r }) = r for each 
ι = 1,2,..., hence φ (S) S E P(S). We conclude that φ(3) = E P(S). By a 
similar argument, φ(3) = EP(S) if ρ = (0,1). 
Suppose now that E (S) £ P(S) . We assume (the other case is similar) that 
there exists χ € P(S) with χ = E P(S). Given ε > 0, let R € В be defined 
by Κ ε := comv{ (C.E^tS)- χ ),(0,ε)}. Let T E = S + RC. (See Fig. 18.1.) 
Note that Ερ(τε) e P(T C). 
If ε approaches 0, Ε (Τ ) 
By the first part of this proof, φ(Τ ) = Ε (Τ ') 
)(T ) converges to E (S) and by PSA, 
ф(ТГ') ä φ(3) for all ε, so EP(S) ä φ(3). If ρ = (1,0) the proof is complete. 
If ρ > 0, then also the proof is complete if we note that φ(3) ì. E (S) by the 
argument in the third sentence of the proof. • 
ρ ε 
EF(T ) 
Figure 18.1. 
An immediate consequence of Lemma 18.8 is that, if, for φ there, 
ф(сот{р}) = ρ for some ρ £ L U { ( 1,0) , (0,1) }, then this ρ is unique. The 
proof of Theorem 18.4 is now straightforward. 
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Proof of Theorem 18.4. If φ satisfies the three properties in the theorem, 
then φ is proportional in view of Lemma 18.8. And it is straightforward to 
verify that a proportional solution has these properties. • 
Note that PSA is implied by SA and IR combined (Lemma 18.2), and that 
every proportional solution satisfies SA. So the following corollary is 
immediate. 
2 
Corollary 18.9. Let φ : В -» Ж be a 2-person bargaining solution. Then φ 
has the properties WPO, HOM, IR, and SA, if and only if φ is proportional. 
Perles and Maschler (1981) require their solution to have (on В ) the 
properties PO, STI, SA, SYM, and some continuity property (on continuity 
properties : see the next section). We must add IR if we consider solutions 
defined on B. Perles and Maschler call their solution the "Super-Additive 
solution". 
2 
Corollary 18.10. There does not exist a solution φ : В -» Ж with the proper­
ties STI, SA, PO, and IR. In particular, there does not exist a Supcr-
Additive solution on B. 
Proof. Straightforward from Corollary 18.9. • 
If we assume the players to have vNM utility functions, then we may con­
sider it a drawback for a solution not to have the scale transformation in­
variance property (cf. (4.2)). There are only two scale transformations in­
variant proportional solutions : this observation leads to the following 
corollary immediately. 
Corollary 18. 11. The only two solutions on В satisfying WPO, STI, IR, and SA, 
are the proportional solutions E ' and E ' 
By excluding "tyrannical" solutions (i.e. E ' , E ), Corollary 
18.11 may be formulated as an "impossiblity result". In section 20, we will 
weaken the super-additivity property, and obtain an alternative characteriza­
tion of the family of nonsymmetric Nash solutions N. 
Myerson (1981) and Kalai (1977) also give characterizations of the family 
of proportional solutions (the two "tyrannical" solutions excluded) using 
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different lists of properties. Kalai and Samet (1985) give an axiomatic 
characterization of "proportional solutions" for the general case of 
η-person games without sidepayments. 
19. CONTINUITY PROPERTIES 
2 
Let К denote the family of those compact convex subsets of Ж which 
contain the origin and a point with both coordinates strictly positive. We 
If 
provide К with the Hausdorff metric d : Κ χ К -» К defined by 
Η 
dîSs,T) := infíe > 0 : S с В (Τ) and Τ с в (S)} 
н ε ε 
2 II for all S, Τ £ К, where Β (S) := ίχ 6 R : min χ - s Se}. 
s ε s 
2 
Further, let ψ : К -» R be a map such that ψ(3) £ S for every S E K . We call 
ψ aontinuous if, for every sequence S,S.,S ,... m К with 
γ 
lim d (S ,S) = 0, we have lim ψ(5 ) = ψ(3). 
„ Η η η 
η-*
 0 0
 τι-* °° 
We now also provide the class of bargaining games В with a metric deno-
B к 
ted d and defined analogous to d . 
Η Η 
g 
(The reader may verify that d : Β χ В -» R is a metric indeed.) Continuity 
H 
2 
of a bargaining solution φ : В -» Ю is defined similarly as continuity of 
2 
ψ : К -» R above. Jansen and Tijs (1983) show that many well-known maps 
("bargaining solutions") ψ defined on К ("bargaining games") as above, are 
continuous. The following lemma relates continuity of such a ψ on К to con­
tinuity of a bargaining solution φ on B. 
2 
Lemma 19.1. Let φ : В -» TS. be a bargaining solution and let 
2 2 
ψ : К -»R be a map with ψ(ε) = ψ(3 D R ) £ S for every S € К. Let further 
ф(сот(3)) = ψ(S) for every S E K . Then : φ is continuous if and only if ψ 
is continuous. 
Proof. First, suppose φ is continuous. Let S,S ,S,,... € К with 
К В lim d„(S ,S) = 0. Then also lim d„(com(S ),com(S)) = 0, hence lim ф(сот(3 )) 
j m Η η H η „ η 
η-» ^  η->
ш
 η-»
β 
= ф(сот(3))/ so lim ψ(S ) = ψ(S) : ψ is continuous. 
η-*»
 n 
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Next, suppose ψ is continuous. Let S,S ,S ,... ζ В with 
В 2 lim d (S ,S) = 0. For Τ £ В, let m(T) С Ж be defined by 
Η η 
η-»
00 
m (Τ) := minio,χ : (χ ,χ ) £ Ρ(Τ)} and 
Κ 2 2 
m (Τ) := min{0,χ : (χ ,χ ) € Ρ(Τ)}. Now lim d ( S П К , З П К ) = 0 , 2 2 1 2 H n + " t " 
η-»
00 
2 2 
hence lim ψ(3 Π К ) = ψ(3 П В ), hence 
~,
 n + + 
п-»
ш 
l i m ψ ( { χ ε Β : x ä m ( S )} ) = ф ( { х е з : x > m ( S ) } ) , 
η η 
η-»
00 
hence lim φ(S ) = φ(S) : φ is continuous. • 
η 
n->œ 
2 
Remark 19.2. The condition "ψ(3) = ψ(3 Π R )" in Lemma 19.1 is not a necessa-
2 
ry condition. For instance, the map ψ : К -» Ж with definition similar to the 
definition of the Kalai - Rosenthal solution (see after Theorem 16.9) is con­
tinuous (Proposition 3.1 (i)(b) in Jansen and Ti^s (1983)), whereas the 
2 
Kalai - Rosenthal solution KR : В -» Ж is also continuous (proof left to the 
reader). Whether we can dispense with some condition of this kind altogether, 
is an open question. 
By combining Lemma 19.1 with Propositions 3.1 (i) (a) and 3.2 in Jansen 
and Tijs (1983), we obtain : 
Corollary 19.3. For every t E (0,1), the nonsymmetric Nash-solution 
t 2 1 2 2 
N : В -» H is continuous. The dictator solutions D ,D : В -* Ж are discon­
tinuous . 
In the remainder of this section, we shall introduce a different metric 
on В such that, w.r.t. this metric, also the dictator solutions are continuous. 
This result will be used in the next section. 
2 
Definition 19.4. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж Pareto contwruous 
if, for every sequence 3,3.,S ,... in В satisfying 
(19.1) lim dK(conv(P(S )),conv(P(S))) = 0, 
Η η 
п-»
ш 
we have lim φ(S ) = φ(S). 
η 
η-»·» 
(Pareto continuity : PCO) 
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The following lemma is straightforward : 
2 
Lemma 19.5. If the bargaining solution φ : В -» К is continuous, then it is 
Pareto continuous. 
We conclude with : 
Theorem 19.6. (a) For every t £ (0,1), the nonsymmetric Nash solution 
N : В -• It is Pareto continuous. (b) The dictator solutions D ,D : В -» Ж 
are Pareto continuous. 
Proof, (a) Follows from Corollary 19.3 and Lemma 19.5. 
(b) Let S,S ,Ξ ,... be a sequence in В satisfying (19.1). Then, in particu­
lar, lim q(S ) = q(S) where, for every Τ £ В, q(T) is the point of P(T) with 
η 
η-»
00 
maximal first coordinate. If q(S) > 0, then lim q(S ) = q(S) implies 
1 1 η - - n 
lim D (S ) = q(S) = D (S) . If q_(S) < 0, then there is an M £ U such that 
η 2 
n-x» 
D„(S ) = 0(=D„(S)) for all η > M : so again lim D (S ) = D (S) . The same 
2 η 2
 m
 η 
n-»œ 
argument holds if q_(S) = 0 and q9(S ) £ 0 for all η larger than some M' £ W; 
if q„(S) = 0 and there is a subsequence S ,S ,... with q(S ) > 0 for all 
2 η. n„ η 1 2 ι 
ι € И, then we have lim D (S ) = lim D (Ξ )= lim q(S ) = q(S) = D (S) . 
η η „ η 
n-> ^  l-> c0 1 l-> ^  1 
1 2 
We conclude that D has the PCO property. Similarly one proves PCO for D . • 
20. RESTRICTED ADDITIVITY 
In this section, we shall give an alternative characterization of the 
family N of nonsymmetric Nash solutions, with the aid of a weaker version of 
the super-additivity property. (For the following definition, recall from 
section 12 that we call an S £ В smooth at χ £ S if S has a unique supporting 
line at x.) 
2 
Definition 20.1. A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -* H is called 
restriotedly additive if, for all S and Τ in В such that S and τ are smooth 
at φ(3) and φ(Τ) respectively, and φ(5) + φ(Τ) £ P(S + Τ ) , we have 
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φ(3 + Τ) = φ(5) + φ(Τ) . 
(Restricted additivity : RA) 
Our main result in this section is the following theorem. 
Theorem 20.2. W is the family of all 2-person bargaining solutions on В with 
the properties IR, PO, STI, PCO, and RA. 
Comparing this result with Corollary 18.9, we have weakened SA to RA, 
strengthened WPO and HOM to PO and STI, and added PCO. Theorem 20.2 follows 
immediately from the following two propositions. 
Proposition 20.3. Every Nash solution satisfies IR, PO, STI, PCO, and RA. 
2 
Proposition 20.4. Let φ : В -» Ж be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, 
STI, PCO, and RA. Let t С [0,l] be such that φ(Δ) = (t,l-t). 
Then φ = N . 
(Recall from Remark 12.10 that Δ = comv{(1,0),(0,1)} € B.) 
In the proof of Proposition 20.3, we use the following lemma, which 
characterizes Pareto optimality of sums of points with the aid of parallel 
supporting lines. 
Lemma 20.5. Let S, Τ £ В and z = x + y € P ( S + T) where χ ξ. S, y £ T. Then 
we have 
(ι) χ € P(S), y £ P(T), 
(ιι) if Л is a supporting line of S + Τ at ζ, then there exist supporting 
lines i.' and £' ' of S and Τ at χ and y respectively, such that SL, l' and i.'' 
are parallel, 
(in) if S and Τ are smooth at χ and y respectively, then I, I' and I' ' in 
(n) are unique (and S + Τ is smooth at z) . 
Proof. (i) is straightforward by the definition of a Pareto optimal subset, 
and (lii) by (n) . To prove (n) , let Я be such a supporting line with a 
normal vector λ, then λ ä 0, and λ.ζ = max{X.(s+t) : s € S,t € τ} = 
maxíX.s : s € S} + maxíX.t : t € τ}, hence λ.χ = raaxíX.s : s £ s} and 
λ.y = maxíX.t : t £ Τ}, from which (il) follows immediately. • 
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Proof of Proposition 20.3. Let φ € W. We only show that φ satisfies RA 
(for PCO see Theorem 19.6). First, let φ = N for some t 6 (0,1). Let 
S, Τ € В such that S and Τ are smooth at χ := N (S) and y := Ν (Τ) respecti­
vely, and χ + y E P(S + Τ) . From Lemma 20.5 (in) it follows that there 
exists a vector λ > 0, unique up to multiplication with a positive scalar, 
such that λ.χ = maxíX.s : s ζ. s}, λ.y = maxíX.t : t € τ}, 
X.(x+y) = maxíX.v : ν ξ. S + τ}. From Lemma 12.1, it follows that χ = Yy for 
some γ > 0, hence x + y = ( l + Y ) y . By applying Lemma 12.1 again, we obtain 
N (S + Τ) = χ + y. 
1 1 
Secondly, let φ = D , and S and Τ in В such that S and Τ are smooth at D (S) 
and D (T), respectively, and D (S) + D (T) £ P(S + T ) . If D (S) = D (T) = 0, 
then D (S) + D (T) = 0, and so D (S + T) = D (S) + D (T) since 
1 1 
D (S) + D (T) € P(S) . Otherwise, in view of Lemma 20.5 (in) , the unique 
supporting lines of S, T, and S + T, at D (S), D (T) and D (S) + D (T) are 
the straight lines with equations χ = D (S) , χ = D (T), and χ = D (S + Τ) , 
respectively. So D (S + Τ) = D (S) + D (T) since D (S) + D (T) 6 P(S + T ) . 
2 
The third case, φ = D , is similar to the second one. • 
In the proof of Proposition 20.4 we will use the following two lemmas. 
2 
Lemma 20.6. Let φ : В -» Ж be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, and 
PCO. Let S 6 В such that S is smooth everywhere (i.e. at every point of 
P(S)) and such that the line of support of S at ф(3) has a normal vector with 
one coordinate equal to 0. Let ζ £ P(S), ζ / φ(3). Then there exists an 
everywhere smooth S' 6 В with S' с S and ζ £ S' such that φ(S') И ζ and such 
that the line of support of S' at φΙΞ') has a strictly positive normal vector. 
1 2 2 
Proof. First note that φ(3) = D (S) or φ(3) = D (3). Assume ф(Б) = D (3) 
(the other case is similar). If φ.(S) = 0, then an 3' as in the lemma can 
easily be found by cutting off a suitable neighbourhood of φ(3) in S in a 
smooth way. Suppose now, that φ (S) > 0. 
First, choose χ € Ρ(S) with φ (S) > χ. > ζ and such that φ (Τ) > ζ where Τ 
consists of all points of S except those strictly above the straight line 
through χ and φ(5). Such a point χ exists in view of PCO. The proof is com­
plete if ф(Т) И ф(3) for then we can take, for 3', the game Τ smoothed off 
at φ(3) and x, in view of PCO. Now suppose φ(Τ) = φ(S) . For every ε with 
0 á ε S φ (S), let Ξ £ В be the game consisting of all points of S except 
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those strictly above the straight line through χ and the point (φ (S)-ε,φ (S)). 
Note that S 0 - Τ, so φ(Ξ0) = φ (Τ) = φ(5) = D (S) = D (S0) . Now let 
E := supíe £ [0,φ (S)] : ф(Зе) = D 2(S e)}. By PCO, ф(5С) = D 2 (se) . 
If ε = φ (Ξ), then we are back in the саье of the first paragraph of the proof 
(where we assumed φ (S) = 0). Otherwise, 0 ύ ε < φ (S). 
Then take η with ε < η < φ.(S) small enough to have 
(D (Ξη) >) φ (Sn) > ζ . And take for S' the game 5П smoothed off at D (3П) 
and x. • 
2 
Lemma 20.7. Let φ : В -» R be a 2-person bargaining solution with the proper­
ties IR, PO, STI, PCO, and RA. Let μ e M be such that φ(Δ) = μ(Δ). Let 
2 
Τ £ В be such that P(T) з conv{v,w} where v, w С R satisfy 
ν + ν = w + w = α > 0, ν < 0, w < 0. Then φ(Τ) = μ(Τ). 
Proof. (See Fig. 20.1.) By STI, φ(δΔ) = μ(6Δ) for every δ € (О,00). Fix 
(5 G (0,α) . Fix 0 < ε < mini ν - δ, w - δ, -ν , -w } . 
Let D £ Β be given by the following constraints : 
{x £ W(D) : x 1 £ 0} = {(x + ε,χ2 - δ - ε) : χ € W(T), Xj i -ε}, 
íx £ W(D) : χ ä 0} = {x S 0 : χ + χ = α - δ}, 
{χ e W(D) : χ 2 S 0} = {(χ - δ - ε,χ2 + ε) : χ e W(T) , χ 2 S -ε}. 
Let Ε € Β be given by E := comv{(δ+ε,-ε),(-ε,δ+ε)}. Then E + D = T. 
2 2 
Note that E and D are smooth at every χ £ P(E) Π К and у £ P(D) Π R , 
and that all supporting lines at these points are parallel, with a normal 
vector λ = (1,1). In particular, χ + у £ P(T) for every 
2 2 
χ £ P(E) D » , у £ P(D) Г) В . So by PO, IR, and RA, ф(Т) = φ (D) + φ(Ε) , 
hence φ (Ε) ύ φ (Τ) S φ (Ε) + α - δ and φ (Ε) ύ φ (Τ) < φ (Ε) + α - δ. 
Letting now ε approach 0 gives, by PCO and the fact that φ(δΔ) = μ(δΔ), 
μ^δΔ) S φ^Τ) S μ^δΔ) + α - δ, μ2(δΔ) й φ 2 (Τ) ύ μ2(δΔ) + α - δ. 
Letting δ approach α, we obtain φ(Τ) = μ(αΔ); hence, since by definition of 
μ : μ(αΔ) = μ(Τ) , we have φ (Τ) = μ (Τ) . • 
Proof of Proposition 20.4. (See Fig. 20.2.) Let μ € W be the solution such 
that μ(Δ) = φ(Δ) = (t.l-t). Suppose there exists an S € В such that 
(20.1) ф(3) И U(S) . 
By PCO of φ and μ we may suppose that S is smooth everywhere, and by Lemma 
20.6 (with μ(3) in the role of ζ), that the supporting line of S at φ(3) has a 
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strictly positive normal vector λ. By STI, we may further suppose that 
λ = (1,1) and φ (S) + φ (S) = 1. Then we have, by Lemma 12.1 and (20.1), 
(20.2) φ(3) / (t,l-t). 
Figure 20.1. 
Let Τ := conivi (3,-2) , (-2,3) }, then, by Lemma 20.7 and μ(Τ) = (t,l-t), 
we have 
(20.3) φ(Τ) = (t,l-t). 
Further, STI and Lemma 20.7 applied to S + T, give 
(20.4) φ(3 + Τ) = 2(t,l-t). 
On the other hand, since S is smooth at φ(5), Τ is smooth at (t,l-t), and 
φ(3) + (t,l-t) ξ. P(S + T) , we have by RA and (20.3) 
(20.5) ф(5 + Τ) = φ(3) + (t,l-t) . 
By combining (20.4) and (20.5) we obtain φ(3) = (t,l-t), in contradiction 
with (20.2). Hence (20.1) must be false, so φ(3) = μ(3) for all S £ В. и 
With the proof of Proposition 20.4, also the proof of Theorem 20.2 is 
completed. The following example shows that we cannot dispense with the 
PCO property in this theorem. 
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Example 20.8. We construct a solution φ : В -» К by first defining it for 
all games S with h(S) = (1,1). By applying the appropriate scale transfor­
mations, the definition is then extended to B, which guarantees that φ satis­
fies STI. So let S E E with h(S) = (1,1). We define φ(Ξ) as follows. 
If S is smooth at N(S), then φ(5) := N(S). If S is not smooth at N(S), then 
also φ(5) := N(S) except for the case that there exists exactly one other 
2 
point χ € P(S) flit such that S is not smooth at x; m that case, φ(5) := χ. 
It is straightforward to verify that this φ, besides STI, satisfies IR, PO, 
and RA, but not PCO. 
The smoothness condition in the definition of restrictive additivity 
cannot be dispensed with, either. 
Example 20.9. Let S := comí (2,1)}. Then Ν(Δ + S) = (2,2) φ ф у ) + (2,1) = 
Ν(Δ) + Ν(Ξ) € Ρ(Δ + S). Here Δ is smooth at Ν(Δ), but S is not smooth at 
N(S) . 
We conclude this section with two remarks. 
Remark 20.10. We have the following link between the results in this section 
2 
and those in section 18. For a solution φ : В -» R and S, Τ € В, say that 
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RA applies to φ, S and Τ if S and Τ are smooth at φ(S) and φ(Τ) respectively, 
and φ(3) + φ(Τ) £ P(S + Τ ) . Then, as a consequence of Lemmas 12.1 and 20.5, 
for every t € (0,1), if RA applies to N , S and T, then N^S) = EP(S) , 
N (T) = Е^СГ) , and N (S + T) = EP(S + T) , for some ρ > 0. 
Remark 20.11. The main result of this section is related to the main result 
in Aumann (1985), where an axiomatic characterization of the so-called Non-
Transferable Utility value is given (cf. Shapley (1969)). Aumann uses a Con­
ditional Additivity axiom, which is stronger than restricted additivity, in 
that it does not require smoothness. However, Aumann restricts attention to 
smooth games, where we have the Pareto continuity property to take care of 
non-smoothness. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MULTISOLUTIONS AND PROBABILISTIC SOLUTIONS 
We restrict attention again to 2-person bargaining games. In section 21 
we consider so-called multisolutions which assign to each bargaining game not 
one outcome but a set of outcomes. Section 21 generalizes results of sections 
11 - on IIA-solutions - and 15 (on IM-solutions); it is based on Peters, Ti]s 
and de Koster (1983). 
In section 22 we introduce probabilistic solutions which assign probabi­
lities to subsets of outcomes of a bargaining game. In particular, the re­
sults of section 11 on IIA-solutions are generalized again, and there is a 
close link with the results of section 21 on IIA-multisolutions. Section 22 
is based on Peters and Ti]S (1983). 
2 1 • MULTISOLUTIONS 
2 
A (2-person) bargaining solution φ : В -» F assigns one point of S to 
each З Е В . Recall that, for nonempty sets X and У, a multifunction F : X -» Y 
is a map assigning to each element of X a nonempty subset of Y; in particular, 
we have the following definition. 
2 
Definition 21.1. A muttisolution φ : В -» К is a multifunction with ф(5) с S 
for every Ξ e В. We call φ closed-Valued if φ(S) is closed for every Ξ С В. 
2 
With every bargaining solution φ : В -* H we can associate a multiSolution 
^ 2 ^ ι ^ 
φ : В -» F by φ(Ξ) := ίφ(3)> for every S € В. We will write φ instead of φ. 
Also, we will often omit the braces in case of one-point sets. 
The purpose of this section is to characterize multisolutions with the 
aid of generalizations of properties of bargaining solutions. We give a list 
of the properties which play a role in this section, for a multiSolution 
2 
φ : В -» JR . 
Definition 21.2. 
2 
U ) Individual rationality (IR) : ф(5) с ж for every з е в . 
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(ii) [Weak] Pareto optimality ([W]PO) : ф(з) с p(s) [w(S)] for every з е в . 
(in) Scale transformation invariance (STI) : ф(аЗ) = аф(3) for every scale 
2 
transformation a Ç. К and every S Ε В. 
(iv) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (HA) : ф(3) = φ (τ) Π S for 
all S and Τ in В with S с Τ and φ(Τ) Π S φ 0. 
2 2 
(ν) Restricted monotonicity (RM) : ф(з) сф(т) - л and ф(Т) с ф(з) + и 
for all S and Τ in В with S с Τ and h(S) = h(Τ). 
(For Χ, Υ св 1 1, by X-Y we denote {x-y : χ e X,у € Y} . For h(S) , see 
Def. 9.10.) 
Note that for bargaining solutions all these properties coincide with 
the existing properties with the same names, which justifies the use of these 
same names. 
The IIA-property as formulated here, can also be found in Kaneko (1980) . 
Aumann (1985) proposes the following "IIA"-property for a multiSolution 
2 
φ : В -»Ж : for all S and Τ in В with S с Τ and φ(Τ) П S И 0, Φ(5) 3 ф(Т) П S. 
For bargaining solutions, both versions coincide. Note however, that the 
multiSolution given by S •+ P(S) for every S € В, satisfies Ашпапп'ь "IIA" 
but not our IIA : "IIA" is strictly weaker than IIA. 
The remainder of this section consists of two parts. In the first part, 
part A, we shall describe the family of all multisolutions satisfying IR, WPO, 
STI and IIA. Notice that, apart from considering multisolutions instead of 
bargaining solutions, we also generalize the results of section 11 by repla­
cing PO by WPO. In part В we describe the family of all closed-valued multi-
solutions satisfying PO, STI, and RM. (We use RM instead of a multiSolution 
version of IM merely for convenience.) Thus, the second part provides a ge­
neralization of especially Propositions 15.13 and 15.14. 
Part A ; Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
We start with a few notations. 
Definition 21.3. For S £ В, p(S) and p(S) were introduced m Definition 11.2. 
By w(S), we denote the point in W(S) with first coordinate 0, and by w(S) the 
point in W(S) with second coordinate 0. By W(S), we denote conv{w(S),p(S)}, 
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and by W(S) we denote conv{w(S),p(S)}. Finally, by M(S) we denote 
(W(S)\ {w(S)}) U {p(S)}, and by M(S) the set (W(S) \ {w(S) }) U {p(S) }. 
- - 2 
Note that w,w,p,p : в -» R are bargaining solutions with, of course, 
ρ = D = N and ρ = D = N , and that w,w,p,p,W,W,M,M : В -» R are multi-
solutions. 
Our purpose in part A is, to prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 21.4. N U {w,w} U {W,W,M,M} IS the family of all multisolutions : 
2 
В -*R which have the properties IR, WPO, STI, and IIA. 
We leave It to the reader to verify that all the mentioned multisolutions 
satisfy the mentioned properties. The other part of the theorem will be pro­
ved with the aid of a string of lemmas. Another notation : О .= com{(1,1)}. 
Remark 21.5. In Peters, Tijs, and de Koster (19Θ3) , compactness instead of 
comprehensiveness of bargaining games is assumed. A consequence is that, 
there, four additional multisolutions are found to satisfy the four proper­
ties of Theorem 21.4. See the mentioned paper for the details. 
2 
Lemma 21.6. Let φ : В -• R be a multiSolution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA. 
Then : 
(ι) If ф(П) = (0,1), then φ = w. 
(li) If φ(θ) = (1,0), then φ = w. 
Proof. We only show (i). Let φ(Π) = (0,1) and S £ В, then by STI : 
ф(М5)П) = w(S) . So by IIA applied to S ch(S)D, we have ф(3 ) = w(S) . 
Finally, by IR and IIA applied to S e s , we obtain ф(3) = w(S). • 
The following lemma can be proved in the same way as Lemma 21.6. Details 
are omitted. 
2 
Lenuna 21.7. Let φ : В -» R be a multisolution with the properties IR, STI, 
and IIA. Then : 
(ι) If ф(П) = W(D), then φ = W. 
(ii) If φ(Π) = w(a), then φ = W. 
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We need four more lemmas before we can prove Theorem 21.4. 
Lemma 21.8. Let φ : В -» R be a multiSolution satisfying IR, WPO, STI, and 
IIA. Suppose a,b £ φ(Ξ) with a φ b, for some Ξ £ В. 
Then a. 
1 bl o r a2 = b 2 · 
Proof. Suppose that a. φ b and a φ b , say a < b and a > b (noting 
In view of IR, we distinguish two cases : (i) a = 0 , that φ satisfies WPO) 
(n) a > 0. In case (i) , let Τ := comv{a,b}. Then (—,1)T с τ, and 
a € ( р П Т Π φ(Τ) φ (Ζ since φ(Τ) )(S) Π Τ => {a,b} by IIA; so, also by IIA, 
Φ((ρ1)Τ) )(T) Π (|,1)Τ. By STI, (|b1,b2) £ φ((|,1)Τ), hence (jbj .Ъ^ Ê φ (Τ) 
in contradiction with WPO. So in case (i) b 1 or a 2 
For case (n) , lete := (a1 (—a + y b ^ , a 2 (j a 2 + j b ) ) € H + + , T a s 
above, and E := comvíb,—(a+b) }. (See Fig. 21.1.) Then an elementary calcula-
1 
tion shows that cE с Τ and cb £ W(T) . Since a = с(y (a+b)) € cE П φ(Τ) , by 
IIA : ф(сЕ) = φ(Τ) Π cE. Since, by IIA, b € φ(Ε), by STI : cb £ ф(сЕ). So 
cb £ φ (Τ), a contradiction since cb 2 W(T) . Hence also in case (n) : 
a. 
1 bl 0 r a2 = Ь 2 · 
d = i(a+b) 
Figure 21.1. 
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Lemma 21.9. Let φ : В -• К be a multiSolution satisfying IR, WPO, STI, and 
IIA. Then : 
(ι) If(α,Ι) e φ(Π) for some α e (0,1), and φ Φ W, then φ = M. 
(il) If(l,a) £ φ(θ) for some α 6 (0,1), and φ Φ W, then φ = M. 
Proof. We only show (i). Let (α,Ι) € φ(π) for some α 6 (0,1), and φ φ W. 
Then, by IIA, (α,Ι) € φ (comv{ (α, 1) }) = φ ( (α, 1) Π) , so by STI, (1,1) €φ(Π). 
Let α S β < 1, then, since (α,Ι) £ φ(Π) Π (β,1)Π, we have by IIA : 
фиЗ,!)13) = (ß,l)D Π φ(α), so, because (β,Ι) € φ((β,1)Π) by STI and 
(1,1) £ φ( π), we have (β,Ι) e φ(θ). We have shown : 
(21.1) (β,Ι) £ φ(θ) for all β € [α,ΐ]. 
By (21.1) and IIA applied to (а,1)0 c u ,
 We obtain φ((α,1)Π) = 
(a,l)D Π φ(Π), hence by (21.1) and STI : (β,Ι) € φ(Ρ) for all β É [α2,ΐ]. 
So, since lim а = 0, we have Mt0) с ф(П). By Lemma 21.8, IR, and Lemma 21.7(ι) 
η-»™ 
we then have : φ(θ) = Μ(Π). 
Let S £ В. If ρ (S) > 0, then ф(5) = M(S) by a proof analogous to the proof 
of Lemma 21.6. Otherwise, let χ £ W(S), χ ä 0, χ > 0. Take у € S such that 
О < y < χ and y > χ . Then χ t M(comv{x,y}) = φ (comv{x,y}), so by IIA 
applied to comv{x,y} cz s, we have χ £ φ(5). So φ(3) = {p(S)} = M(S) , also 
in this case. • 
2 
Lemma 21.10. Let φ : В -* К be a multiSolution satisfying IR, WPO,STI, and 
IIA. Then : 
(ι) If (0,1),(1,1) £ ф(П), then φ = W. (ii) If (1,0), (1,1) € φ(α), then 
φ = W. 
Proof. We only show (i). Suppose (0,1), (1,1) £ φ( π). Take 0 < β < 1. By 
IIA : φ((β,1)0) = φ(Π) η (β,1)Π, hence (β,Ι) £ φ(Π), since (β,Ι) É φ((β,1)α) 
by STI. Since β was arbitrary, we have φ(π) = W(O), and hence φ = W, by 
Lemma 21.7 (ι). • 
2 
Lemma 21.11. Let φ : В -> Ж be multiSolution satisfying IR, WPO, STI, and 
IIA. If φ(θ) = (1,1), then φ € W. 
Proof. Assume φ (E) = (1,1). Suppose φ(Ξ)\ρ(3) φ CI for some S € В. Say 
χ £ φ(3)\Ρ(8) , then у e W(S) exists with y Ê χ, y φ χ. By STI : 
ф(уО) = γ. ву IIA : χ 6 ф(у а). So we have a contradiction from which we 
conclude that φ satisfies PO. Hence, in view of Lemma 21.8, φ is a bar­
gaining solution. Now the proof is complete by Theorem 11.8. • 
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Proof of Theorem 21.4. As noted before, the proof of the fact that the 
mentioned raultisolutions satisfy the mentioned properties, is left to the 
2 
reader. Now let φ : В -* Ж be a multiSolution satisfying IR, WPO, STI, and 
IIA. We distinguish a few cases. 
(ι) φ(θ) = (1,1). Then φ £ N by Lemma 21.11. 
(il) φ (Ο) Π W(0)\ {(1,1)} / 0 . Then, by Lemma 21.8, φ(П) с W(Π). If 
φ(α) = и(П), then φ = W by Lemma 21.7 (ι). If φ f W and (α,Ι) € φ(α) for some 
α e (0,1) , then φ = M by Lemma 21.9 (ι). otherwise φ(α) с {(0,1) , (1 ,1)}, 
hence φ (Π) = (0,1) by Lemma 21.10 (ι), so φ = w by Lemma 21.6 (ι). 
(in) φ(Π) Π W(D)\{(1,1)} 4 0. Analogous to (n) , left to the reader. • 
Part В : Restricted monotomcity 
We start by introducing an extension of the concept of a monotonie curve 
of section 15. 
Definition 21.12. A monotonia multbourve is a multifunction μ : [1,2] -» V, 
where V := conv{(1,1),(1,0),(0,1)}, with the following properties : 
(21.2) For every t £ [1,2], p(t) is a non-empty closed subset of 
{x £ V : χ + χ = t}. 
2 2 
(21.3) For all s, t 6 [1,2] with s it : M(t) с:ц(з) +Ж , U(s) cp(t) -B . 
The family of all monotonie multicurves is denoted by M. 
We will see that to monotonie multicurves correspond closed RM-multiso-
lutions. We first take a closer look at monotonie multicurves. For μ € M, 
let 0(μ) := U μ(ΐ). Further, recall that a multifunction F s X -» Y 
t e [1,2] 
(with X and Y topological spaces) is called upper semieontinuoue if for every 
open U с γ the set F (U) := {χ £ Χ : F(x) с υ} is open in Χ; and lower senri-
continuous if for every open U с γ the set F (U) := {x e X : F(χ) Π и ^  0} is 
open m Χ. 
Lemma 21.13. Let μ € M. Then μ is upper and lower semicontinuous and 0(μ) is 
a closed subset of V. 
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proof. (ι) First we prove that μ is upper semicontinuous. Let U be an open 
subset of V (where V is provided with the relative topology). We show that 
μ+(υ) is open in [1,2]. This is true if μ (U) = 0. Suppose t0 £ μ (U). Then 
]i(t°) is a compact subset of U. So we can take an ε > 0 such that 
Τ := íx e V : I х-уі < ε for some y Ε μ(ί0) } <= U. Let t € [1,2] , with 
t0 - ε < t й f . By (21.3) , for each χ £ p(t) there is an y £ μ(ΐ0) with 
x < y. Then (by (21.2)) ¡y-xlj = (YJ-XJ)* ( Y J - V = ( yl + y2 ) " (xl+ X2 ) = 
t" - t < ε, so χ £ Τ с и. Hence p(t) с и, t £ μ+(υ). If t £ [1,2] with 
t° ¿ t < t" + Z, then there is, for each χ £ y(t), a ζ £ \l(t°) with ζ S χ. 
We then find, similarly, \l(t) eu, t £ μ (U) . 
(n) Next, we prove that μ is lower semicontinuous. Let U again be an open 
subset of V. We show that μ (U) is open m [1,2]. Suppose t £ μ (U) and 
χ £ W(t ) Π U.There is a δ > 0 with {y £ V : || y - x|| < 6} с U. Let 
1 1 
s £ [t ,t + δ) fi [1,2]. Then u ä χ for some u £ U(s) . Then || u - χ || . < δ, so 
u £ U, s £ μ"(υ). Similarly for s £ (t1- δ,^] П [1,2]. 
(ni) Finally, we show that 0(μ) is a closed subset of V. Let 
Η(μ) := {(t,x) : t £ [1,2], χ £ μ^)} be the graph of μ. Then, since μ is 
upper semicontinuous, Η(μ) is a closed subset of [1,2] χ V (see Hildenbrand and 
Kirman (1976, p.194)). So Η(μ) is compact, and also D(y) = ττ(Η(μ)) is compact 
where π : [1,2] χ V -» V is the continuous function with TT(t,x) = χ for all 
(t,x) £ [1,2] χ V. • 
Lemma 21.14. Let S £ В with h(S) = (1,1) , and μ £ M. 
(ι) if a € 0(μ) and (a - В ) Π P(S) ¿ 0, then (a - R2) П P(S) Л ϋ(μ) И 0. 
(ii) if b £ 0(μ) and (b + R2) П P(S) / 0, then (b + R 2) fl P(S) Π 0(μ) ^  0. 
Proof. We only prove (n) . If b £ P(S) or (1,1) £ P(S), then there is 
nothing to prove. So, suppose b £ P(S) and (1,1) ΐ P(S). Let 
К := {χ £ V : b S χ < (1,1)} and let β := b + Ь . Let μ : [β,2] -• V be the 
multifunction with i¡(s) = μ(3) Π К for all s £ [0,2]. In view of (21.3), 
μ(3) ¿ 0 for each s £ [β,2], and μ is upper and lower semicontinuous in view 
of Lemma 21.13 and the fact that μ is the restriction to [β,2] of a monotonie 
multicurve. Now let 
V := {x £ К : χ ? P(S), (х-К^) П P(S) ¿ 0}, Ij := {t £ [β,2]: i¡(t) с ν}, 
W := {χ £ К : χ ? P(S) , (χ+R2) ПР(3) ¿0}, Ι 2 := {t £ [β,2]: ¡¡(t) П W И 0}. 
Note that 2 £ I , that β £ I. because Ь € μ(β), and that Ι Π I = 0. 
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Since V and W are open subsets of К (in the relative topology) it follows 
from the upper and lower semicontinuity of the multifunction μ, that I. and 
I 2 are open subsets of [3,2]. Now Ij U I 2 = [3,2] if (b+ Έ?) П P(S) П О Ш ) = 0 
and that is in contradiction with the connectedness of [3,2]. Hence 
(b+ Ж 2) Π P(S) Π 0(μ) fi 0. • 
We now associate with each μ £ M a multifunction IT : Β -» К . Let S € В. 
If h(S) = (1,1) then let ττμ(5) := 0(μ) П P(S) . In general, let 
π
μ(Ξ) := h(S)πμ ((h^sr^h^srSs) . 
Proposition 21.15. Let μ £ M. Then π is a closed-valued multiSolution 
satisfying PO, STI, and RM. 
Proof. By Lemma 21.14, π (S) ^ (3 for each S £ В. Since 0(μ) is closed in 
view of Lemma 21.13 and also P(S) is closed, we have π (S) closed for each 
S £ В. Further, it is obvious that π satisfies PO and STI. To prove that 
π satisfies the RM-property, let S and Τ in В with h(S) = h(T) = (1,1) and 
S с т. Take а С Τΐμ(Τ). Then (а-К ) Π P(S) ^ 0. By Lemma 21.14 (i) : 
0 φ (а-Κ 2) Π P(S) Π 0(μ) = (a-K
+
) Π πμ(3) . This implies that 
μ u 2 
IT (T) с TT (S) + Ж . Analogously, it follows with Lemma 21.14 (n) that 
π
μ(3) с πμ(τ) - » 2 . • 
2 
Lemma 21. 16. Let φ : В -» В be a multiSolution satisfying PO and RM. Let 
S, Τ £ В with h(S) = h(T). Then ф(3) Г) P(T) с ф(Т). 
Proof. Let D := S Π Τ 6 В. Then h(D) = h(S) = h(T). Take у € φ(S) Π Ρ(Τ). 
Then y £ P(D). By RM, χ á y for some χ £ φ(ϋ). 
Since also χ £ P(D) by PO, we have χ = y, so y £ φ(0). By RM again, there is a 
ζ £ φ(Τ) with y £ ζ. Since y, ζ £ Ρ(Τ) we have y = ζ £ φ(Τ). Hence, 
φ(3) Π Ρ(Τ) с φ(Τ) . • 
2 
Lemma 21.17. Let φ : Β -» H be a multiSolution satisfying PO and RM. Let 
S £ В. Then : 
(ι) φ(5) = φ(3 ), (ιι) φ is individually rational. 
Proof. (ιι) follows from (ι) and PO, and (ι) from PO and RM. • 
2 
Proposition 21.18. Let φ : В -» Ж be a closed-valued multiSolution satis­
fying PO, STI, and RM. Then φ = тг for some μ £ M. 
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Proof. Let V(t) := comv{(1,0),(1,t-l),(t-1,1),(0,1)} for each t £ [1,2]. 
2 
Define the multifunction μ : [1,2] -»В by y(t) := φ(ν(^) for all t £ [1,2]. 
Then U(t) is a non-empty closed subset of P(V(t)) = {x € V : χ + χ = t} and 
f o r l â s < t < 2 w e have by RM of φ : 
\l(t) = φ ( ν ( ί ) ) с ф( Ы ) + п2+ = μ (s) +Ж^, 
μ (s) = φ(ν(ε)) с φ ( ν ( ΐ ) ) - :R2 = u( t ) - ж 2 . 
Hence, μ £ M. We want to show that φ = π . In view of STI, it is sufficient 
to show that φ(3) = IT (S) where S £ В with h(S) = (1,1). Note that 
φ(ν^)) = ττμ(ν(ΐ)) for all t € [1,2]. Take χ ξ. ТТУ(5). Let s := χ + χ . 
Then, by applying Lemma 21.16 we obtain : 
x e ττ
μ(3) Π p(v(s)) => χ e πμ(ν(Ξ)) = ф( (Е)), 
х e Ф( (з)) η p(s) =» χ e Φ(5). 
Hence, TT (S) с ф(3). For the converse, take an у € ф(5) and let t := у + у 
(note that у € V in view of PO of φ and Lemma 21.17(ii)) . Then, by applying 
Lemma 21.16 again : 
у £ φ (S) Π P(V(t)) ·» y € ф( (і)) = 7ry(V(t)) , 
y e TTU(v(t)) η ρ (s) => y e π μ ( 3 ) . 
So, φ(3) с ττμ(3). We have proved that φ(3) = π μ(3). • 
The main result of this part of the section follows from Propositions 
21.15 and 21.18. 
Theorem 21.19. {тг : μ € м} is the family of all closed-valued multisolutions : 
2 
В -* Ж which satisfy PO, STI, and RM. 
In Peters, Tijs, and de Koster (1983), it is shown that PO in Theorem 
21.19 can be relaxed to WPO if a class of not necessarily comprehensive 
bargaining games is considered, instead of B. In the present Theorem 21.19 
however, PO cannot be replaced by WPO : 
2 
Example 21.20. All following multisolutions φ : В -> Ж satisfy WPO, STI, 
RM, but not PO. For every S € В : 
(ι) ф(3) =W(S), (il) ф(3) = W(S) ПЖ^, 
(ni) φ (S) = h(S) (0(μ) Π W((h (S)" , h (S)" ) S) ) for a fixed arbitrary μ € M, 
(iv) φ(Ξ) = {([^(S)] 2, p 2(S)), ÜPjtS)]3, ¿2(S))} if h(S) = (1,1) and 
φ(5) = Ь(3)ф((Ь1(5)"
1
, h2(S)~
1)S) otherwise. 
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22. PROBABILISTIC SOLUTIONS 
Whereas a bargaining solution assigns exactly one point to a bargaining 
game, and a multisolution a set of points, a so-called probabilistic solution 
assigns a probability distribution (measure) to each bargaining game. We 
shall see that (multi)solutions can be related to probabilistic solutions. 
We shall study "probabilistic" versions of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives property, and characterize families of probabilistic solutions 
with the aid of such properties. Thereby, like in the previous section, we 
extend results of section 11. As everywhere in this chapter, we confine our­
selves to the 2-person case. 
For S G В, we denote by σ(3) the Bore! σ-algebra of S. A probability 
measure on S is a map φ : σ(3) -» [0,1] such that φ (S) = 1 and such that φ 
is σ-additive, i.e. φ ( UE ) = Ι φ (E ) if E , E ,... is a sequence of pair-
¿5 -ι 1 O J _ L Z. 
wise disjoint elements in a(S). The support of ф
с>
 denoted зирр(ф ), is 
о S 
defined by 
зирр(ф ) :- {χ С S : Φ3(Ε) ? 0 for all E in σ(5) with χ € Ε}. 
M(S) denotes the family of all probability measures on S and F(S) <= M(S) the 
family of all probability measures with finite support. 
A probabitistia solution is a map φ assigning to each S € В an element 
φ in M(S). For з е в and E € σ(3), φ (E) can be interpreted as the probabi­
lity that the final agreement between the players in the bargaining game S 
will be in E. 
2 
To a bargaining solution φ : В -» Η we associate a probabilistic solution 
Φ by φ (ίφ(3)]) = 1 for every S £ В. We call φ the probabilistic solution 
oorrespondbng to φ, and will write φ instead of φ. As in the previous section, 
we wi]1 often omit braces in case of one-point sets. 
% 2 
Further, we say that the (multi)solution φ : В -» Ж supports the probabi-
listic solution φ if φ (S) = зирр(ф ) for every S G В. 
In the remainder of this section, we shall often use the abbreviation 
"p-solution" for "probabilistic solution". Many properties for bargaining 
solutions can be translated in an obvious way for a probabilistic solution φ : 
Definition 22.1. 
2 
(i) Individual rationality (IR) : φ (S Π к ) = 1 for all S € в. 
di) [V/eak] Pareto optimality ([w]po) : φ (P(s)) = 1 [φ (W(S)) = 1] for ail 
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з е в . 
(in) Saale transformation invariance (STI) : φ (aE) = φ (E) for all S £ в, 
as s 
E E 0(3) , and a £ В . 
We propose the following "probabilistic" version of the IIA-property, 
for a p-solution φ. For solutions, this property coincides with the IIA-pro­
perty given in Def. 11.1. 
Definition 22.2. We call φ independent of irrelevant alternatives if, for all 
S and Τ in В with S с T, and every E in σ(3), \ 
(Independence of irrelevant alternatives : IIA) 
c Τ 0 ) , we have φ (E) È Φ-, (E) 
This IIA-property may be interpreted as follows. If the set of possible 
outcomes in a bargaining game is decreased, then every still available (Borei) 
subset of outcomes should have at least as large a probability of containing 
the final agreement of the game as it originally had. Two preliminary results 
with respect to this property are in order. 
Lemma 22.3. Let φ be a p-solution satisfying IR and IIA. Then : 
(ι) φ (Ε) = φ (E) for every S € В and E E σ(3 ). 
(li) For all S, Τ € В with S с Τ , we have φ (E) ä φ (E) for every E € 0(S). 
Proof. Let S б В, E б 0(3 ). Then by IR and IIA : φ (E) = 
φ 3 (E Π Ж^) > фз (Ε Π Έ?) = φ 5 (Ε) and φ 3 ( (S Π F^) \ Ε) > φ ( (S П Κ^ ) \Ε) , 
2 hence φ (Ε) = φ (Ε) since otherwise φ„ (S Л Ж ) > 1. This proves (ι). 
S S S + 
ι ι ι 2 
Let Τ € В with S C T . Let E 6 0(3). Then φ (E ) = φ (Ε Π К ) = 
+ + S 5 + 
Ф 2 (E' fi ΐ φ > φ τ (Ε* Π ΐφ = φ (Ε' Π ΐφ = φ (Ε*), by IR, IIA, and (l). This 
+ + 
proves (il). • 
Lemma 22.4. Let S G В and let φ be a p-solution with the properties IR, STI, 
2 « 
and IIA. Then χ i n Π P(S) U {0,w(S) , w(S) } implies φ (χ) = 0. 
+
 2 2 
Proof. Let χ € S. If χ £ К , then Фд(х) = 0 by IR. Suppose χ e n , and 
suppose there exists a set S <=• S such that y S χ for all y £ Ξ , S is 
Χ X X 
countably infinite, and for every y € S there exists an a € K^ with ay = x. 
By STI and IIA, if y € S and ay = χ for some a € R , then φ (y) = 
χ ++
 T
s 
as 
(χ) ä Φ (x) since a i (1,1). If Φ (x) > 0, then summing for all y £ S 
θθ 
would yield ·*> = φ (S ), an impossibility. So ф
с
(х) = 0. The proof is com-
ib X s „ 
plete by the observation that such a set S exists for every χ £ S Π К with 
χ Ζ P(S) Π {0,w(S), w(S)}. • 
The remainder of this section consists of two parts. In part A we 
characterize a family of finite p-solutions with the aid of the IIA-property; 
we call a p-solution finite if φ € F(S) for every S G В. In part В, we 
characterize a family of p-solutions with the aid of the so-called "conditional"-
IIA-property, which is strictly weaker than IIA. 
Part A : Finite probabilistic solutions with tho IIA-property 
We start with some additional notations. For every к € TI/ let 
Qk := {χ C m k : χ > 0, Σ k, χ = 1}. 
* ι=1 ι 
Let further Й be the family of p-solutions N U {W,W,D} (D IS the disagreement 
"k 1 2 к rk 
solution, see Definition 11.7). For к £ W, q € Q , and V = (V ,V ,...,V ) £ Ν , 
к ι 
let the finite p-bolution q.V be defined by q.V (Ε) := Σ q V (E) for every 
S £ В and E £ σ(3). In words, q.V is a probability mixture of к p-solutions 
of the family N. Our main result in part A is the following theorem. 
Theorem 22.5. φ is a finite p-solution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA, if and 
к rk 
only i f φ = q.V for some k £ l J , q £ Q , v £ M . 
Note that Theorem 11.8 is a special case of Theorem 22.5. See also the 
paragraph before Def. 11.7, about the dibagreement solution D. 
In order to prove the theorem, we need some lemmas. But first we give 
the following proposition. 
к rk Proposition 22.6. For every k £ n , q £ Q , v £ N , the p-solution q.V is 
finite and satisfies IR, STI, and IIA. 
Proof. Follows from the fact that every V £ Η satisfies the mentioned pro­
perties. • 
Θ9 
For the following lemma, recall (Def. 9.12) that, for S € В, the function 
1 - 2 2 
f : [0, w (S) ] -» Ж has graph W(S) U P(S) П F and f : [θ, w (Ξ) ] -» H has 
2 
graph W(S) U P(S) Π Ж . Both functions are nonincreasing and concave (cf. 
Lemma 9.13). 
Leimna 22.7. Let Ξ £ В. Then : 
1 2 (ι) There are at most countably many points in the domains of f and f 
where these functions are not differentiable. 
2 
(ii) For every χ £ P(S) П К there is a φ £ N with (f>(S) = x; if χ > 0, χ φ p(S) , 
+
 1 
then this φ is unique if and only if f is differentiable in χ ; if χ > 0, 
2 
χ φ p(S), then this φ is unique if and only if f is differentiable in χ . 
2 (in) For every χ £ P(S) Π Ш , there is a closed interval J in [0,1] such 
+
 t x 
that, for all φ £ Μ, φ(S) = χ if and only if φ = N for some t £ J . 
2 X 
(iv) If x, y £ Ρ(Ξ) Π В , then α á β for all α £ J , β £ J if and only if 
X1 = У, "1 - -τ 
2 
Proof. (i) E.g. Theorem 25.3 in Rockafellar (1970). (n) Let χ £ P(S) П ]R . 
- 2 1 + 
If χ = p(S) then χ = D (S). If χ = p(S) then χ = D (S). Otherwise there is 
a supporting line of S at χ (e.g. Theorem 11.6 m Rockafellar (1970)) with 
a strictly positive normal vector, say (—, ) for some t £ (0,1). Then 
Xl X2 
t - 1 • 
χ = N (S) by Lemma 12.1. Now let χ > 0, χ Φ p(S), If (f ) (χ ) exists then : 
1 ' 1 
either (f ) (χ ) = 0 implying φ (S) = χ •• φ = D for all φ £ N by Lemma 12.1; 
1 ' t 
or (f ) (x_) < 0 implying φ(5) = χ » φ = N for all φ £ W and some unique 
t £ (0,1), by Lemma 12.1 again. If f is not differentiable in χ , then 
t 
N (S) = χ for infinitely many t £ (0,1), by Lemma 12.1 again. The final 
statement in (n) can be proved analogously. Also (in) and (iv) can be proved 
mainly with the aid of Lemma 12.1. We only note : if χ = p(S) = w(S), then 
J = {θ}; if χ = p(S) / w(S) then J = [0,t] for some t £ [0,1]; if x £ P(S) with 
P^S) < x 1 < ρ (S) then J = [s,t] for some s, t £ (0,1) with s < t; if 
x = p(S) φ w(S), then J = [t,l] for some t € [0,1]; and if χ = p(S) = w(S), 
then J = {l}. The proof of these facts Is left to the reader. • 
If we have a finite p-solution φ satisfying IR, STI, and IIA, and we 
к rk know that φ = q.V for some k £ l J , q £ Q , v £ W , then, according to Lemma 
22.7, the exact values of k, q, and V, could be determined by considering 
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φ for an S ε Β with only positive Pareto optimal points and with Pareto 
S
 1 2 
functions f and f differentiable everywhere on the interiors of their 
2 domains; e.g. the comprehensive hull of the ball in F with center (1,1) and 
radius 1. For proof-technical reasons, however, it will be more convenient 
to look at the games Δ = comv{(1,0),(0,1)} and α = com{(l,l)}. 
Lemma 22.Q. Let φ be a finite p-solution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA. Then : 
(ι) φ
Λ
(0) =φ 0 ( 0 ) , (il) φπ((1,1)) = φ (Ρ(Δ)) - φπ((1,0)) -φ ο((0,1)), 
(in) φ ((1,0)) > φ
α
((1,0)), ф
д
((0,1)) ä φ
π
((0,1)). 
Proof. By IIA, φ (0) ä φ,-,ίΟ), and by IIA and STI, φ^Ο) = Φι
α
(0) ä φ (0) , 
hence (ι) is proved. (in) follows by IIA. In view of Lemma 22.4 and (ι) , 
φ (Ρ(Δ)) = 1 - φ (0) = 1 - φ
π
(0) = φ
α
((1,1)) + φ
π
((1,0)) + φ
π
((0,1)), hence 
(il) is proved. • 
For an arbitrary fixed p-solution φ, we define the following numbers in 
[0,1] : 
q D := Ф п<0). Ч^ ·•= Φα((1,0)), q- := φα((0,1)) , 4 ι := ΦΛ((1,0)) - φα((1,0)), 
q0 ! = <Ι ,Δ ( ( 0' 1 ) ) " Φ α ^ 0 ' 1 ^ ' 4 t := ΦΔ((t,l-t)) for every t e (0,1). If φ is 
a finite p-solution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA, then, by Lemma 22.θ and 
Lemma 22.4, we know : 
(22.1) Φ3(Ε) = qDDs(E) + q ^ t E ) + %^s^) + lt£[0 і] з ( Е ) f 0 r e a C h E e c J ( S ) 
holds for S = a and S = Δ. Until further notice, φ will be this arbitrary 
but fixed finite p-solution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA. We want to show that 
φ satisfies (22.1) for every S ε В. 
Lemma 22.9. Let S € В. Then : (ι) φ,,ίΝ^ε)) ^ q for every t £ (0,1), 
- t 
(li) φ3(0) > q D, (in) φ8(ν(3)) ä q ^ (iv) φ5(ν(3)) > q^, (ν) φ3(Ν (S)) Z^, 
(vi) φ3(№(3)) > q0. 
Proof. (ii), (in), and (iv) , follow, with the aid of Lemma 22.3 (n) from 
applying STI and IIA to S and h(S) n. (i) follows, with the aid of Lemma 
22.3 (ii) and Lemma 12.1, from applying, for each t € (0,1), STI and IIA to 
S and (t~ Nj(S), (l-t)~ N^tsnA. Of (v) and (vi) , we prove (vi) . If S = о, 
then (vi) holds since (22.1) holds for S = n . Now suppose S ^ Π. Since 
φ ε F(S), there is a point ζ ε P(S), ζ И N (S) such that φ (χ) = 0 for all 
0 -
χ 6 P(S) with N (S) < χ - ζ . Let the straight line through w(S) and ζ 
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contain (α,Ο) where α > 0, and let Τ := comv{w(S),(α,Ο)}. 
Let V := S Π Τ. By STI, φ (w(S)) = q + q-, hence by IIA, 
φ (w(S)) £ q. + q-. We now distinguish two cases. First, suppose V 0 w 
w(S) ИМ (S). By the choice of ζ and Lemma 22.4, Ф3( ) = 1 - φ (Ν (S)). 
Further, ф3( ) = Ф3(^(5)) + Фд( \ {w(S)}) , so 
Ф5(^(3)) = 1 - Ф3(№(5)) - ф3( \{^(3)}) > 1 - ф3(№(5)) - ф ( ) + фу(Й5)) > 
q- + q - φ (Ν (S)). Further, STI and IIA give q- = φ
 D(w(S)) > φ (w(S)) 
where a = N (S). We conclude, for this case, that φ (Ν (S)) S q . 
Secondly, if w(S) = №(S) then 1 - φ (№(S)) = Ф3( \{ ?(5)}) S фу(У\{у;(Б)}) 
á 1 - q„ - q-. So also in this case : φ„(Ν (S)) δ q . • U W s u 
If S e В is such that the set {w(S),w(S)} U {мЬ(5) : q > 0} contains 
exactly 2 + | {t Ç. [0,1] : q > 0}| elements, then φ satisfies (22.1) for 
such an S, in view of Lemma 22.9, since the sum of all probabilities 
(Чг,» 4 r •··) is 1. The following two lemmas take care of games S where Û w 
this is not the case. 
Lemma 22.10. Let S £ В. 
(l) If w(S) = N (S) , then φ3(ν(3)) S q- + q0. 
(il) If w(S) = N^S), then ф3(^(3)) È qw + q . 
Proof. We only prove (i). Let w(S) = N (S). Choose ζ > 0 as in the proof 
of Lemma 22.9. Let V := {x e S : χ £ ζ }. Then, by IIA, 
Φ
ν
(ν\{ζ,(0,ζ2)}) > φ3(ν\{ζ,(0,ζ2)}) = ф3(3\{^(3)}) = 1 - φ3(^(3)). 
So 1 = ф ( ) > 1 - ф^ЙЗ)) + φ
ν
({ζ,(0,ζ2)}) > 1 - φ5(ίί(5)) + q0 + q^, 
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 22.9, (iv) and (vi). We con­
clude that φ (w(S)) 2 q- + q . • 
Lemma 22.11. Let S € Β, ζ e P(S), ζ > 0. Then : φ (ζ) Ì Σ q 1 (ζ) 
S
 te[0,1]11 {/(S)} 
Proof• Let I := {tf ζ Ν : ЦЬ(S) = ζ, q > θ}. 
If I I I =1, then the proof is complete in view of Lemma 22.9, (ι), (ν), and 
(vi). If Ν , N € I, then S = h(S)n (e.g., Lemma 22.7 (lii)), and the proof 
is complete again. We are left with the case : | I | 2 2 and {Ν ,N } £ I, and 
we will give a proof by induction on | I [ . So we suppose the lemma holds 
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for I I I < k, where к G К, к ä 2. Then let | I | = к, I ^  {Ν ,N }. Let J be 
the closed interval in [0,1] as in Lemma 22.7 (111). There is an 
t' t* ' 
r € int (J ) such that t' < r < t", with t', t" € J and N , N e I. By 
ζ ζ 
Lemma 12.1, there is a supporting line i of S at ζ with equation 
r z . x , + ( l - r ) z , x _ = z , z „ . S i n c e r e i n t ( J ) , £ Π S = { ζ } . L e t ε > 0 , ε < ζ , ζ , 2 1 1 2 1 2 Ζ 1 / 
Then : 
S £ := S Π {χ € Κ : r z χ + ( l - r ) z χ S ζ ζ - ε} Ε Β. 
r ε -1 r ε 
By Lemma 12.1, Ν (S ) = (ζ.ζ.-ε) (ζ ζ ) ζ. Since ζ > Ν (S ) , we have 
Ν (S ) ? P(S), so, in particular, fìp is differentiable in Nn(S ). Hence, it 
S*- ¿ 
f o l l o w s by Lemma 2 2 . 7 , ( i i ) - ( i v ) , t h a t : 
(22 .2 ) N^(SC) < [>] N^(SE) i f ^ e i w i t h ί < [ > ] Γ , Ν ^ ( Ξ ε ) > Ν ^ ( 3 Γ ) , N ° ( s e ) < N ^ ( s e ) 
Since i Π S = {ζ} and φ is a finite p-solution,there is an η 6(0,ζ ζ ) small 
enough such that 
(22.3) φ3(ε\{ζ}) = Φ3(3
η) =φ 3(Ξ
η\Α) 
where A := {χ 6 S : rz χ + (l-r)z χ = ζ ζ - η}. 
By definition of S , we have ψ(S ) 6 A for all ψ 6 I. By the choice of r, 
(22.2), and the induction hypothesis, we obtain : 
(22.4) φ
 η
(Α) > α := Σ q . 
Ν € I 
By (22.4) we have : 1 = Ф5П(3
П) = Ф ^ Б ' Ч А ) + Φ3η(Α) > α + φ,,η^ΧΑ). 
So by (22.3) : φ (S\{z}) й 1 - α, hence : φ (ζ) ì a, which proves the 
lemma. • 
Proof of Theorem 22.5. The "if"-part of the theorem is Proposition 22.6. 
For the "only if'-part, let φ be a finite p-solution with the properties IR, 
STI, and IIA. We want to show : φ = q.V for some к € H, q € Q , V 6 N . Let 
4nF q-, q, q,.» be the numbers defined before Lemma 22.9. Among these num-
bers there are only finitely many positive ones, say k, and these sum to 1, 
in view of Lemma 22.Q. These positive numbers can be arranged to constitute 
a vector q 6 Q , and the corresponding solutions constitute an element 
V 6 R . Lemmas 22.9 - 22.11 show that φ satisfies (22.1) for every S 6 B. 
Hence, φ = q.V. • 
We conclude this part of section 22 by noting that Theorem 11.8 can be 
derived from Theorem 22.5 by considering p-solutions corresponding to bar­
gaining solutions; recall that Theorem 11.8 provides a characterization of the 
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family N of bargaining solutions with the aid of HA. 
Part В : Conditional independence of irrelevant alternatives 
In this second half of the section, we concern ourselves with a variation 
on Theorem 22.5 : we will not require a p-solution φ to be finite but, on the 
other hand, replace HA by a stronger property. This property bears close 
resemblance to the so-called Choice Axiom in Luce (1979). 
Definition 22.12. We call the p-solution φ oonditionally independent of 
irrelevant alternatives if for all S, Τ € В with S с: τ and all E € 0(3) , we 
have : Ф5(Е)фт(3) = φτ(Ε) . 
(Conditional independence of irrelevant alternatives : CHA) 
An equivalent way to formulate CHA is : for all S and T in В with S с τ, 
and for all E € σ(3), if φ (S) ^  0, then Φ (E) = φ (Ε)φ (S)" . So Φ
Ξ
(Ε) is 
equal to the conditional probability of E given S under φ . This explains the 
use of the expression "conditional" HA. 
Note that, for S and Τ in В with S с Τ, and Ε ξ. σ(3) , HA only requires 
φ (Ε) ä φ (E) . If φ (Τ \ S) ?* 0, then this remaining "probability mass" has 
to be distributed over 3. The CHA-property gives one way to do this. Thus, 
HA is weaker than CHA; in the sequel, it will turn out that HA is strictly 
weaker, even in the presence of conditions like PO, IR, and STI. 
The p-solutions debcnbed in the following definition all satisfy IR, 
STI, and CHA. 
Definition 22.13. For every t E (0,00) , the solutions D , D , W , W , are 
defined as follows. For S € В and E С 0(3), 
ï1(S)"t ƒ 1 (x)dx1:, 
[O.WjCS)] {XE E : x2=0} 
w (S) t ƒ 1 (x)dx^, 
[0,w2(S)] {xÊE : x^O} 
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¿(E) : = 
P p(S) - t ƒ 1 (x)dx^ if ρ (S) > О 
[0,p2(S)] {xGE : x ^ p ^ S ) } 
w
s
(E) if p2(S) = 0, 
Wg(E) := \ 
¿.(S) t ƒ_ 1 (xjdx*1 if ρ (S) > О 
[Ο,ρ^Ξ)] {χ€Ε : x 2=p 2(S)} 
w (Ε) if p^S) = 0. 
t s For all t,s £ (0,°°) , the solutions h ' are defined as follows. For S £ В, 
E £ σ(3) : 
hg'S(E) := α/Γ 1 (x)dxjdx2 where α := (ƒƒ lg (x)dx^dx2)"1. 
]R2 R2 
+ + 
So, for S e В, D and D are nonatomic probability measures with 
- t -t 
supports conv{0,w(S)} and conv{0,w(S)} respectively, and W and W are 
nonatomic probability measures with supports W(S) and W(S) (if W(S) ^ {w(S)}, 
— — t s 
W(S) И {w(S)}), respectively, and h ' is a nonatomic probability measure 
2 S 
with support S Π Ж . 
The proof of the following proposition is left to the reader. 
Proposition 22.14. If φ £ Я or φ £ {Db, 5 Ь, W*1, vF, h t' S : t,s € (0,°°)}, 
then φ satisfies IR, STI, and CHA. 
We will show that the converse of this proposition also holds. The 
proof will be based upon a string of lemmas. In these lemmas, φ is an arbi­
trary but fixed p-solution satisfying IR, STI, and IIA. 
2 1 2 2 
Lemma 22.15. Let E С σ(Π), E C K , and let a , a , ... € Κ with 
І — 2 + + 
(1,1) й а È a í ... . Let a E = E for every η € M, and 
E = (lim a )0 η Ю . Then, if Ф0(Е) > 0, we have Φ,-,ίΕ) = 1. 
η-»
00 
Proof. Let ФдІЕ) = e > 0. By STI and CHA, we have for every η £ N : 
ε = φ
α
(Ε) = ф
а П а
(Е)ф
а
(а Пп) = εφ
ϋ
(3 ηα), hence φ,-,^Π) = 1. So 
lim φ (a π) = 1, which implies, by σ-additivity of φ
α
, that φρίΕ) = 1. • 
n-»œ 
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Lemma 22.16. (ι) φ
ο
(0) > О =» φ
α
(0) = 1 (li) φ
α
((1,0)) > О => φ
ο
((1,0)) = 1 
(ni) φ
ρ
((0,1)) > О - φ
π
((0,1)) = 1 (iv) φ
π
((1,1)) > Ο •* φ
α
((1,1)) = 1. 
Proof. (ι) Apply Lemma 22.IS with E = {θ} and a = (η ,n ) for every η € К. 
(il) Suppose 0 < ε = φ ((1,0)). Let 0 < a < (1,1). By STI, CIIA, and Lemma 
22.4, 0 = ф
а
((а1,0)) = фо(аП)фаа((а1,0)) = Сфа(аП), hence ф0(аП) = 0. From 
this we may conclude ф_(соп {(0,0),(1,0)} \ {(1,0)}) = 0. Now apply Lemma 
22.15 with E = conv{(0,0),(1,0)} and a" = (l,n~ ) for every η E U. This 
gives φ (conv{ (0,0) , ( 1,0) }) = 1, hence φ ((1,0)) = 1. (in) Analogous to (il) 
2 
(iv) Analogously as in (ii) , one proves φ (ad) = 0 for every a Ç. R with 
a < (1,1), a / (1,1). Hence, φ
π
(π\{(1,1)}) = φ
α
(υ aD) = 0 where 
2 aÉA 
A := {a e ç + + : a < (1,1), а И (1,1)}. So φ^Π,Ι)) = 1. • 
For every S € В, we denote D(S) := conv{(0,0),w(S)}, and 
— - - 2 -
D(S) := conv{ (0 ,0) , w(S) } . (D, D : В -» В a r e m u l t i s o l u t i o n s . ) 
Lemma 2 2 . 1 7 . ( ι ) φ ^ τ β ΐ ι η ΐ (D(n) ) ) = С > 0 -» e = 1. 
( i i ) ф
п
( г е 1 і п М О ( П ) ) ) = ε > 0 - » ε = 1 . 
Proof. (ι) Suppose 0 < e = φ 0 (relint(D(D))). By Lemma 22.15 with E = D(O) 
and a = (l,n ) for every η € iN, we have φ (D(D)) = 1. Since ε > 0 
we have in view of Lemma 22.16 d ) , (n) : ε = 1. 
(ii) Analogous to (i). • 
Lemma 22.18. (i) ф
а
(ге1іпі(W(n))) = ε > 0 * ε = 1 . 
(ii) ф^геііпишо))) = ε > О =» ε = 1 (m) ф
п
(іпМа П К2) ) = ε > 0 =» ε = 1. 
Proof. (ι) Suppose 0 < ε < 1. In view of Lemma 22.16 (ii) , (iv), there must 
exist α,δ > 0 with а < 1 such that φ ((β,1)α) £ δ for every β with а й β < 1. 
Hence, for every such β, we obtain by STI and CIIA : 
фцІгеІіпиииЗДіа))) £ εδ. From this : 1 = φ,-,ί0) à Σ εδ = ", an im-
a<ß<i,ßec 
possibility. So ε = 1. 
(li) Analogous to (ι). 
(in) Follows from (i) , (ii) , and Lemmas 22.16, 22.17. • 
So far, we have examined зирр(ф
а
). Next we consider φ,. 
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Lemma 22.19. φ
π
((1,1)) = 1 =» ф
д
( (t, 1-t) ) = 1 for some t € [0,1] . 
2 
Proof. Let a € В with a + a < 1. By STI, CHA, and Lemma 22.4, 
0 = фд(а) = φ
 |:1(а)фд(а°) = фд(аП) since by assumption фп((1,1)) = 1. 
Then 1 = ΦΔ(Δ) = фд(Л\р(Л)) + фд(Р(Л)) = фд( U аа) + фд(р(Л)) = φ (Ρ(Δ)), 
- а€А 
where A := {a 6 Q
+ +
 : a 1 + a 2 < l}. So фд(Р(Л)) = 1. 
Supposo φ
Λ
((ΐ,1-ί)) φ 1 for every t E [0,l]. Then we can find s,u £ [0,1] 
with s < u such that Φ.ΐίχ ε Ρ (Δ) : χ < s}) Φ 0, ФдКх £ Ρ(Δ) : х« ^ ui) φ 0. 
(See Fig. 22.1.) Take г £ (s,u). Take η £ (r,l) close enough to 1 to 
guarantee that b (1-u) < 1-r where (b ,b ) E R such that ЬЛ = Δ η , where Δ is tt 
convex comprehensive hull of (η,Ο) and the point with first coordinate 0 on 
the straight line through (η,Ο) and (r,l-r). Further, let Τ := Δ Π Δ , so 
Τ = comv{(0,1),(r,1-r),(η,Ο)}. Since фд(Р(Л)) = 1, we have ф
д
(Т) = 
Ф
л
(соп {(0,1) ,(r,l-r)}) . By CHA : ф
т
 (conví (0 ,1) , (г, 1-r) }) фд(Т) = 
фд(соп {(0,1) ,(r,l-r)}) > фд(соп {(0,1) ,(s,l-s)}) φ 0, hence 
φ (conv{(0,1),(r,1-r)}) = 1. From this, we obtain : φ (bíx £ Ρ(Δ): χ S u}) = 0, 
in view of the choice of η. On the other hand, by C H A and STI, we have 
Ф
т
(Ь{х £ Ρ(Δ) : x 1 > и})фдП(Т) = ФдП(Ь{х £ Ρ(Δ) : x 1 ï u}) = 
фд({х € Ρ(Δ) : χ à u}) φ 0, hence φ (b{x £ Ρ(Δ) : χ S u}) φ 0. We have 
a contradiction and may conclude that φ,Π^Ι-ΐ)) = 1 for some t £ [0,1]. • 
r u 
Figure 22.1. 
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Before proceeding, we need an elementary result in real analysis. The 
reader may prove it for himself, or, otherwise, the result may be derived 
from, e.g.. Theorem 2.6.3 in Eichhorn (1978). 
Lemma 22.20. For the function f : [0,1] -» [0,l], the following two statements 
are equivalent : 
(i) There exists t E (О,») with f(χ) = χ for all χ G [0,l]. 
(il) The function f has the following properties : (a) f(x) = 0 if and only 
if χ = 0, for all χ € [0,1] (b) f is continuoub in 0 and 1, and f is 
bounded (c) f(xy) = f(x)f(y) for all x,y € [0,1]. 
We take up again the string of lemmas leading to the converse of 
Proposition 22.14. Again, φ is a solution satisfying IR, STI, and CHA. 
Lemma 22.21. (ι) If φ0(Γθ1ιηί(D(D))) = 1, then there is a t > 0 such that 
Ф
п
(соп {(0,0) ,(λ,0)}) = λ*- for all λ ζ [0,1]. (ii) If φ
α
(Γθ1ιηί (5(α))) = 1, 
then there is a t > 0 such that φ
α
(οοηνί(0,0),(0,λ)}) = ХЬ for all λ E [0,l]. 
(in) If φ!^(relint (И(П) ) ) = l, then there is a t > 0 such that 
ф0(соп { (1,0) , (Ι,λ) }) = \
Ь
 for all λ € [0,1].(ιν) If (jj^relint (W (D) ) ) = 1, then 
there is a t > 0 such that φ^οοηνί (0,1) , (λ, 1) }) = \Ь for all λ € [0,1]. 
Proof. We only prove (i) . The proofs of (n) , (in) , and (ιν) , are analogous. 
Suppose ф^геІіпМОСП)) ) = 1. Let f : [0,l] -» [0,l] be defined by 
f(λ) = ф
а
(соп {(0,0),(λ,0)}) for all λ e [0,l]. The proof is complete if we 
show that f satisfies (n) of Lemma 22.20. Obviously, f(0) = 0 and f(l) = 1> 0. 
Hence, (a) is partly proved. 
Next, let η,λ e [0,1]. If η € {0,l} or λ € {θ,ΐ}, then ί(ηλ) = £(η)£(λ). 
Suppose 0 < λ й η < 1. Then, by C H A and STI, 
£(λη) = φ0((η,1)
π)Φ( 1 ) D (соп {(0,0),Цг|,0)}) = f(n)f(X). So (с) holds. 
Now let λ := infíA € [0,l] : ί(λ)> θ}. Then obviously λ < 1. 
2 " 2 
Suppose that λ > 0. Take η e (λ,Ι) such that η < λ. Then f(η ) = 0 and 
2 2 f(Л) > 0, in contradiction with f(η ) = f(η) . So λ = 0, and (a) is proved 
completely. 
Since f is nondecreasing and φ ((1,1)) = 0, it follows that f is continuous in 
1. Further, if λ decreases to 0, then f (λ) decreases to ФгЛО) = 0 = f(0), so 
f is continuous in 0. Noting that f is bounded, we have proved (b). • 
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2 
Lemma 22.22. Suppose φ
ϋ
(ιηί(Π П К )) = 1 . Then there exist t, s £ (0,°°) such 
that φ (E) = J/ 1 (C,ri)dCtdnS for every E e 0(a). 
в
2 
+ 
Proof. Let the functions f,g : [0,1] -» [0,1] be defined by f (ζ) = φ
π
((ζ,1)Π) 
and g (η) = φ
π
((1,Γ|)Π) for all ζ,η ζ [0,1]. Analogously as in the proof of 
Lemma 22.21, one verifies that f and g satisfy (n) of Lemma 22.20, so there 
t s 
exist s,t € (0,°>) such that f (ζ) = ζ and g(n) = η for all ζ,η € [0,1]. Now 
let the probability measures μ , μ on the σ-algebra o([0,l]i*be defined by 
μ (C) = ƒ dÇ*1 and μ (C) = ƒ dris for all С Ê σ([0,ΐ]). 
С с 
Let ζ, η € (0,1]. Then, by C H A and STI, we have 
Φ
α
((ζ,η)θ) = φ
α
((ΐ,η)Π)φ - ) Π ((ζ,η)Π) = 9(η)ί(ζ) = 
= ƒ - dn s ƒ . ας*1 = μ,ίΙΟ,ζ^μ,ίΙΟ,η]). 
[0,η] [Ο,ζ] 1 
2 
Hence, because σ(Π Γ\ Ж ) = σ([θ,ΐ])χ σ([0,ΐ]), φ
π
 = μ χ μ is the product 
measure of μ and μ . So, by Fubini's theorem, we have for every E £ σ(Π)
 : 
φ
π
(Ε) = ƒƒ 1 (ζ,ΠΗζ^η 
ж
2 
+ 
We are now sufficiently equipped to show : 
Proposition 22.23. φ E Ñ U {б11, D 1, if, vf, Ъ^'5-. t,s € (0,«·)}. 
Proof. We distinguish several cases. 
(ι) Φ
π
(0) φ 0. Then φ
π
(0) = 1 by Lemma 22.16 (i). Let S € В. By IR and 
+ 
,(0) 
Ф
Ь(5)
а
(0)
 = K(S)U^\^ =V 0 )· 3°Ф = D· 
(n) ΦρίίΙ,Ο)) φ 0. Analogously as in (ι) , φ = w, with the aid of Lemma 22.16 
(11). 
(in) φ ((0,1)) φ 0. Analogously as in (ι) , φ = w, with the aid of Lemma 
22.16 (in) . 
(iv) φ (relint(D(D))) Φ 0. Analogously as in (ι), φ = D for some t > 0, with 
the aid of Lemma 22.17 (i) and Lemma 22.21 (i) . 
(v) ф
а
(ге1іпі(D(O))) φ 0. Analogously as in (ι), φ = D for some t > 0, with 
the aid of Lemma 22.17 (n) and Lemma 22.21 (ii) . 
(vi) ф
а
(ге1іп^(П) ) ) ji 0. Then φ
π
(Γθ1ιηί (W(n) ) ) = 1 by Lemma 22.18(i). 
Let S € В. We distinguish two subcases. 
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(vi.a) p(S) И w(S). Analogously as in (ι), φ = W , for t > 0 with φ = W , 
with the aid of Lemma 22.21 (111). 
(vi.b) p(S) = w(S) . Suppose φ (ρ(Ξ)) f 1. Then there exists ζ ξ. P(S), ζ > О, 
such that for all y G P(S) with ζ < y < ρ (S), we have φ (Ξ ) > φ (S ) > О 
1 1 - 1 . fay faZ 
where Ξ := {χ £ S : χ S y }. By (vi.a), φ (S ) = φ (W(S )), and since 
У ^ У' =» W(S ) Π W(S ,) = 0 for all y.y' with ¿ S y ,y ' < ρ (S) , we obtain 
2 
φ (S) ä Σ φ (S ) = », where A := {y £ E : y 6 P(S),z S y < ρ (S)}. From 
fa ,- _ fa У "гт 1 1 —1 
yfcA 
this impossibility we conclude φ (p(S)) = 1. 
By (vi.a) and (vi.b) we conclude : φ = W , for t as in (vi.a). 
(vu) φ^ΓοΙιηί (W(a) ) ) f 0. Analogously as in (vi) , φ = W for some t > 0, 
with the aid of Lemma 22.18 (n) and Lemma 22.21 (iv) . 
2 t s 
(vin) φ0(ιηί(Ε П Н )) Φ 0. Analogously as in (ι) , φ = h ' for some t,s > 0, 
with the aid of Lemma 22.18 (in) and Lemma 22.22. 
(ix) and final case : φ
π
((1,1)) φ 0. Then φ ((1,1)) = 1 by Lemma 22.16 (iv), 
so φ ((t,l-t)) = 1 for some t € [0,1] by Lemma 22.19. If 0 < t < 1, then 
φ = Ν , by a modification of the proof of Theorem 11.5. I f t = 0 [ t = l ] , 
then φ = D [φ = D ], by a modification of the proof of Theorem 11.8. • 
Combining Propositions 22.14 and 22.23, we obtain the main result of 
part В of this section. 
Theorem 22.24. A probabilistic solution φ satisfies IR, STI, and CHA, if 
and only if φ € Ñ U {θ', ^, ^, W*1, h*1'5 : t,s € (0,»)}. 
We conclude with a few remarks. 
Remark 22.25. The results in this section were published (without detailed 
proofs) in Peters and Ti]s (1983). There, also a probabilistic version of 
the individual monotomcity property is suggested. 
Remark 22.26. We formulate the following two properties, for a probabilistic 
solution φ. 
CIIA(a) For all S, Τ € В with S с Τ and every E £ σ(5), we have : 
Φ0(Ε)φ„(8) > Φ ^ Ε ) . 
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CIIA(b) For all S, Τ G В with S с Τ and every E E 0(5), we have : 
Φ5(Ε)φτ(Ξ) < φ τ(Ε). 
We note that both properties are equivalent to CIIA. For instance, CIIA 
implies CIIA(b). Let S,T 6 В with S с τ and E G 0(3), and suppose 
Φ3(Ε)ΦΤ(5) < Φ Τ(Ε). Then φτ(3) > 0 and ф 2(Б\Е) = 1 - ф3(Е) > 
1 - Ф
т
(Е)ф1,(3)"
1
 = Ф
Т
(5\Е)Ф
Т
(3)" 1, hence ф2(3 \ Е)фт(3) > ф ^ з Ч Е ) . 
This shows that CIIA^b) implies CIIA. Similarly one shows tiflat CIIA (a) is 
equivalent to CIIA. 
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CHAPTER Э 
RISK PROPERTIES 
In section 5, we have introduced the relation "more risk averse than" 
on the family U(A) of functions defined on a non empty set of alternatives A; 
further, we have given a mathematical characterization of that relation 
(Theorem 5.5). In this chapter, we use that characterization when we study 
the following questions : Given a bargaining solution, is it favourable for 
one player in a (2-person) bargaining situation or game if the other player 
is replaced by a more risk averse player ? And : Which are the consequences 
for the latter two players ? We shall give an answer to this question by 
considering risk properties of bargaining solutions. 
Section 23 introduces such properties, and establishes some elementary 
relations between them. Sections 24 and 25 give relations between risk 
properties and other properties, for the case where all Pareto optimal out­
comes in a bargaining game correspond to nskless alternatives in the bar­
gaining situation assumed to underly that bargaining game. The more general 
case, where Pareto optimal outcomes may also correspond to risky alternatives, 
is considered in section 26. Section 27 concludes the chapter with conside­
rations of a strategical nature, such as : can it sometimes be advantageous 
to pretend to be more (or less) risk averse, for a player in a bargaining 
game ? 
Everywhere in this chapter, attention is confined to the 2-person case : 
the η-person case will be considered in section 30. Most of the results in 
this chapter were published before, in several papers. For a survey, see 
Peters and Tijs (1985). 
23. RISK PROPERTIES OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 
- 1 2 
Let Г = <A,a,u ,u > € BS be a 2-person bargaining situation (see section 
8). For ι = 1,2, we denote by С (Г) the family of all nondecreasing continuous 
concave functions к : u (A) -* К with k(0) = 0 and with k(x) > 0 for some 
χ б u
1(A) . Further, for ι = 1,2 and k 1 € cNl) , we denote by К1(Г) the bar­
gaining situation which arises from Г by replacing u by k „ u . Of course, 
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Κ (Ι) ε BS. In view of Theorem 5.5, we say that К (Г) arises from Г by re­
placing player ι by a more risk averse player. 
What will be the effect on the outcome assigned by a bargaining solution 
if a player in a bargaining situation is replaced by a more risk averse 
player ? Some possible effects are described by the following properties. 
Definition 23.1. Let С е в and С c= CS (cf. notation 10.2) . A 2-person bar-
2 . . ^ 
gaining solution φ : С -» Ж is called ггзк аепвгіг е on С if, for all 
i, : G {1,2} with ι φ :, Γ e С, k1 e С1(Г) with К1(Г) e CS, we have 
φ (S _ ) δ φ (S
r
) . If С = BS (and С = В) then φ is called risk sensitive. 
(Risk sensitivity : RS) 
% 
Definition 23.2. Let С and С be as in Def. 23.1. A 2-person bargaining 
2 , ^ 
solution φ : С -> К has the worse аІЬетаЬг е property on C, if, for each 
ι € {1,2}, Г =<A,ä,u1,u2> £ С, k1 € С1!!1) with К1(Г) in CS, Ζ € аШф,Г) , 
m € αΙΜφ,Κ^Γ)) , we have EuNsL) S Eu1 (m) . If С = BS (and С = В) , φ is said 
to have the worse alternative property. 
(Worse alternative : WA) 
The risk sensitivity property says that it is not disadvantageous to 
bargain against a more risk averse opponent. It was introduced by 
Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1901), in a weaker form (since we allow non-
decreasingness of k ). The worse alternative property claims that a bargai­
ner does not prefer an alternative giving rise to the solution outcome of 
the game played by his more risk averse substitute to an alternative giving 
rise to the solution outcome of the game played by himself. In order to 
illustrate the definitions so far, we give a few examples. 
2 2 
Example 23.3. Let Γ € BS be as in Example 8.3, and let k £ С (Γ) , 
2 2 k (λ) = \/T for all λ € u (A) . In this case, S = S v2ir\ = 
ί К (1 ) 
comv{(0,0) ,(1,0) ,(0,1)}, зоф^З^ =Ф1(3К2(Г)> апааШф,Г) =аШф,К (Г)), 
Eu (ί.) = Eu (m) for ail Л,m Ç. а1і(ф,Г); all this holds for any bargaining 
2 
solution φ : В -» В . 
2 
Example 23.4. Let Г 6 BS be as in Example Θ.4, and k as in Example 23.3. 
Then S F = comv{(l-X,A) : 0 < λ < l}, and So,r^ = comv{ ( Ι-λ,/Χ) : 0 ¿ λ < l}. 
i К ( 1 ) 
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2 1 1 
Let φ : В -» TR be the Kalai - Smorodinsky s o l u t i o n KS, then : ф(З
г
) = (—,-r), 
Ф ( 3
К
2 ( Г ) ) = (у\Л5^- { , γ ν Τ - - i) , а1і(ф,К 2 (Г)) = { ( I / Γ - | , | - j / 5 ) } . 
So ф^Зр) < Ф 1 ( 5 К 2 ( І ) ) ' { = Еи2(5.) > I - ^ Т = u 2 ( ( j / 5 - ì | - Ì / 5 ) ) for 
a l l A € β Ι ΐ ( φ , Γ ) . Also note t h a t [~ ( 1,0) À; (0,1 ) ] € а 1 і ( ф , Г ) , and 
E(k 2 0 u 2 ) ( [ | ; ( l , 0 ) , | ; ( 0 , l ) ] ) = { < J V ^ - I = к 2 , и 2 ( ( | / 5 - - у , | -{\^5)); 
2 _ 
that is, the more risk averse player 2, in К (Г), prefers the alternative 
2 
obtained by him (the unique element of а1Мф,К (Г)), to at least one element 
of а1і(ф,Г) which is the set of alternatives giving rise to the solution out­
come obtained by the less risk averse player 2 in Г. 
These examples indicate, firstly, that it makes all the difference which 
bargaining situation is thought to underly a specific bargaining game, when 
we study risk properties of bargaining solutions; secondly, that a property 
similar to the WA property, formulated for the more risk averse player, 
would not always be satisfied. As to the latter remark : it may, from the 
point of view of the more risk averse player, actually be advantageous to 
be - openly - more risk averse, depending on which alternative will be 
picked out to realize the solution outcome. Section 27 deals with some rela­
ted questions of a strategical nature. 
We shall frequently use the following notation (cf. the first remark 
in the previous paragraph) : 
- 1 2 
BSC := {Г = <A,a,u ,u > € BS : for every χ £ PtS-) , there exists an 
1 2 
an a £ A with χ = (u (a),u (a))}. 
So BSC(C of "certain") consists of all bargaining situations in BS for which 
every Pareto optimal outcome is generated by a nskless alternative. Note 
that Γ £ BSC [Γ Ζ BSC] in Example 23.4 [23.3]. Bargaining situations Γ in 
BSC "behave nicely" under "transformations" k in С (Г) : 
Lemma 23.5. Let Г = <A,ä,u1,u2> £ BSC, ι £ {l,2}, k 1 £ С 1(Г). For χ £ PIS.,) 
let χ £ В denote the point with i-th coordinate k (x ) and ]-th coordinate 
χ (] ft i) , and let Ρ := {x : χ £ PfSp)}. Then S , „ = com(P) and 
P(S K l ( r )) e ¿ . 
Proof. The equality follows from the inclusion. For the inclusion, let 
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1 1 2 
χ e P(S ,
 г
 ) , ьау ι = 1 and χ = (E(k „ u ) (Í) ,Eu (Ä)) where Л € L(A) . 
К (IJ 
1 2 1 2 
Since Г e BSC, there exists an a £ A with (Eu U),Eu (Л)) S (u (a) ,u (a)) eP(S
r
) 
1 1 2 1 2 
By Lemma 5.4, we obtain (k
 0 u (a) ,u (a)) ä (E(k „ u )(î.),Eu (JJ.)) = x, hence 
1 1 2 
χ = (k „ u (a),u (a)) since χ e ρ( 3
κ
ι ( Γ ))· So χ С P. • 
Most results on risk properties of bargaining solutions will be derived 
for the class BSC of bargaining situations with riskless Pareto optimal out­
comes in the corresponding bargaining games. Risk properties of 2-person 
bargaining solutions on a larger subclass of BS will be considered in section 
26. Here, we give already the following "impossibility result". 
2 
Theorem 23.6. Let φ : В -» К be a weakly Pareto optimal and individually 
rational 2-регьоп bargaining solution. Then φ is not risk sensitive, and 
does not have the worse alternative property. 
- 1 2 - 1 2 1 - 2 -
Proof. Let Γ = <A,a,u ,u > £ BS with A = {a,a ,a }, u (a) = u (a) = 0, 
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 
u (a ) = u (a ) = 2, u (a ) = u (a ) = -1. Then S- = comv{(2,-1),(-1,2)} and 
φ(Ξ
Γ
) £ W(S
r
) Π Ж+ = conv{ (1,0) , (0,1) }. Let, for every В Ç. (γ,2] , the 
function k R 6 С (Г) be defined by • 
k
e
(-l) = -1, k (0) = 0, kß(2) = β. 
Suppose for a moment that φ is risk sensitive. Then 
• M 3 - /г J - Φ, <sr> f c i r a 1 1 3 e (\,2]. Since the set W(S„ ) П Ж 2 shrinks 1 Κ
β
(Ι) 1 Γ 2 Κ
β ( Γ ) + 
to {θ} if β decreases to —, this implies that ф(Б
г
) = (0,1). By reversing 
the roles of the players, we similarly find that ф(З
г
) = (1,0). So φ cannot 
be risk sensitive. The second statement in the theorem follows from the 
same example. • 
The next lemma says that, for a Pareto optimal solution, risk sensitivi­
ty implies the worse alternative property. 
2 
Lemma 23.7. Let φ : В -» Ж be a Pareto optimal 2-person bargaining solution, 
о. л. ч, 
and С с BS. Then, if φ satisfies RS on С, φ also satisfies WA on С. 
- 1 2 ^ 2 2 
Proof. Let Г = <A,a,u ,u > € С and k € С (Г) . Suppose φ satisfies RS on 
С. Then Eu1 (i) < Eu1 (m) for ail A Ç. а Ш ф , Г ) , m £ а Ш ф , К (Г)). So by PO 
2 2 
of φ. Eu (Л) S Eu (m) for such î. and m. • 
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A sufficient condition for a Pareto optimal 2-регьоп bargaining solution 
to be risk sensitive, is given by the following lemma. 
2 
Lemma 23.8. Let φ : Β -» Ή be a Pareto optimal bargaining solution, let 
С с BS, and suppose the following condition holds : 
(23.1) For every Г = <A,â,u1,u2> Ç. С, ι £ ί 1,2}, к 1 £ С 1 (I) , 
I £ alt «ρ. Γ) , m € 3ΐί(φ,Κ1(Γ) ) , we have : Efk1,, u 1) (£) S Etk1,, u 1) (m) . 
Then φ is risk sensitive on C. 
Proof. With Γ, i, k 1, i , m, as in (23.1), we must have Eu3 (i.) ί Eu"1 (m) for 
] ^ ι, since otherwise PO of φ would be violated. • 
We now give three examples. The first two of these show that the con-
verses of Lemmas23.7 and 23.8 do not hold, at least not for general C. The 
third example indicates why we have not formulated condition (23.1) as a 
separate property. 
Example 23.9. Let С consist of one bargaining situation, namely 
— 1 2 — 1 2 3 1 - 1 2 
Г = < A , a , u ,u > 6 BS w i t h A = { a , a ,a ,a }, u (a) = u (a ) = 0 , 
2 , " , 2 , ! , о 1, ! , 2 , 2, , 1 . 3 . 2 , З
ч
 1
 т
 ^ , 2 
u (a) = u (a ) = 0 , u (a ) = u (a ) = 1, u (a ) = u (a ) = —. L e t φ : В -»К 
1 1 
be any Pareto optimal bargaining solution such that, firstly, φίΞ-) = (y,-^ ) , 
and, secondly, for any ι €. {1,2} and к £ С (Г) , we have φ (S ,
 г
 ) = 
'Э ^ ч і К ( 1 } 
к
1
 „ u N a ) and φ ( S K 1 ( r ) = u ^ a ) (j И ι) if thereby {a } = alt (φ,ΚΧ (Γ) ) , 
and Ф(3„і,
г
>) = К3(5„і/гч) otherwise (; KS is the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution) 
« K(l) K(l) 
On C, such a φ satisfies WA but not RS. 
Example 23.10. Let С consist again of one bargaining situation 
г г л - ! 2 S _, , , - 1 2 3·, 1,- 1. 2. 
1 = <- A,a,u ,u > , with A = ta,a ,a ,a }, u (a) = u (a ) = 0, 
2 - 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 
u (a) = u (a ) = 0 , u (a ) = u (a ) = 1, u (a ) = u (a ) = —. L e t φ : В -» » 
be again any Pareto optimal bargaining solution such that a^ £ 3ΐί(φ,Κ (Γ)) 
for every i £ {1,2} and k 1 £ С^ЧГ). Then, for every ι £ {l,2}, ц Φ ι, 
k £ С (Γ) , we have φ (S
 Ъ
_. Л = u (a ) = — = φ (S
r
) , so φ is risk sensitive 
J K ( 1 ) Ζ J 1 
on C. On the other hand, [:r;a ,y;a ] £ 3ΐί(φ,Γ) and, for strictly concave k , 
,,ι ι.,
Γ
1 ! 1 2
η >
 Ι,ι ι. 1
ч
 Ι,ι ι. 2, ^ ,ι,Ι. ,ι ι, 3. E(k
 0 u ) ([-,-a ,-;a ] ) = j k „ u (a ) + ^ k 0 u (a ) < k (-) = k „ u (a ) = 
Efk1,, u ) (a ), which violates (23.1). See also Example 23.4. 
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2 
Example 23.11. Suppose that φ : В -» Ж is a Pareto optimal bargaining solu-
O: - 1 2 
tion which satisfies (23.1) on some class С containing Г = <A,a,u ,u > as in 
Example 23.4. Let ф(З
г
) = (l-λ,λ), for some λ € [0,1]· Then 
[1-λ,(1,0),λ;(0,1)] еа1і(ф,І). Let Τ := comv{(1,0) , (0,1) , (j,j) } . There is 
1 1 
а к £ С (Г) such that Τ = S ι
 г
 , so by (23.1) : 
К ( 1 ) 
ф^Т) < Etk1,, u 1) ([1-X;(1,0) ,λ,(Ο,Ι)]) = (l-Xjk^l) = 1-λ. 
2 2 
There is also а к € С (Г) with Τ = S„2/ri' "hich, by (23.1) again, gives : 
К ( 1 ) 
φ (Τ) £ λ. So φ(Τ) S (1-λ,λ), whence either λ=0, φίε.) = (1,0), or 
λ=1, φ ^ ) = (0,1) . 
Example 23.11 indicates that condition (23.1) is overly strong. Because 
of this, we restrict attention to RS and WA. 
2 
Theorem 23.12. Let φ : В -» Ж be a Pareto optimal bargaining solution. The 
following three statements are equivalent. 
(ι) φ satisfies RS on BSC. 
(il) φ satisfies WA on BSC. 
(in) For all Γ = <A,â,u1,u2> € BSC, ι e {l,2}, к 1 e С1«?) , a,b Ê A with 
a £ а Ш ф , Г ) and b e alt (φ ,Κ.1 (Γ) ) , we have к1,, uNa) ä k10 u 1 (b) . 
Proof. (ι) ^  (n) follows from Lemma 23.7. (ii) * (in) follows from the 
nondecreasingness of к . (in) =» (i) follows from the Pareto optimality of φ 
and the definition of BSC. • 
In the next two sections, where we restrict attention to bargaining 
situations in BSC, we will, in view of Theorem 23.12, investigate only risk 
sensitivity of (Pareto optimal) solutions. The next and final theorem of this 
section tells us that, for Pareto optimal bargaining solutions, scale trans­
formation invariance is a necessary condition for risk sensitivity. This 
result was obtained by Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1981) . 
2 
Theorem 23.13. Let φ : В -» Ж be a Pareto optimal bargaining solution satis­
fying RS on BSC. Then φ is scale transformation invariant. 
2 
Proof. Let S £ В, a € К . Let Г be the trivial bargaining situation corres­
ponding to S (see Example 9.6). Note that Г € BSC, and also note that multi-
plying first coordinates by a and by a are elements of С (Г>, so by RS 
applied twice we have : φ ((a ,1)S) = φ (Ξ). From this it follows by PO that 
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φ. ( (a ,1)S) = a φ (Ξ). Applying similar arguments again gives 
Ф^аЗ) = (^((a^US) , Ф2(а3) = а ф2((а ,1)S) . Зоф(а5) =аф(5). We have 
shown that φ satisfies STI. • 
24. RISK SENSITIVITY, INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, (GLOBAL) 
INDIVIDUAL MONOTONICITY 
The purpose of this section is to show that the first property in its 
title is implied by every other property mentioned in its title (together 
with a few basic properties) , for a bargaining solution on the class BSC 
(to which we restrict ourselves here, cf. Lemma 23.5, Theorem 23.6). We 
repeat (cf. Def. 10.3) that for a bargaining solution φ and a bargaining 
situation Γ, we sometimes write φ(Γ) instead of <р(Г) = φ (S-). Further, in 
view of Lemma 5.6, we may restrict attention to cases where а к £ С (Г) is 
defined on conv(u (A)) and not only on u (A) , for Г = <A,a,u ,u > € BSC and 
ι £ {1,2}. 
2 
Theorem 24.1. Let φ : В -» Л. be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, 
STI, and IIA. Then φ satisfies RS on BSC. 
Proof. Suppose φ is not risk sensitive on BSC, and let (say) Γ £ BSC and 
2 2 
к £ С (Г) such that 
(24.1) ф ^ К 2 ^ ) ) < ф ^ Г ) . 
2 
Let (q.jq-) be the point in P(S
r
) with q = φ (К (Г)); such a point exists 
in view of Lemma 23.5. Then q > ф-(Г) ä 0, in view of IR, the fact that 
q £ Ρ (S.,) , and (24.1) . In view of STI we may suppose that 
(24.2) k 2(q 2) = q 2. 
2 2 2 
Then φ(Κ (Γ)) = (q ,q ). The concavity of k , (24.2), and k (0) = 0, imply 
(24.3) k2(A) > λ for all λ G [0,q2]. 
Now let D := com{p € PiSp) : q < ρ S φ (Γ)} € B. Since φ(Γ) Ε Ό and 
φ (К (Г)) € D, and further, by (24.3) and Lemma 23.5 : D с S 2 ,ΤΛ ' w e h a v e ЪУ 
IIA : 
(24.4) ф(0) = ф(К2(Г)). 
On the other hand, D с s Hence, by IIA again : 
(24.5) ф(0) = ф(Г). 
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Now (24.4), (24.5), and (24.1), are in contradiction. • 
Corollary 24.2. Every Nash solution is risk sensitive on BSC. 
Proof. Theorems 24.1 and 11.8. • 
2 
Theorem 24.3. Let φ : Β -+ Ρ be a bargaining solution satisfying PO, STI, 
and IM. Then φ satisfies RS on BSC. 
2 2 
Proof. Let Γ e BSC, and (say) к G С (Г). We show 
(24.6) φ (К2 (Г)) > φ (Г). 
2 
In view of STI and Lemma 23.5, we may suppose к (h (S»)) = h (S-). Then the 
2 2 
concavity of к , and к (0) = 0, imply 
(24.7) k2(X) ä λ for all λ Ç. [0,h (Sp)]. 
In view of Lemma 15.10, Lemma 23.5, (24.7), h(S. ) = h(S η,τΟ/ a n d I Mf we 
obtain φ(Γ) < ф(К2(Г)), from which (24.6) follows. • 
Corollary 24.4. Every 2-person bargaining solution π (λ e Λ, see section 15) 
is risk sensitive on BSC. 
Proof Theorems 24.3 and 15.15. • 
2 
Theorem 24.5. Let φ : Β -» К be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, 
STI, and GIM. Then φ satisfies RS on BSC. 
2 2 
Proof. Let Γ € BSC, and (say) k e С (Г). We show 
(24.8) φ (Κ2(Γ)) > φ (Г). 
2 2 
In view of STI, we may suppose k (g,(Sp)) = g (S
r
). Then the concavity of k , 
and k (0) = 0 , imply 
(24.9) k2(X) > λ for all λ e [0,g2(Sp)]. 
In view of Lemma 23.5, (24.9), Lemma 16.4, the fact that g(S
r
) = g(S
v
2/r\'' 
2 1 К ( 1 ) 
and GIM, we obtain ф(Г) S ф(К (Г)), from which (24.8) follows. • 
θ „ 
Corollary 24.6. Every 2-person bargaining solution ψ (θ € 0, see section 16) 
is risk sensitive on BSC. 
Proof. Theorems 24.5 and 16.9. • 
Thus, we have shown that most solutions appearing hitherto in this mono-
graph, are risk sensitive on BSC. It can easily be shown that the proportional 
solution E (see section 18) is risk sensitive on BSC if and only if ρ = (1,0) 
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or ρ = (0,1). (Note that Theorem 23.13 does not apply here since proportional 
solutions are not Pareto optimal.) 
Next, we remark that all (risk sensitive) solutions discussed m this 
section have the worse alternative property on BSC, as a consequence of 
Theorem 23.12. 
We conclude with some references to the literature. Kihlstrom, Roth, 
and Schmeidler (1981) have related results for the (symmetric) Nash solution 
N , the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution KS, and the so-called Super-Additive 
solution of Perles and Maschler (1981). For the results in this section, see 
de Koster et al. (1983) and Peters and Ti]s (1985a). 
25. RISK SENSITIVITY, TWIST SENSITIVITY, AND THE SLICE PROPERTY 
In this section, we consider 2-person bargaining solutions defined on В 
(see Def. 9.10) , or restrictions of 2-person bargaining solutions to В . This 
restriction to В is intended to serve convenience of presentation. We fur­
ther limit attention to underlying bargaining situations m 
B
+
SC = {Г £ BSC : S-, € B +}. 
(This notation is in the same spirit as Def. 10.2.) So we consider only 
bargaining situations Г for which every Pareto optimal outcome in the corres­
ponding bargaining game corresponds to a nskless alternative and has both 
coordinates at least 0. Therefore, and in view of Lemmas 5.6 and 23.5, if 
ι С {1,2} and к £ С (Г), Ξ ι
 Γ
 arises from S
r
 by application of a con-
K ( 1 ) 1 
tinuous nondecreasing nonconstant concave function, assigning 0 to 0, on the 
2 
i-th coordinates of the points in Ξ Π Ж , after which the comprehensive hull 
of the resulting set is taken. For S £ В , let now С (S) denote the family 
of all continuous nondecreasing nonconstant concave functions 
k 1 : [0,h (S)] -»H with k1(0) = 0. For k 1 £ C ^ S ) , let K1(S) £ В denote the 
comprehensive hull of the set of points obtained by application of к to the 
2 
i-th coordinates of the points in S Π H . The following observation is 
immediate and will be used throughout this section without our further men­
tioning it : 
2 (25.1) A 2-person bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж is risk sensitive on В SC 
H O 
if and only if φ (К1(S)) £ φ (Ξ) for all S £ В , ι,] € {1,2} with ι φ ], 
к
1
 € C1(S) 
We introduce two new properties for a 2-person bargaining solution 
2 
φ : В -» R , and our main purpose is, to prove a relation between these pro­
perties, and risk sensitivity of φ on В SC. By-products of the main theorem 
of this section are new proofs of the risk sensitivity (on В SC) of the IIA-
and IM-solutions of the previous section, since, as we will see, all these 
solutions are twist sensitive : twist sensitivity is one of the new properties 
announced above. 
Let S, Τ e Β , ι e {1,2}, α e [Ο,h (S)]. We say that Τ is a favorable 
twist of s or s an unfavorable twist of τ for player ι at level a if 
(25.2) χ > a for all χ £ T\S 
ι ι 
(25.3) χ < α for all χ £ S\T. 
ι ι 
2 
Definition 25.1. A bargaining solution φ : В -»К is called tWbst вепзгіг е 
if for each Ξ and Τ in В with φ(Ξ) £ P(T), we have for each ι £ {1,2} · 
(25.4) φ (Τ) Й φ (S) if Τ is a favorable twist of S for player ι at level 
Φ
ι
(3). 
(Twist sensitivity : TS) 
2 
Lemma 25.2. Let φ : В -> TR satisfy TS and PO. Let S, Τ £ В with 
φ(Ξ) £ Ρ(Τ), ι £ {ΐ,2}, and suppose that Τ is an unfavorable twist of S for 
player ι at level φ (S). Then φ (Τ) S φ (S). 
ι ι ι 
Proof. For all χ £ S\T, we have χ > φ (S), hence χ < φ (S) for ] И ι since 
φ(S) £ Ρ(S). For all χ £ TNS we have χ < φ (Ξ), hence χ > φ (S) for ] Φ ι 
since φ (Ξ) £ Ξ. Ξο Τ is a favorable twist of Ξ for player ] j¿ ι at level 
φ (S). By TS : φ (Τ) > φ (S); because φ(3) £ Ρ(Τ), this implies φ (Τ) S φ (S). 
For Pareto optimal solutions, TS is equal to the twisting property 
Tw (for n=2), introduced in Thomson and Myerson (1980, p.39). In general 
(for n=2) , Tw =» TS. 
The following theorem is one of the main results of this section. 
2 
Theorem 25.3. Let φ : В -»В satisfy PO and STI. Let φ be twist sensitive. 
Ill 
Then φ is risk sensitive on В SC. 
2 2 
Proof. Let S € В , and, say, к 6 С (S). We have to prove 
that 
(25.5) ф1(К
2(5)) ä ф^З) . 
If Φ2(Κ
2(3)) = 0 then by PO, we have ф^К^З)) = h^K^S)) = h (S) δ Φ 1 (S) , 
and (25.5) holds. Suppose now that φ (К (S)) > 0. Since φ satisfies STI it 
is no less of generality to suppose that, for q = (q ,q ) € P(S) with 
2 
ql = Φ 1(К (S)), we have 
(25 6) k 2(q 2) = q2. 
By the concavity of k we then have 
(25.7) k2(X) È λ for all λ € [0,q2], k2(X) < λ for all λ € [ς,,Ιι (S)]. 
From (25.6) and (25.7) it follows that S is an unfavorable twist of К (S) for 
2 
player 1 at level φ (К (S)). From Lemma 25.2 we may conclude that (25.5) 
holds. • 
The converse of Theorem 25.3 does not hold as Example 25.7 below shows. 
We introduce now another property for 2-person bargaining solutions on В . 
2 
Definition 25.4. A bargaining solution φ : В -* V. is said to have the 
slice property if, for all S, Τ e В with h(S) = h(τ) and T e s , we have : 
(SLj) φ^Τ) ä φ (S) if x 2 > Φ2(Ξ) for all χ € S\T 
(SL ) φ (T) ä φ (S) if χ > φ (S) for all χ € S\T. 
(Slice : SL) 
An SL-solution φ favours the opponent of a player ι when a piece of the 
outcome set 3, preferred by ι over φ(3), is sliced off, the utopia point 
remaining the same. The slice property resembles the Cutting axiom of 
Thomson and Myerson (1980), for n=2. The difference (for Pareto optimal 
solutions) is, that in the Cutting axiom there is no condition on the utopia 
point, which makes SL weaker than Cutting. 
2 
Theorem 25.5. Let φ : В -»К satisfy PO. Let φ be twist sensitive. Then 
φ has the slice property. 
Proof. We only prove that (SL ) holds. 
Let S, Τ £ В with h(S) = h(T), Τ с S, and χ > φ (S) for all X £ S\T. We 
have to show that 
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(25.8) φ^Τ) > ф^З) . 
Note that ф(3) G P(T) and χ < φ (S) for all χ G S\T because φ(5) € P(S). 
Since T\S = 0, we may conclude that Τ is a favorable twist of S for player 1 
at level φ (S). So (25.8) follows from (25.4) for 1=1. • 
Example 25.8 will show that the converse of Theorem 25.5 does not hold. 
In the following theorem a characterization of twist/risk sensitivity is given. 
2 
Theorem 25.6. Let φ : В -»Ж satisfy PO and STI. Then φ is^twist sensitive 
if and only if it has the slice property and is risk sensitive on В SC. 
Proof. (See Fig. 25.1.) The "only if-part follows from Theorems 25.3 and 
25.5. For the "if"-part, let φ satisfy SL and RS on В SC. Let S, Τ € В with 
φ(S) £ Ρ(Τ), such that 
(25.9) χ > φ (S) for all χ 6 T\S 
and 
(25.10) Xj < ф^Б) for all χ € sVr. 
Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that 
(25.11) ф^Т) < ф^З) . 
We derive a contradiction which will complete the proof. Let к € С (Τ) be 
defined by : к1(t) = t if 0 â t ί h (S), k1(t) = h (S) if h (S) S t S h (T). 
1 1 
Then Κ (Τ) = {χ e Τ : χ S h (S)}, and by RS of φ we have φ (Κ (Τ)) δ φ (Τ), 
hence, since φ(Τ) 6 Ρ(Τ) : 
(25.12) φ^Κ^Τ)) < φ^Τ). 
2 
By a similar argument we obtain for К (S) := {χ 6 S : χ S h (Τ)} : 
(25.13) Φ1(Κ
2(5)) -i ф^З) . 
Let D := Ξ Π Τ € B+. Then h(D) = (h (S) , h (Τ) ) = hfK^T)) = h(K (S)). 
If χ € К (T)\D, then χ € T\S, so by (25.9), (25.11), and (25.12), we have 
χ > φ (S) > φ (Τ) ä φ (Κ (Τ)). By (SL ) applied to D с κ (Τ), we then obtain 
φ (D) > φ (Κ (Τ)) hence by PO : 
(25.14) φ (D) < φ (Κ1(Τ)). 
2 
By a similar argument, we have φ (D) S φ. (К (S)), which combined with (25.14), 
(25.12), and (25.13), gives : φ (S) S φ (Τ). This contradicts (25.11). • 
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Figure 25.1. 
We now discuss some examples of bargaining solutions, with respect to 
the three properties which are central in this section. 
Example 25.7. The so-called Super-Additive solution of Perles and Maschler 
is risk sensitive (on В SC) but not twist sensitive and does not have the 
slice property. See Counter-Example 7.1, p.189, in Perles and Maschler (1981) 
Example 25.8. Let the Pareto optimal, scale transformation invariant solution 
2 
φ : В -»Ж be defined by : for all S € В with h(S) = (1,1), (¡>(S) is the 
point of intersection of P(S) with γ which has maximal second coordinate, 
where γ is the curve depicted in Fig. 25.2., and described as follows. 
(1,1) 
Figure 25.2. 
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Let α := — - -jV^i then between (1,1) and (α,α) , γ = conv{ (1,1) , (α,α) }, and 
2 2 between (α,α) and (1,0), Y is an arc of the circle (x.-2) + (x.-l) = 2. 
By STI, φ is uniquely determined for all S e В . It is easy to see that φ 
has the slice property. However, φ is not twist sensitive. Let 
S := {(1,0),(α,α),(0,1)} and Τ := comv{(1,0),(0,α(1-α)~ )}. Then Τ is an 
unfavorable twist of S for player 1 at level α = φ (S), but φ (Τ) = 1 > α = φ (S), 
so by Lemma 25.2, φ is not twist sensitive. 
Example 25.9. We give another example of a (continuous) solution which has 
the slice property but is not twist sensitive (and hence, not risk sensitive). 
2 
Let this solution φ : В -» В be defined by : for all S £ Β , φ(S) maximizes 
2 
the product (x + h (S))(x_ + h (S)) on Ξ Π Ж . (So φ(Ξ) is obtained by 
calculating the Nash solution with -h(S) as disagreement outcome.) It is 
easy to see that φ satisfies PO, STI, and SL. However, φ is not twist sensi­
tive. Let S := coinvi (1,0) ,(0,1)}, then φ (S) = (j,j) . Let Τ := comví ( 1,0) , (j,^) }, 
then Τ is a favorable twist of S for player 1 at level φ (Ξ) = —. Now 
3 5 
φ(Τ) = (—,—), so φ (Τ) < φ (S). Hence, φ is not twist sensitive. 
о о 1 1 
2 
Example 25.10. Let α : В -»Ж be the equal area split solution, that is, 
+
 2 
for every S Ε В , a(S) is that point of P(S) such that the area in S Π К 
lying above the straiqht line through 0 and a(S) equals half the area of 
2 
S Г) Ж . Then α satisfies PO and STI, is twist sensitive, and consequently is 
also risk sensitive and slice sensitive. 
We conclude this section with two theorems, which, together with Theorem 
25.6, can be used to give alternative proofs for Theorems 24.1 and 24.3. 
Note that for the solutions under consideration (i.e. Nash solutions, and non-
symmetric extensions of the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution), the restriction to 
В is without loss of generality. This would not be the case, however, for 
the globally individually monotonie solutions in Theorem 24.5. 
2 
Theorem 25.11. Let φ : В -* R be a solution satisfying PO, STI, and IIA. 
Then φ is twist sensitive. 
Proof. Let S, Τ € В with φ(S) € Ρ(Τ) and with Τ a favorable twist of S for 
player 1 at level φ (S), i.e. 
(25.14) Xj > 4>1(S) for all χ С T\S 
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(25.15) χ < φ (S) for all χ £ S\T. 
We have to prove that 
(25.16) φ^Τ) > ф^З) . 
Let D := S Л T. Since D C S and φ(S) £ Τ, we have by IIA 
(25.17) φ(0) = φ(3). 
Since D с τ the IIA-property implies φ(Ο) = φ(Τ) or φ(Τ) 2 D. 
In the first case, we have φ(Τ) = φ(3) in view of (25.17), so (25.16) holds. 
If φ(Τ) € D, then φ(Τ) £ T\S, and then (25.16) follows from (25.14). • 
The proof of Theorem 25.11 is related to the proof of lemma 5 in 
Thomson and Myerson (1980). As to the following theorem : Thomson and 
Myerson (1980, lemma 9 for n=2) show that their property WM (which is some­
what stronger than IM) together with WPO implies Tw. We have : 
2 
Theorem 25.12. Let φ : В -»H be a solution satisfying PO, STI, and IM. 
Then φ is twist sensitive. 
Proof. Let S, Τ £ В with ф(3) £ P(T) and suppose (25.14) and (25.15) hold. 
We have to show that (25.16) holds. Let D := S Π T. Since D e s and 
h (D) = h (S) by (25.15), we have by IM that φ (S) δ φ (D). Since φ(S) £ D 
and φ(0) € P(D), φ (S) £ Φ2(0) implies that 
(25.18) ф^З) < ф^О) . 
From D с Τ, h (D) = h (Τ) and IM we may conclude φ.(D) S φ.(Τ) which, together 
with (25.18), implies (25.16). • 
The results of this section were published in Ti]S and Peters (1985). 
26. RISK SENSITIVITY AND RISKY PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
- 1 2 We consider bargaining situations Γ = <A,a,u ,u > where not necessarily 
every χ £ P(S
r
) is viskless, i.e. χ may be visky , which means : there exists 
1 2 
no a £ A with χ = (u (a),u (a)) . We have seen (Theorem 23.6) that there 
exists no weakly Pareto optimal, individually rational bargaining solution 
2 
φ : В -* R that is risk sensitive (i.e. risk sensitive on BS). There are, 
however, some results on risk properties for specific cases : see Roth and 
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Rothblum (1982) for the (symmetric) Nash solution, and Peters (1981) for non-
symmetric Nash solutions, and the Kalai - Rosenthal solution (cf. section 16). 
We do not describe these results in detail, because that would require the 
introduction of quite many new notations which will not be used any further. 
The proof of the "impossibility" Theorem 23.6 indicates that the meant 
impossibility (see above) is due to the fact that an alternative which does 
not have nonnegative utilities for both players, may still influence the 
solution outcome. Indeed, if we restrict attention to bargaining games in В 
and bargaining situations in В S, then we have the following result. 
2 
Theorem 26.1. Let the bargaining solution φ : В -» К be risk sensitive 
on В SC (cf. the first paragraph of section 25). Then φ is risk sensitive on 
В S. 
+ 
The proof of Theorem 26.1 will be postponed for the moment. It first 
appeared in Wakker, Peters, and van Riel (1985). Some consequences are 
collected in the following corollary. 
2 
Corollary 26.2. Let φ : В -* TR be a bargaining solution satisfying PO and 
STI. Then : 
(i) If φ satisfies IR and IIA, then it satisfies RS and WA on В S. 
(il) If φ satisfies IM, then it satisfies RS and WA on Β Ξ. 
Proof. Theorems 24.1 and 24.3 (or 25.11, 25.12, 25.3), Lemma 23.7, Theorem 
26.1. • 
Theorem 26.1 enables us to establish the risk sensitivity of bargaining 
solutions on a subclass of the class of all bargaining situations, containing 
also situations with risky Pareto optimal outcomes in the corresponding bar­
gaining games, from the risk sensitivity of these solutions on В SC. For the 
proof of Theorem 26.1, we need the following lemma. Roughly, this lemma says 
that, if we apply a continuous nondecreasing concave function on the second 
2 
coordinates of the points of a nonempty compact subset of В with only Pareto 
optimal points, then we can extend this function to a function with the same 
properties defined on the convex hull of the set of second coordinates, such 
that the Pareto optimal surface of the convex hull of the original set is 
mapped into the (weak) Pareto optimal surface of the convex hull of the new 
set. Formally : 
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2 
Lemma 26.3. Let X с: It be nonempty and compact, with X = P(X) . Let 
Y := conv(X) . Let к : {χ € R : (χ. ,χ ) 6 X for some χ € Ж} -» Ж be continuous, 
nondecreasing and concave, such that X' с Ρ(Y') where 
χ' := {(х1,к(х2)) : (х1,х2) e χ} and Y' := conv(X'). Then f^.U) = к β ί^(λ) 
with к : [р^, р Л -» Ю continuous, nondecreasing, and concave, for all λ in the 
domain of f ,(λ) . 
Y 
2 2 ι 
[Here f , f , are the Pareto functions, defined analogous to the functions f 
Y _ Y 
in Def. 9.12, and ρ and ρ denote the right and left endpoints of P(Y), res­
pectively. ] 
We first give an example to illustrate this lemma, the proof of which is 
postponed. 
Example 26.4. Let I = <A,a,u ,u > £ BS with A = {a,a ,a ,a ,a }, u (a) = 
2
,-* η 1, !, 2, 2. , 1, 2, 2, 1, . 1,3. 1 2, 3
λ
 3 
u (a) = 0, u (a ) = u (a ) = 1, u (a ) = u (a ) = 0, u (a ) = j , u (a ) = -, 
u^a
4) = jr, u 2(a 4) = j ^ . Let к 2 G С 2 (Г) be defined by к 2 : λ •* \/T. 
1 2 3 2 
With notations as m Lemma 26.3, we let X := {a ,a ,a }, к := к . Then the 
conditions of the lemma are fulfilled. We have к : [0,1] -» Ρ defined by 
k U ) = | λ /6 if λ £ [Ο,^·], and k(X) = (2 - j\/6)\ - 1 + ±\f6 if λ £ [jfl]. 
Now let Γ' :=<{ (0,0)} U conv{(l,0) , (0,1) }, (0 ,0) , π 1, ττ2>, so f' is the trivial 
bargaining situation corresponding to S„ (cf. Example 9.6). In particular, 
we have S
r
 = S
r
i and S τ,-,. = S- „' where Κ(Γ ) is obtained from Г by substi-
1 1 K¿ ( ι ) К ( 1 ) 
- 2 2 2 ι 
tution of k
 0 тг for π . The advantage of replacing I and К (Г) by Г and 
Κ(ΐ'), respectively, is that Г*, К(Г') € BSC whereas Ι, К (Г) £ BSC. This idea 
will be applied in the proof of Theorem 26.1. 
2 
Proof of Theorem 26.1. We suppose that φ : В -» Ж is risk sensitive on В SC. 
- 1 2 2 + 2 + 
Let now Г = <A,a,u ,u > £ В S, and, say, k £ С (Г) . We 
have to prove 
(26.1) ^(SK2{T)) >^(ST). 
We apply Lemma 26.3 with X := { (u1 (a) ,u2 (a) ) : a £ A, (u (a) ,k2
 0 u
2(a)) £ P(S„2,r0b 
У K U ) 
Then X and k := k satisfy the conditions of Lemma 26.3, so, with notations as 
2 — 2 — Y — Y 
in that lemma, f ι (λ) = k „ f (λ) with k : [p7,P7J -» H continuous, nondecreasing, 
and concave, for ail λ in its domain. If 0 ΐ [ρ,,Ρ-], then we further extend 
k to a function Я which assigns 0 to 0, where SL is well-defined and inherits 
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- - 2 
the properties of к ыпсе к extends к = к . We write к instead of i . 
Now let Г be the trivial bargaining situation corresponding to S-, Note 
that Г' б В SC, and that к ε С (Г ). So by RS of φ on В SC we have 
(26.2) «^(S-^.j) Ì Φ^βρ.) = Φ^Ξρ). 
Since, further, S 2іг\ = sí/г^' w e т а У conclude (26.1) from (26.2). • 
К 11 ) K(Í ) 
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 26.3. In 
this proof, we use the following auxiliary results. For the definition of 
concavity of a function on a nonconvex domain, see Def. 5.3. 
Lemma 26.5. Let V с В, к : V -»F. Equivalent are : 
(ι) к is concave. 
(ii) k(ax +(l-a)y) Ì ak(x) + (l-a)k(y) for all x, y e V and α E [0,1] with 
αχ +(l-a)y € V. 
Proof. (ι) =» (ii) is by Definition 5.3. Now suppose (ii) holds. Let I £ U, 
x, x , x , ..., x. С V and λ , λ , ..., λ. > 0 with Σ _ λ = 1 and 
α 
χ = Σ .λ χ . We have to prove : 
i = l l i 
(26.3) k(x) > í1f'1^1k(xi) . 
The proof is by induction on £. Suppose (26.3) holds for all £ < n. We shall 
now prove (26.3) for i = η > 2. W.l.o.g. we may suppose that 0< χ < χ <...<x 
Let 1 < ι й η and α ε [0,l] be such that χ = αχ . + (1-α)χ . Since 
α + (1-α) = 1 > λ + λ , we have α > λ , or 1 - α > λ . W.l.o.g. say 
1 - α > λ . By rearranging terms in χ = αχ + (1-α)χ = Σ _ λ χ and 
dividing by 1 - α - λ , we obtain : 
(26.4) χ 
3 
Σ , . λ χ + (λ. .- α)χ , 
iH:-l,D ι ι j-1 D-l 
ι - α - λ 
D 
which means that χ is a convex combination of n-1 elements of V, so by 
3 
induction : 
(26.5) (1 - α - λ ) k(x ) > Σ , , λ k(x ) + (λ - α) k(x . ) . 
D 3 i^D-1/3 ι ι 3-1 3-1 
By (26.5) and (ii) , k(x) > ak(x _ ) + (1-a) k(x ) Ì Σ ^ λ k(x ), which is 
(26.3) for I = n. • 
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Lemma 26.6. Let X, к. Y, Y' be as in Lemma 26.3, with the conditions of that 
lemma fulfilled. Let w = (w ,w ) e x \ P ( Y ) , let w > w be the second coor­
dinate of the point in P(Y) with first coordinate w , and let 
kr ι : {x_ € F : x_ φ w. , (x. ,x_) € X for some x, € R } U { W .} -* К be defined 
tw/ ¿ ¿ ¿ 1 ¿ 1 — ¿ 
by kr -, (w ) = k(w ) and kr -itx-) = k(x_) if x_ i w . Then kr ι is concave. iw> 2 2 twj 2 2 2 2 tw> 
Proof. For convenience, we write к instead of kr ι. Let x
n
, y., ¿_ be in 
tw/ ¿ ¿ ¿ 
the domain of k, with x. > ¿ and у = αχ + (1-α)ζ for some 0 < α < 1. In 
view of Lemma 26.5 it is sufficient to show : 
(26.6) k(y 2) й ak(x 2) + (l-a)k(z 2). 
If w φ χ , у , ζ , then (26.6) follows from the concavity of k. Otherwise, 
there remain two cases : (i) w = ζ (il) w = у . (The case w. = χ is 
analogous to case (i).) 
(i) Let w = ζ . We write у = βχ + (l-ß)w with 1 > β > α. Then 
к(У 2) = к(у 2) > ßk(x2) + (l-3)k(w2) > ак(х 2) + (l-o)k(z 2), where the last 
inequality follows from the nondecreasingness of k. 
( n ) Let w = у . There are s, t € X П P(Y) with x S ε > w > t ä ζ 
such that y = (w ,w ) = 6s + (l-6)t for some 0 < 6 < 1. Concavity of к 
implies 6k(s ) + (l-6)k(t ) Ï ак(х ) + (l-a)k(z ). Hence 
k(y ) Ì ak(x ) + (l-a)k(z ) = otk(x ) + (l-a)k(z ) since otherwise 
( y ^ i ^ ) ) = (y1rk(w2)) = (w1,k(w2)) e x' C P Í Y ' ) would be contradicted. " 
Lemma 26.7. With notations and conditions as in Lemma 26.6, let 
1 2 Л 
w , w , ..., w € X\P(Y), and let 
kr 1 £·, : {x. £ H : x„ И w
n
,. ..,w,, (χ, ,χ.) e Xfor some χ Gm} U{w , . ...w }-»H 
Iw ,•••#w / 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 ¿ ¿ 
be defined by kr 1 lx (w!") = kiwÜ") for і=1,2,...Д, and t.w , . . . ,w I ¿ λ 
kr 1 £·, (χ.) = к(х-) otherwise. Here, for i=l ,2, . . . Д , w„ is again the iw , . ..,w ) 2 2 2 
second coordinate of the point in P(Y) with first coordinate w . Then 
kr 1 Л-, is concave. iw , — ,w ) 
Proof. First, apply Lemma 26.6 to obtain the concavity of kr l-,. Note that 
kr 11 is also nondecreasing. Then apply Lemma 26.6 again to obtain the con-
tw i 
cavity of (kr li)r 2i, etc., until, finally, the concavity of 
Iw ¡ iw s 
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(...((kr li) г 2,)...)
 s
 £-, results. Then note that this last function is equal {w i W ) {w i 
to k,· 1 2 Л, ш 
tw ,w ,...,w ] · 
Proof of Lemma 26.3. For every χ = (χ ,x ) С X, denote by χ = (χ ,χ ) the 
point in P(Y) with first coordinate equal to χ . Define the function 
к : W := {x € К : χ = (χ ,χ ) € χ} -»Β by k(x ) := k(x ) for every χ € W. 
Then к is well-defined since X = P(X), and к is nondecreasing since к is non-
decreasing. For concavity it is in view of Lemma 26.5 sufficient to show, 
for χ , у , ζ € W with χ > ζ. and y = αχ + (1-α)ζ for some 0 < α < 1, 
that k(y ) Ì ak(x,) + (l-a)k(z ). In order to prove this, we may suppose 
that x\P(Y) с {χ,у,ζ}; but then the inequality follows by application of 
Lemma 26.7. Now let λ £ [p9,P ] such that λ i W. Then λ := miníx £ W:x >λ} 
and λ := maxíx £ W : χ < λ} exist since X is compact, and λ = βλ + (1-β)λ 
for some 0 < β < 1. Put k(A) ;= ßk(X) + (l-ß)k(A). By this definition, к 
Y —Y 
is extended to a nondecreasing concave function on [ρ,,ρ,]; hence it is con-
Y -Y Y 
tinuous on (ρ.,ρ,]. Continuity in ρ follows from the continuity of к in 
Y
 я 
Ρ2· " 
27. STRATEGIC RISK AVERSION 
Several authors (Kannai (1977); Crawford and Varían (1979); and Eobel 
(1981)) consider the question (or questions related to it) whether (under cer-
tain conditions) it is advantageous for a bargainer to pretend to be less risk 
averse. We will also briefly address this question in the present section, 
as a special case of a more general observation which involves the b-monotoni-
city property for 2-person bargaining solutions (cf. Def. 13.12). 
1 2 
We consider the class V of division problems D = <U ,U > where : 
(27.1) U : [0,1] -»Ж is a nondecreasing continuous concave function with 
ü1(0) = 0 and U1«!) > 0. 
2 
(27.2) U : [0,1] -*'R is a nonincreasing continuous concave function with 
2 +2 
U (0) > 0 and U (1) = 0 . 
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1 2 
As interpretation of a D = <U ,U > £ Ό, we say that for every t € [0,1], 
U (t) is the utility for bargainer 1 of receiving 100 t percent of one unit of 
2 
a certain good, and U (t) is the utility to bargainer 2 of receiving 100(l-t) 
percent of one unit of the same good. We call 
1 2 
S(D) := com{(U (t),u (t)) : 0 й t S 1} the bargaining game aorreponding to D. 
1 2 
Note that S(D) € В and P(S(D)) = {(U (t),U (t)) : 0 S t S l). Also, for 
every S Ε В we can find a D £ V with S = S(D). 
( Proof : similar to the proof of Lennna 13.9.) 
1 2 1 2 
Remark 27.1. If A = <u ,u > is an allocation problem, then <! U ,U > (see 
Def. 13.4) is a division problem. 
1 2 
With every division problem D = <U ,U > we can associate a 2-person 
bargaining situation 
Г(0) = <{(t,l-t) : 0 < t á 1} U {(0,0)},(0,0),v1,v2> 
with v^t.l-t) = u S t ) , v2(t,l-t) = U2(t), ν^Ο,Ο) = v2(0,0) = 0, for 
every 0 á t £ 1. Of course S r i m = S(D), and Γ(0) £ BSC. One difference 
between Г(0) and D is the existence, by definition, of lotteries on the set 
of alternatives in Г(0). 
We assume that any S £ В occuring in this section corresponds to Г(0) 
for some D £ Ό. The following, and main, result of this section involves the 
b-monotonicity property of 2-person bargaining solutions. (Recall that sec­
tion 13 provides an interpretation of this property with the aid of competi­
tive equilibria of simple markets, for the case b > 0; in particular, see 
Remark 13.15.) 
2 2 Observation 27.2. Let b £ Ρ with b. + b. = 1, and let φ : В -»К be a 
+ 1 2 Y + 
weakly Pareto optimal and b-monotonic bargaining solution. 
Let D = < V , U > £ P and D' = <U 1,V 2> € Ό with V 1 and V affine functions. 
Then, for (t,l-t) € аШф,Г(0)) and (t'jl-t') £ alt(φ,Γ(Ο') ) , we have t S b 
and l-t' £ b . 
Proof. Straightforward. • 
So, an affine utility function V guarantees player 1 the utility of 
receiving at least b., under the conditions of Observation 27.2, and similar­
ly, player 2 can secure for himself the utility of receiving at least b-, all 
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provided a division of the good as in the Observation actually takes place. 
If, however, the final agreement in the bargaining game is effectuated by 
some non-trivial lottery, then an affine utility function may not be desirable, 
e.g. if a bargainer's true utility function is not affine : we will not go 
into further details, but refer to Example 23.4 and the paragraph following 
that example. As already indicated a few lines ago. Observation 27.2 may 
play a role if the players can report any utility functions as long as these 
satisfy (27.1) and (27.2); further,many bargaining solutions in this monograph 
satisfy its conditions, as the following theorem and corollary show. 
2 
Theorem 27.3. Let φ : В -• R be an individually rational, weakly Pareto 
optimal, 2-person bargaining solution. Suppose further that φ is risk sen­
sitive on В SC and that φ has the slice property (cf. section 25, especially 
(25.1)). Let b = φ(Δ). Then φ is b-monotomc. 
Proof. Let з е в . We want to prove that φ(Ξ) ä bh(S). First note that for 
2 
any a £ К we have ф(аД) = аф(Д) = ab; this can be proved in the same way as 
+ +
 2 
Theorem 23.13, mainly since Н(Д) П К = Ρ(Δ),· so the restriction of φ to games 
аД is Pareto optimal. For notational simplicity, we suppose further that 
h(S) = (1,1) . We assume that b < 1 (the case b = 1 is analogous to the case 
b = 1). Now suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that ф9(3) < b = φ-(Δ) 
Let Τ be the game in В consisting of all points of S except those strictly 
above the straight line through (0,1) and ф(5). By SL of φ and the definition 
of T, we have φ (Τ) ¿ φ (S), so φ.(Τ) < b . Since φ.(S) < 1, the function 
1 1 1 
к : λ >-» f (1-λ) for all 0 £ λ S 1, is an element of С (Δ) . Because 
Τ = Κ (Δ), we have by RS of φ, that φ (Τ) £ Ф9(Л) = b-. So we have a contra­
diction and conclude that ф.(5) Ì b . Similarly, one shows that φ (S) a b . · 
Corollary 27.4. Every Pareto optimal, scale transformation invariant, and 
twist sensitive solution φ on В is φ(Δ)-monotonie. Every φ £ W and every 
χ * 
φ £ {π : λ € Λ} is φ(Δ)-monotonie. 
Proof. Theorems 25.6 and 27.3, 25.11 and 25.12. • 
We conclude this section with an example which shows that the slice pro­
perty in Theorem 27.3 cannot be dispensed with. 
2 
Example 27.5. Let φ : В -* Η be defined as follows : 
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N(S) If (0,h2(S)) e P(S) 
Φ(3) := 
D^S) If (0,h2(S)) l P(S) 
Then φ is (weakly) Pareto optimal and individually rational, and risk sensi­
tive on В SC; φ does not have the slice property, and is not symmetrically 
monotonie. Verification of these statements is left to the reader. 
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CHAPTER 9 
PROPERTIES OF n-PERSON BARGAINING SOLUTIONS 
In a so-called n-person game without sidepayments, each nonempty 
ooaliti-on M с N (including the all-player coalition N) can achieve any point 
Μ ι ι 
in some subset V(M) of К (which denotes the Cartesian product of | M| copies 
of Ж indexed by the names of the players in M) by cooperation; in particular, 
we assume the utility functions of the players to be normalized such that 
V({i}) = (- 00,0] for every 1 £ N. If for every M с: N we have 
V(M) = {χ e Ж : χ й 0}, and if V(N) satisfies the conditions in Def. 9.1, 
then the game is an n-person ("pure") bargaining game, in which only the dis­
agreement outcome 0 and the grand coalition N play a role. If n=2, then 
every game without sidepayments is a bargaining game : this is one of the 
main reasons why the case n=2 has attracted considerably more attention than 
the general case of n-person bargaining games has. 
Until now, there have been some articles also on characterizations of 
"values" for n-person games without sidepayments; we mention Hart (1985), 
Aumann (1985), Kalai and Samet (1985). Here, we confine attention to n-person 
bargaining games and solutions. Of all the results for 2-person bargaining 
solutions obtained so far, we only generalize a few ones to the n-person case. 
In section 28 we consider the n-person independence of irrelevant alternatives 
property, and obtain an extension of Theorem 11.8 with the aid of an additional 
property called "consistency". In section 29, we consider the n-person indi­
vidual monotonicity property and obtain an n-person version of Theorem 15.15. 
Finally, in section 30, we consider risk properties of n-person bargaining 
solutions : in particular, we introduce a new property called "risk profit 
opportunity". 
28. INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES 
In section 11, we have characterized the family N = Í N : 0 α t £ l} of 
nonsymmetric Nash solutions by the four properties : IR, PO, STI, and IIA. 
The main question we ask in this section is : how can this result be generali­
zed to n-person bargaining solutions with η > 2 ? 
125 
For completeness' sake, we now first give the definition of IIA for the 
general case η ä 2; for IR, PO, and STI, see section 10. 
Definition 28.1. An η-person bargaining solution φ : В -»H is called 
•independent of -irrelevant alternatives if φ(Ξ) = φ (τ) for all S and Τ in в 
with S с τ and φ (Τ) ζ. S. 
(Independence of irrelevant alternatives : IIA) 
So Definition 28.1 equals Definition 11.1 with Β instead of B. We now 
give an example of a 4-person bargaining solution which satisfies IR, PO, STI, 
and IIA. 
4 4 4 
Example 28.2. Let φ : В -»Ж be defined as follows. For S € Β , let 
φ (S) = max{x4 : X G S, χ È О}. Let Ζ = {(χ^χ^χ ) ξ. Κ : (χ ,χ2 ,χ3 ,φ4 (S)) £ S} 
If ζ > 0 for some ζ £ Ζ, then let φ(5) be such that (φ.(S),φ (S),φ,(S)) maxi-
3 1 2 3 
mizes the product χ χ χ on Ζ Π Ж . Otherwise, let (φ (S),φ (S) ,φ (S)) be 
the lexicographical maximum of Ζ П Ж . We leave it to the reader to verify 
that φ batisfies IR, PO, STI, and IIA. 
The solution φ of Example 28.2 is further explored in the next example. 
4 
Example 28.3. Let S and Τ in Β be defined by 
S = comv{(l,0,0,1)/(0,1.0,1) ,(0,0,1,1)} and 
2 2 ι 4 4 
Τ = comví (1,0,0,0) , (0,—, 0,1) , (0,0,—,1) }. Let φ : Β -» Β be as in Example 
1 1 1 2 
28.2. Then φ(3) = (-j,-j,-j, 1) , φ(Τ) = (Ο,γ,Ο,Ι). Now, if we fix in the game 
S player I's utility at —, then for the other players there remains 
com{(y - α,α , 1) : 0 < α < - | } = {(x2,x3,x4) £ Ж 3: (ф^З) ,x2,x3,x4) G S}. 
Further, also { (χ ,χ ,χ ) € Ж : (φ (Τ) ,χ ,χ ,χ ) Ç. τ} = 
2 2 
comí (— - α,α,Ι) : 0 S α S - } , but nevertheless we have (φ (S) ,φ (S) ,φ (S) ) = 
(|,уД) Φ (f,0,1) = (Φ2(Τ),φ3(Τ),φ4(Τ)). 
Example 28.3 shows that the solution of Example 28.2 violates the pro­
perty described in Definition 28.4 below. In order to state this property, 
we need some additional notations : for a bargaining solution φ : В -» IR , 
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з е в , χ e Ж , and 0 fi M c Ν = {l,2,...,η}, we denote by χ . the vector 
obtained from χ by deleting the coordinates with indexes in M, and by 
0
-м
( ф
'
3 ) :
= 4 \ M = *
 e s Wlth X
M = Фм(
5)> 
the opportunity set for the bargainers ι £ M with respect to φ and S. 
The opportunity set Ο (φ,S) consists of those utility (n - |м| )- tuples, 
—M 
available for the collective N\M, if the bargainers ] in M receive φ (S) . 
We write Ο (φ,S) instead of 0 , -, (φ,S) . 
- D -ili 
Definition 28.4. An η-person bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж is called 
consistent if for all S and Τ in В and every 0 И Μ ς N we have : 
'Э-м'Ф'
3
'
 = 0
_M
(!t,''r) implies φ (S) = φ (Τ) for all ι g M. 
(Consistency : CONS) 
We shall restrict attention to bargaining solutions which have, besides 
IR, WPO, STI, and IIA, the consistency property : so we exclude a solution 
like the one in Example 28.2. 
As before, we let N denote the set of η players {l,2,...,n}. If we are 
dealing with a non-empty subset M с: N with m =| M | , it will often be con­
venient to let our notations express that we are considering this specific 
M 
subset. For instance, we denote by В the family of m-person bargaining 
games where the players are those of M, and keep the same names, i.e. 
M 
numbers as in N. Similarly, В denotes the Cartesian product of m copies of 
Ж, indexed by the names of the players in M. 
We proceed by giving a definition, in which we partition the player set 
N into a hierarchy of subsets, with each player in each subset having a weight 
which determines his power with respect to the other players in that subset. 
Definition 28.5. A Weighted hierarchy H of N is an ordered (k+1)-tuple of 
1 2 k 1 2 k 
the form H = < N ,N ,. . . ,Ν ,ω> where (N ,N ,. . . ,N ) is a partition of N 
(with 1 < к ¿ η) and ω € В П with Σ ^,0 ш = 1 for every Л -1,2,...,к. We 
+ + itN ^  ι 
Ζ Ν 
call Ν the i-th class of Η. By Η we denote the family of all weighted 
hierarchies of N. 
We will associate with each weighted hierarchy Η € π an η-person bar-
gaining solution φ , by lexicographically maximizing "Nash products" in a 
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game S according to the partition and weights in H. Before we can give a 
formal definition, we need some more definitions and notations, and a lemma. 
Definition 28.6. (i) For 0 Φ L с м с N and V с к , we call V nondegenerate 
for L if χ € V exists with χ > 0, where, as before, χ is obtained from χ 
by deleting the coordinates with indexes in M\L. If V is not nondegenerate 
for L, then we call V degenerate for L. If V is degenerate for every non­
empty subset of L, then we call V strongly degenerate for L. 
(li) For V с W с к and a function f : W -»R, we use the somewhat loose 
notation:argmax{f(x) : χ 6 V} := {x £ V : f(x) > f(y) for all у € v}. 
(in) Let Η = <N ,N , ,Ν ,ω> be a weighted hierarchy of N, and let S ε В . 
For Л = 0,l,...,k, we define the sets S as follows. 
p(s) η κ η, s 1 argmax {Пх
Ш
і : I £ N , X £ S } , 
'argmaxin χ ι : ι Ç. N with S nondegenerate for ι, χ ε S }, 
1 2 
if S is not strongly degenerate for N 
otherwise 
ω A £.—1 Л—1 
'argmaxill χ ι : i £ N with S nondegenerate for ι, χ ε S }, 
ί,-ι
1
 f. 
if S is not strongly degenerate for N 
¿-1 S , otherwise. 
'argmaxill χ ι : ι ε N with S nondegenerate for ι, χ ε S }, 
k-1 k 
i f S i s not s t rongly degenerate for N 
k-1 S , o therwise . 
L M Definition 28.7. Let 0 H L C M C N . By e ε κ we denote the vector with 
e = 1 if ι ε L, e =0 otherwise. In particular, we write e instead of 
e , if L = ii}. For χ ε К , we denote by Ο (χ) ε К the vector with 
M M M M 
Ο (χ) = χ if ι ε L, Ο (χ) = 0 otherwise; and by Ε (χ) ε Κ the vector with 
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M M L 
Ε (χ) = x if ι € L, Ε (χ) = 1 otherwise. For S c= R , we denote 
M Г Μ 1 M r M 1 
О (S) := {θ (χ) : χ € s} and Ε (S) := {E (Χ) : χ £ s}. 
1 2 k N к 
Lemma 28.8. Let Η = <N ,Ν , . . . ,Ν ,ω> £ Η . Let S be the s e t described in 
Def. 28.6 ( i n ) . Then : 
(i) |s k| = 1 for every S € В П. 
(ii) The bargaining solution, denoted φ , which assigns to every S 6 В the 
unique element in S , satisfies IR, PO, STI, IIA, and CONS. 
Proof. (ι) Let S £ В . Since S is convex and every "Nash product" Π χ ι 
strictly concave if the number of indices ι is greater than 1, we have, for 
every I € {l,2,.. . ,k} and all x,y € S , that χ = y for all ι 6 N 1 U N 2 U. . .UN 
к
 i 1 
In particular, x=y for all x,y ε S . 
y 
(ii) The straightforward proof of IR, PO, STI, and IIA of φ is left to the 
reader. We show that φ is consistent. Let S,T ε В , let 0 φ M с N with 
_ Η Η 
0 φ Μ := Ν\Μ, and suppose that 0 , (φ ,S) = Ο „(φ ,τ). We have to prove 
-M —M 
(28.1) φΗ(5) = фН(Т) for all ι ε M. 
Let M := {ι ε M : φΗ(3) = θ} and M := {ι ε M : φΗ(3) > θ}. By STI, we may 
2 Η 
suppose Μ = { ι € Μ : φ ( 3 ) = ΐ } . Similarly, we partition M into 
M := {ι ε M : φΗ(Τ) = θ} and M 4 = М\М3 = {ι ε M : фН(Τ) = l}. Let further 
ι ι 
Ν Η Ν H -
Ζ := Ο (Ο „(φ ,S)) = 0 (О „(φ ,Τ)). Suppose Ζ is degenerate for M, i.e. 
-M —M 
_ H H 
there is an ι ε M with ζ á 0 for all ζ ε Ζ. Then φ (S) = φ (Τ) = 0 which 
1
 Η Η 
proves (28.1) for such an ι. For the determination of φ (Ξ) and φ (Τ) for 
Η 
all other j (Φ i), we might, by definition of φ , restrict attention to 
ίχ ε S : χ = 0 } and {χ ε Τ : χ = θ} from the start: in other words, it is 
ι ι 
without loss of generality to suppose that Ζ is nondegenerate for M. 
i n 1 9 
Now let V := com[conv(Z U{e } ) + e ] = comv(Z U {e } + e ) and let 
г г МЗ, М^т
 r
 M3-, M 4 
W := comLconv(Z U le Л + e J = comv(Z U ie ; + e ). Since Ζ is supposed 
N 
to be nondegenerate for M, we have V,W ε В . Further, we may in view of STI 
МІ М^ м2 Ν Η 
suppose that e £ S and e ε Τ; and also e = Ο (φ 9(S)) ε S and 
4 
e" = 0Ν(φ"4(Τ)) £ Τ; so V с S and W с T. Since φΗ(3) ε V and φΗ(Τ) Ç. W, we 
have by IIA : 
(28.2) фН( ) =ф Н(3),ф Н№) = ф Н ( Т ) . 
Since we may restrict attention to Ζ for the determination of both φ (V) and 
Η Η Η 
φ (W) , we conclude φ (V) = φ (W), which in combination with (28.2) gives (28.1). 
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Definition 28.9. For Η Ε H , we call φ : В -» Ю , defined as in Lemma 
28.8 (n), the bargaining solution corresponding to the weighted hierarchy H. 
The main purpose of the remainder of this section is to show that the 
converse of Lemma 28.8 (n) also holds, that is : 
Proposition 28.10. Let φ : В -* ]R be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, 
PO, STI, IIA, and CONS. Then there exists a weighted hierarchy Η € Η such 
that φ = φ . 
Definition 28.11. We call a bargaining solution φ : В -»К a Generalized 
Nash (GN-)solut ion if it satisfies IR, PO, STI, IIA, and CONS. 
Μ ι Μ ι 
We denote Δ := comvíe £ F : ι € Mi, for 0 φ Μ с Ν, and call 
Δ := com(E (Δ )) the standard bargaining game for M с Ν. We shall characte­
rize a GN-solution φ by the outcomes it assigns to standard bargaining games. 
Definition 28.12. Let φ : В -»К be an η-person bargaining solution and 
Η = <N ,N ,... ,Ν ,ω> e Η a weighted hierarchy. We say that φ determines Η 
(on standard bargaining games) if 
N N - N\N1 N^ Ν (28.3) φ(ΔΗ) = Ο1 (ω
Νΐ
),φ(Δ1 и ) ) = e + о и(ω^) , ..., 
,,τΝΧίΝ
1
 U ... UN11) „ N^.-.UN^ Ν . „ .. 
Φ (Δ )) = e + 0 (u> Î.+ 1) ,..., 
Ν 
φ^ΝΜ^υ... UZ"1')) ^ ...UN*-1
 + ( Л с у о . 
Ν Η 
Lemma 28.13. (ι) For every Η € Η , φ determines Η. (ιι) If the bargaining 
solution φ : В -»К determines Η and Η ' in Η , then Η = Η'. (in) Every 
Pareto optimal and individually rational bargaining solution φ : В -» К 
determines some Η € Η . 
Proof, (ι) follows with the aid of Lemma 28.14 below. (n) follows from defi­
nition, i.e. (28.3). Similarly, (in) follows from (28.3), as follows. Let 
φ satisfy IR and PO. Let N := {i £ N : φ (ΔΝ) > θ} and, for ι € Ν , 
ω := φ (Δ Ν). If Ν φ Ν 1, then let Ν 2 := {ι € Ν Χ Ν 1 : φ (ΔΝ Ν )) > 0} and, for 
2 -Ν\Ν* 
1 € Ν , ω := φ (Δ )). Etc. • 
The following lemma is the analogue, for the case m i 2, of Lemma 12.1 : 
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Lemma 28.14. Let S € Bm, ω £ Κ™ with Σ " ω = 1, ζ £ P(S) П К Ш . Then ζ 
++ ι=1 ι ++ 
maximizes the product Π χ ι on P(S) П Жш if and only if the hyperplane 
with equation F , ω ζ χ = 1 supports S at ζ. 
ι=1 ι ι ι 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 12.1. • 
We will prove Proposition 28.10 by induction on the number of players. 
Therefore, we start by reconsidering the 2-person case. 
2 
Lemma 28.15. A 2-person solution φ : В -» H is a GN-solution if and only if 
φ = φ for some Η £ Η ' 
Proof. This lemma is a restatement of Theorem 11.8. For, note that every 
2 
Pareto optimal solution φ : В -* Ж is consistent. Note further that, for 
0 < t < 1, N corresponds to the weighted hierarchy <{l,2},(t,l-t) >, that 
N = D corresponds to <{ΐ},{2},(1,1)>, and that N = D corresponds to 
<{2},{1},(1,1) >. • 
In the proof of Proposition 28.10 we shall use the following induction 
hypothesis. 
(I) For all 2 й к < η, for all К e N such that |κ| = k, and for all Η € HK, 
Κ Κ Η 
if the k-person GN-solution φ : В -» It determines H, then φ = φ . 
Ν Ν 
For an η-person bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж , we define solutions 
for subclasses of the player set N, as follows. 
Ν N 
Definition 28.16. Let φ : В -»Ж be an η-person bargaining solution, and 
ll M M 
0 ^ M c N , m = |M| . We denote by Мф : В -* Ж the m-person bargaining solu­
tion defined by Мф(3) := ф„(сот(Е (S))) for every S £ В . 
M 
Ν Ν 
Lemma 28.17. Let φ : В -»Ж be a GN-solution, and 0 ^ M с N. Then 
M M 
Мф : В -» Ж is a GN-solution. 
Proof. We only show that Мф is consistent, and leave verification of the 
M 
other properties to the reader. Let S, Τ € Β , 0 ^ L с M, L ^ M, such that 
Ο (Μφ,5) = Ο
τ
( Μ φ , Τ ) . Then О (ф,сот(ЕЫ(3))) = О (ф,сот(ЕЫ(Т))), so by 
CONS of φ we have Мф (S) = φ (com(E (Ξ))) = φ (com(E (Τ))) = Мф (Τ) for all 
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j ε M, з g L. We c o n c l u d e t h a t Μφ i s c o n s i s t e n t . • 
Ν Ν 
Lemma 2 8 . 1 8 . L e t t h e b a r g a i n i n g s o l u t i o n φ : В -*Ж d e t e r m i n e 
< N ,N , . . . ,Ν , ω > £ Η , where к ì 2 . Le t M := N \ N . Then Μφ d e t e r m i n e s 
< Ν 2 , Ν 3 , . . . , Ν \ ω
Μ
> H M . 
P r o o f . Μφ(ΔΜ) = Φ
Μ
( Δ Μ ) ) = 0Μ(ΐϋ 2) , 
Μ N¿ 1 2 
Α , , „ Μ , . Μ \ Ν 2
 ч
 . . τ Μ \ Ν 2
λ
 . , τ Ν \ ( Ν UN ) , 
Мф(сот(Е (Δ ) ) ) = φ„(Δ ) = φ (Δ ' ) = 
e + 0 (ω.τ) , e t c . • 
Ν 
The n e x t lemma i s P r o p o s i t i o n 28 .10 f o r a s p e c i a l c a s e . 
Lemma 2 8 . 1 9 . L e t t h e G N - s o l u t i o n φ : В -» R d e t e r m i n e Η = < Ν , ω > £ И . 
Then φ = φ . 
Proof. E.g., theorem 3 in Roth (1979). • 
Whereas the previous lemma treated the special case in which the first 
class of the weighted hierarchy determined by the GN-solution φ contains all 
players, the following lemma deals with the case in which this first class 
contains exactly one player. 
Ν N Lemma 28.20. Let the GN-solution φ : В -»В determine 
Η = <N ,Ν ,...,Ν ,ω> £ Η with |Ν Ι = 1. Then, under induction hypothesis 
(Ι), Φ = Φ Η. 
Proof. W.l.o.g. let N = {l}. Take S £ BN, and let zeP(S),z >0,z <h (S) . Take β>0 
so large that ζ £ comvíh (S)e ,ße ЕЖ : 1=2,3,...,η} =: V, which is possible since 
N 1 1 
ζ < h (S). By STI and φ(Δ ) = e , we have ф( ) = h (S)e . From this, we 
conclude ф(5) И ζ since otherwise, by НА, ф( Π S) = h (S)e as well as 
ф( Π S) = ζ, which would contradict h (S) > ζ . We have proved : 
(28.4) For every Τ £ BN, φ (Τ) = φ"(Τ) (= h (Τ)). 
Let M := N\{I}, and let L с M such that 0 .(φ,Ξ) is nondegenerate for L and 
strongly degenerate for M\L. Suppose M\L ^  0. Note that φ (S) =0 for all 
1
 M\L 
ι £ M\L, and that, in view of (28.4) , Ο / ^ , , ^ 'Φ'5) = 0_{I}UM\L ^ ' e + S ) ' 
M\L 
so CONS gives φ (S) = φ (e + S). In other words. It is without loss of 
L L 
generality to suppose M\L = 0, i.e. L = M which means that Ο (φ,S) is non­
degenerate for M = N\{I}. In view of STI we may suppose h.(S) = 1, so by IIA : 
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<t>(S) = ф(сот(Е (0_1(ф,3) ) )) ,hence фм(3) = Мф(0_ (ф,3)) = ф!!(5), where the last 
equality follows from lemmas 28.17 and 28.18, and induction hypothesis (I). 
CT 
So we have proved φ (S) = φ (S) for all ι £ Ν. • 
We proceed by considering the case, in Proposition 28.10, in which the 
first class of the weighted hierarchy determined by the GN-solution φ contains 
at least two, but not all players. 
Ν N 
Lemma 28.21. Let the GN-solution φ : В -» R determine 
Η = <N ,N , . . . ,Ν ,ω> e H N , with 1 < |N | < n. Let S 6 B N, and ζ = φ(3) . 
Then : 
(28.5) Π _ „ι ζ Ші = maxin ,. < χ ω ι : χ € S П :RN } . it Ν 1 ι iE Ν 1 ι + 
Proof. W.l.o.g. let N = {l,2,...,s} with 1 < s < n. Let M := N\N and let 
q £ S with q.. = 0 and Π , q ι = тах{П .χ ι : χ € S fi Ж , χ.. = θ} . As a 
M 1=1 ι 1=1 1 + M 
Ν
1 
consequence of Lemma 28.14, there is a hyperplane Y in Ж , supporting 
{χ 1 £ В : χ € S, χ.. = θ} at q . , with equation Σ . ω q χ = 1 . In view 
N 1 M TJl 1 = 1 i l ι 
Ν 
of STI, we may suppose that q = ω (i=l,2,...,s). Let ζ := 0 (ζ j). We 
distinguish three cases. 
Case
 <4· 2 N1 = Sil
 (=
 V ' · Т Ь е п Пі = 1 2 Л =Пі=1ЧіШі = 
niaxín S , x Ш і : χ € S fi Ж®, χ „ = θ} = maxiïï S , x " ι : χ € S П I t N } . 
ι = 1 ι + M ι = 1 ι + 
So f o r t h i s c a s e ( 2 8 . 5 ) h o l d s . 
Case ( i i ) . ζ.,ι £ Y. Then z i € i n t ( A ) , so ζ G r e l i n t ( 0 N ( A N ) ) . T h e r e f o r e 
Ν N 
we can find δ > 0 so large that ζ 6 V := comv(0N(AN JUÍóe1^»14: ібм}) e B N. 
Ν Ν 
By STI and the equalities φ(Δ ) = 0 (ωι) = q, we have ф( ) = q. Then, by 
IIA, ф( Π S) = q, and also ф( Л S) = ζ. In particular we have q ι = ζ ι and 
Ν Ν
1 
ζ ι € Y. From this contradiction we conclude that case (n) cannot occur. 
N1 
Case (in), ζ . € Υ, ζ . ^  q ι . In this case, let y € S with y = 0 and 
Ν
1
 Ν
1
 Ν M 
!, ч
т
^ т т
5 Ш
 ÍT, S ω ^ дМ1-! . _ Ν 1 
У.,1 = τ(ζ.,ι + Ч.,і) · Then Π , у ι = maxlU ,χ ι : χ t аД i where а ЕЖ 
Ν  2 Ν 1 Ν χ ι=1 1 ι=1 ι ++ 
is defined by a = y q for every 1=1,2,...,s. A tedious but elementary 
calculation then shows that z« € int(aA ), so ζ £ relint(0 (аЛ )), which 
N 1 
brings us m a case analogous to case (n) above. The conclusion that also 
case ( m ) cannot occur, completes the proof. • 
133 
Ν Ν 
Lemma 28.22. Let the GN-solution φ : В -»Ж determine 
Η = < Ν , Ν , . . . , Ν , ω > ε Η , with 1 < Ι Ν I < η. Then, under (I) , φ = φ . 
Ν 
proof. Let S £ В . In view of Lemma 28.21, we have : 
(28.6) Φ
Ν 1 ( 3 ) = Φ ^ Ο ) . 
By (28.6) and an argument analogous to the one used in the proof of Lemma 
28.20, which was based on the consistency of φ, we may suppose without loss 
of generality that Ο ι(φ,3) is nondegenerate for M := N\N . In view of STI 
"
N
 Nl Nl 
we may further suppose that φ \(S) = e 6 К , so by IIA : 
φ(5) = ф(сот(Е (О ι(φ,Ξ)))), hence φ (S) = Мф(0
 м1(ф,3)) = φ (S) where the 
-Nx Μ -Ν1 M 
last equality follows from Lemmas 28.17 and 28.18, and induction hypothesis (I) 
ц 
So we have proved φ (S) = φ (S) for all ι £ Ν. • 
ι ι 
Proof of Proposition 28.10. Let Η £ Η be the weighted hierarchy determined 
1 2 к by φ (cf. Lemma 28.13) , say H = <N ,N , . . . ,Ν ,ω> with к δ 1. If к = 1, then 
φ = φ by Lemma 28.19. If к > 1 and |N | = 1, then φ = φ by Lemmas 28.20 and 
i l i Η 
28. IS. Finally, if к > 1 and 1 < |N | < n, then φ = φ by Lemmas 28.22 and 
28.15. • 
Our main result in this section is the following theorem. 
Theorem 28.23. The bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж satisfies IR, PO, STI, 
Η Ν 
IIA, and CONS, if and only if φ = φ for some Η £ Η . 
Proof. Lemma 28.8 (n) and Proposition 28.10. • 
We conclude with a few remarks. 
Remark 28.24. In Peters (1983a),a modification of Theorem 28.23 is proved : 
degenerate "bargaining games" are allowed there, but on the other hand, the 
property "degeneracy consistency" which plays the role of CONS, in that paper, 
seems weaker than CONS. We further conjecture that CONS in Theorem 28.23 
may be replaced by some continuity property like PCO. 
Remark 28.25. In several papers, W. Thomson characterizes bargaining solu­
tions with the aid of properties which say something about the behavior of 
η-person bargaining solutions when the number of players η varies. Our 
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consistency property is closely related to his "stability" property : see 
e.g., Thomson (1982). See also Lensberg (1982), and the following remark. 
Remark 28.26. Example 28.3 shows that Theorem 28.2 3 does not hold without 
the consistency property. A variation on Theorem 28.23, however, is the 
following assertion : 
(28.7) The bargaining solution φ : В -» Ж satisfies SIR, PO, STI, and IIA, 
Η Ν 
if and only if φ = φ for some Η € Η of the form <Ν,ω>. 
For a proof, see Theorem 3 in Roth (1979); cf. Lemma 28.19. So, if we restrict 
attention to strongly individually rational solutions, we can dispense with the 
consistency property. Another question we may ask is : can we dispense with 
the IIA-property in Theorem 28.23 ? The answer is "no", as the following 
3 3 3 
example of a solution φ : В -»F shows. For every Ξ ε В such that 
aS = comv{ (y,—,0),(1,1,1)} for some a € Κ , we have 
ф(Б) = (a ,a ,a ) (т«Т»у)· F o r every other game Ξ in Β , we have 
ф(5) = фН(5) with Η = <{l,2,3},(-j,-j,j)> € Η ' 2' 3 . Then the reader may 
verify that this φ satisfies P0,SIR, SYM, CONS, but not IIA. This example is 
taken from Lensberg (1982, Proposition 5.2). Lensberg gives a characteriza­
tion of the solution φ : В -*· В with Η = <N, (—,—,...,—)> € Η , for any 
η η η 
η £ 14, without using the IIA-property : instead, he uses a stability property 
which is closely related to CONS, but which is required for a "solution" 
assigning outcomes to bargaining games in which the number of players may be 
any arbitrary natural number. See also Remark 28.25. 
Remark 28.27. A property closely related to CONS, was already used by 
Harsanyi (1959). See also Aumann and Maschler (1985). 
29. INDIVIDUAL MONOTONICITY 
In this section we give an η-person version of Theorem 15.15, in which a 
family of 2-person individually monotonie bargaining solutions is characteri­
zed. We start with the definition of the individual monotonicity property 
for the η-person case. 
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Definition 29.1. An n-person bargaining solution φ : С -» Ж , where С с: в , 
is called indLv-Ldually monotonia if, for all Ξ and Τ in С with S с τ and 
every ι £ N with h (S) = h (Τ) for every j € Ν, ] ^  ι, we have φ (S) S φ (Τ). 
(Individual monotonicity : IM) 
The following definition is the η-person analogue of Def. 15.11. 
Definition 29.2. Let 1 denote the vector in В with every coordinate equal 
η 
to 1, and let V denote the set 
{χ € Β η : 0 < χ < 1 , 1 < Σ ", χ S n } . 
η ι=1 ι 
An {n-person) monotonia curve is a map λ : [l,n] -» V satisfying the following 
condition : 
(29.1) For all 1 < s С t S η we have X(s) < X(t) and Τ " λ (s) = s. 
By Λ we denote the family of all (n-person) monotonie curves. Note that 
Λ
2
 = Λ, cf. Def. 15.11. 
Every map λ £ Λ is continuous since Σ _ |λ (t)- λ (s) | = |t-s| for all 
s, t £ [l,η]. With each map λ € Λ we would like to associate a bargaining 
solution, ]ust like we have done in section 15 (Definition 15.12). Unfortuna­
tely, difficulties arise if we want that bargaining solution to be Pareto op­
timal, аь the following example will illustrate. 
3 3 
Example 29.3. Let S := comv{(1,0,1) ,(0,1 ,1)} € Β , and let λ^  £ A be defined 
by Xjt) = &ЛЛ) for every t € [1,3]. 
Then U^tt) : t € [1,3]} П W(S) = { ( j . jÀ) Ì and (jÀ,j) £ P(S) 
We will circumvent the difficulty indicated by Example 29.3 by restric-
ting ourselves to a subclass G of Β , to be described below. For other 
approaches to the same problem, we refer the reader to the end of this section, 
below Theorem 29.17. 
Definition 29.4. G denotes the subclass of В consisting exactly of those 
bargaining games S in В which satisfy the following condition : 
(29.2) For each χ € S, χ i 0, and each ι G {l,2,...,n} we have : if χ g P(S) 
and χ < h (S), then there exists an ε > 0 such that χ + ε e € S. 
ι ι 
(As before, e € IR denotes the vector with i-th coordinate 1 and the 
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other coordinates 0.) 
In the following lemma, we collect some properties of bargaining games 
in G . There we use for an S € G the notation 
α(χ,ν) := sup{3 £ [0,») : χ + βν £ S} 
where χ £ S and ν € В , ν φ 0. 
Lemma 29.5. Let S £ G", Χ € R" Π S, and ν en", ν Φ 0. Then 
+ + 
(ι) χ + βν e S for each β £ [Ο,α(χ,ν)], 
(il) χ + α(χ,ν)ν £ P(S) or there is an ι £ {l,2,...,n} with ν > 0 and 
χ + a(x,v)v = h (S) , 
1 1 1 
(in) a(0,h(S))h(S) £ P(S) . 
Proof. (i) The set {β 6 [θ,00) : χ + βν £ s} is a closed and bounded interval 
containing 0, since S is compact and convex and ν φ 0. Hence, α(χ,ν) £ В and 
χ + βν £ S for all β £ [Ο,α(χ,ν)]. 
(il) Suppose χ + α(χ,ν)ν g P(S) and χ + α(χ,ν)ν < h (S) for all ι £ N with 
ν > 0. Because χ + α(χ,ν)ν £ S Π » η (by (ι)), there is, in view of (29.2), 
an e > 0 such that 
(x + α(χ,ν)ν) + εν e £ S for all ι £ N. 
Then χ + (α(χ,ν) + η ε) ν = η Σ _ (χ + α(χ,ν)ν) + εν e . Hence 
χ + (α(χ,ν) + η ε)ν £ S because S is convex. But that is in contradiction 
with the definition of α(χ,ν). So we have proved (ii). 
(in) This follows from (ii) with 0 in the role of χ and h(S) in the role of 
v, if we note that h(S) > 0. • 
The following lemma gives a characterization of the subclass G . One 
reason to present it here is, that it may contribute to the reader's insight; 
further, it will be used in the proof of Lemma 29.10. Another notation : 
D denotes cornil }, in particular α = α (see section 21). 
η 
Lemma 29.6. For every S £ В , we have S £ G if and only if S = h(S)α or 
S fi cl(h(S)Dn\s) Π *" = P(S) Π ж". 
Proof. Let S ε В . W.l.o.g. we assume h(S) = 1 . We first show the "only 
if"-part of the lemma. Let S ε G , and suppose S / О . Let χ ε P(S), χ ä 0. 
Then у £ Q \S for every у £ conv{x,l } with у И x, so χ £ cl(n \S). We con­
clude that P(S) Π Ю П с: Ξ Π cl(Dn\s) D Rn. 
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Next, let χ £ S\P(S), χ S 0. By (29.2), there exists for every ι £ N with 
χ < 1, an ε > 0 such that χ + ε e es. Let ε := mini ε : ι G Ν with χ < l} 
ι ι 
and let Q be the ball with center χ and radius η ε. Then, for y € Q Π π , 
we have y £ χ if χ =1 and y Sx +n ε if χ < 1 . Let, for ι € N, 
1 1 1 1 1 ι 
χ £ S be defined by χ := χ if χ =1 and χ := χ. + ε e if χ < 1 . Because 
1 1 
S is convex, η Σ χ € S. Now y ζ Q Π D implies y i n i. _ χ , so y £ S. 
We have shown that Q Π π e s , hence Q Π о = Q П S, which implies 
χ £ cl(Dn\S). We have proved : S П cl(an\S) П н" с p(s) П ЖП, which completes 
the proof of the "only if"-part. 
For the "if'-part : if S = Ο , then S £ G straightforwardly; now suppose 
S И π", and S Π cl(nn\s) Π ЖП = P(S) П к". Let χ € S, χ È 0, χ ? P(S), and 
ι £ N with χ < 1 = h (S). Then χ g cl(Dn\s). For every ε £ [0,1-х ], we 
have χ + ε ε 6 П ; з о х + Е е Í S fo r e v e r y ε £ ( 0 , 1 - х ] would imply 
χ £ cl(Q \S), and hence a contradiction. We have proved (29.2) , so S £ G . • 
Our purpose is, to describe all η-person bargaining solutions φ : G -»К 
which satisfy - on G - the properties PO, STI, and IM. Just like in section 
15, IM and PO imply IR : 
Lemma 29.7. Let the bargaining solution φ : G -»Ж satisfy IM and PO. Then 
φ satisfies IR. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 15.7. • 
Again, just as in section 15, the IM-property is strongly related to the 
following property. 
Definition 29.8. An η-person bargaining solution φ : G -»Ж is called 
restriotedly monotonia if, for all S and Τ in G with S с τ and h(S) = h(T), 
we have φ(3) Ì φ(Τ). 
(Restricted monotonicity : RM) 
Lemma 29.9. Let φ : G -»Ж be a bargaining solution satisfying PO and STI. 
Then φ satisfies IM if and only if φ satisfies RM. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 15.10. • 
13Θ 
We shall associate an n-person bargaining solution with each monotonie 
curve λ € Λ . In order to do this, we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 29.10. For each λ £ ЛП and S ζ. G" with h(S) = 1 , the set 
η 
Ρ (S) Π {A(t) : t e [l,n]} contains exactly one point. 
Proof. Let λ € Λ and S E C with h(S) = 1 , and denote 
η 
L := {X(t) : t С [l,n]}. In view of condition (29.1) and the definition of 
P(S), the set L Π P(S) contains at most one point. 
Let m := sup{t £ [l,n] : X(t) 6 s}. From λ(1) £ S, the continuity of λ and 
the closedness of S, we conclude X(m) £ S. If m=n, then L Π P(S) = {l }, and 
η 
the proof is completed. Otherwise, {X(t) : t £ (m,n]} с • \s, hence 
X(m) £ cl(Dn\S). So by Lemma 29.6 we conclude that A(m) £ P(S). • 
Definition 29.11. For each λ £ Λ , we denote by ïï the n-person bargaining 
solution : G -» Ж which assigns to every S £ G with h(S) = 1 the unique 
point in P(S) Π {A(t) : t £ [l,n]} (cf. Lemma 29,10), and to every other 
S £ Gn the point h(S)z with ζ = π ( (h, (S)"1, h. (S)" ,..., h (S)"1) S) . We 
, 1 ¿ η 
call π the bargaining solution oorresponding to λ £ Λ . 
Verification of the following proposition is left to the reader. 
Proposition 29.12. For every λ £ Λ , the n-person bargaining solution 
π : G -»» satisfies PO, STI, and RM. 
The converse of Proposition 29.12 is also true : 
Proposition 29.13. Let the bargaining solution φ : G -» H satisfy PO, STI, 
and RM. Then φ = TT for some λ £ Λ . 
Proof. For each t £ [l,n] let 
V(t) := {x £ ЖП : χ S 1 , Σ ", χ, < t} . 
η ι=1 i 
Then V(t) £ Gn and h(V(t)) = 1 for each t £ [l,n]. 
η 
Define λ : [l,n] ->Fn by X(t) := ф( ( Ш for each t £ [l,n]. For 1 S s S t S η 
we have by RM : X(s) = ф( (з)) й φ(ν(ί)) = X(t). Furthermore, for each 
t € [l,n], X(t) £ P(V(t)) = {x £ V(t) : Σ ^  χ = t}. Hence, Σ ^ λ (t) = 
So λ £ Λη. Note that 
(29.3) φ(ν(ΐ)) = π (V(t)) for each t £ [l,n]. 
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We want to prove that φ = TT . In view of STI it is sufficient to show that 
φ(3) = π (S) where S € Gn with h(S) = 1 . Let s := Σ "ir (S), and let 
W := V(s) Л S. Then W € G" with h(W) = 1 . 
λ
 n 
Since π (S) e P(S) fi p(V(s)ì, we have in view of (29.3) : 
(29.4) IT (W) = π (Ξ) = π (V(s)) = ф( (з)) e P(W) П P(S) Π P(V(s)). 
In view of RM, ф № i ф( (5)). Since, by (29.4), ф( (з)) £ P(W), we obtain 
(29.5) ф( ») = ф( (з)) . 
In view of RM, ф № Í ф(3). By (29.4) and (29.5) : ф^) £ P(S). So 
(29.6) ф( ») = ф(5). 
Combining (29.4) - (29.6) we may conclude that ф(5) = TT (Ξ) . • 
The main result of this section is the following theorem. 
Theorem 29.14. The η-person bargaining solution φ : G -» Ж satisfies PO, 
STI, and IM if and only if φ = π for some λ £ Λ . 
Proof. Lemma 29.9 and Propositions 29.12 and 29.13. • 
Remark 29.15. Let λ. £ Л П be defined by λ ft) := tn~ 1 for every t £ [l,n]. 
\ * η 
Then the solution π * corresponding to λ^ can been seen as an extension, on 
G , of the (2-person) Kalai - Smorodinsky solution KS (see Def. 15.3). It is 
easily seen that π * is the only symmetric member of {ir : λ £ Λ } . 
λ 2 
Remark 29.16. Theorem 15.15, which characterizes the family {π :Л6Л = Л }, 
is a special case of Theorem 29.14 : for, if n=2, then G = В . This follows 
2 
simply by verification of (29.2) for Β , or by Lemma 29.6. 
Just like in the 2-person case (cf. Corollary 15.16) we can ask the 
tion : Which solutions φ 
perties IM as well as IIA ? 
ques : G -*Ж satisfy, besides PO and STI, the pro-
Theorem 29.17. The solution φ : G -»К satisfies PO, STI, IIA, and IM, if 
and only if there is a permutation π : N -» N such that, for every Ξ £ G , 
2 
πφ(5) is the lexicographical maximum of S Π К . 
(Recall the notation introduced before Def. 10.7.) 
Proof. For the "if'-part : let π be a permutation of N with, for S £ G , 
2 
φ(S) £ S such that πφ(5) is the lexicographical maximum of S Π H . Then 
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note that φ = φ Η : G " -» ж" with Η = <{π( 1) } ,{^(2) } , . .. ,{ττ(η) } , 1 > (see sec-
η 
tion 28). So φ satisfies PO, STI, and H A (Theorem 28.23). Note further 
that φ = π 0 where λ € Л has graph 
ι ιτ(1) π(ΐ) іі(2Ь ,. г ιι(ΐ) π(2) π(ΐ) π(2) ir(3), 
convie ,e + e ) U convie + e ,e + e + e ; U . . . 
U conv{En~ e" , 1 }. So φ satisfies IM (Theorem 29.14). For the "only 
ι=1 η 
if"-part, let λ £ Λ be such that λ is not of the form λ above. In view of 
Theorem 29.14, it is sufficient to show that the corresponding π : G -* К 
does not satisfy IIA. Note that λ is not of the form λ if and only if there 
is a point on the graph of λ with at least two coordinates unequal to 0 and 
1. W.l.o.g. we may suppose, for some t £ [l,n) : 
(29.7) о < Xjttg) < ι, ο < λ 2α 0) < 1. 
We may further suppose that λ (t) > λ (t ) or λ (t) > λ,^η' f 0 r a 1 1 t * Ь0' 
say : 
(29.8) X2(t) > A2(t0) for all t > t 0. 
Let V := {x £ D n
 :
 I " χ S t }. Then V £ G n and π (V) = X(t ). 
Choose α £ (λ (t ),1), and let W := {x £ V : χ S α}, then W £ G". 
Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that π satisfies IIA. Then, 
since W с: ν and π (V) = X(t ) £ W, we have 
(29.9) πλ(νί) = A(t
n
). 
λ λ -1 
On the other hand, π (W) = (α,1,...,1)π ((α ,1,...,1)W) = 
= (α,Ι,... ,l)X(t) for some t > t since X(t )£ ((a" , 1,.. ., l)W)\p((a~ ,1,...,1)W). 
So, in view of (29.8) and (29.9), we have π (w) = λ (t) > λ (t ) = π (W), an 
impossibility. We conclude that π does not satisfy HA. • 
We present a brief discussion of related literature. The results in this 
section were published in Peters and Tijs (1983a) . Other approaches to the 
more restricted problem of extending the Kalai - Smorodinsky solution to the 
case η > 2, were taken by Thomson (1980) and Imai (1983) . Thomson also 
restricts the class of bargaining games, by requiring a bargaining game to 
have no weakly Pareto optimal points in the positive orthant, i.e. for S £ В 
he requires W(S) П V. с P(S); this restriction is stronger than our restric­
tion to G . Imai, by means of modifying the relevant properties, obtains a 
characterization of the so-called "lexicographic maxmin solution"; on our 
class С 
29.15. 
G this solution coincides with the symmetric solution π * of Remark 
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We indicated in the beginning of this section (Example 29.3) that an 
extension of Theorem 15.15 - a characterization of a family of 2-person indi­
vidually monotonie bargaining solutions - to the η-person case is unlikely to 
be trivial. We conclude this section with an "impossibility result" which is 
inspired by Roth (1979, p.105), but stronger than his result because we drop 
the symmetry property and consider the - smaller - class В . 
Theorem 29.18. There exists no bargaining solution φ : Β -»Β (n>2) which 
is Pareto optimal and individually monotonie. 
Proof. For every ι £ N, let у be the vector in Ж with i-th coordinate 0 
and all other coordinates equal to 1, and let 
V := comviy : ] £ N, 3 И ι} £ В . Let further V := comviy : 1 6 N } . 
Suppose φ : В -» R satisfies PO and IM. By PO, we have φ (V ) = 1 for every 
1 С N. By IM, φ (V) S φ (V1) for every 1 £ N. Hence ф( ) ä l , an impossi-
bility since 1 £ V. So such а φ cannot exist. • 
η 
30. RISK PROPERTIES 
In chapter 8 (sections 23 - 27) we have considered risk properties for 
2-person bargaining solutions. We shall now present a few generalizations 
to the η-person case. 
We start with some notations and definitions. Most of these are straight­
forward extensions of the corresponding notations and definitions for the 
2-person case, but we list them anyhow, for completeness'sake. 
Let Γ = <A,a,u ,u , . . . ,u > £ BS be an n-person bargaining situation. 
For every 1 £ N, we denote by С (Г) the family of all continuous nondecroasing 
concave functions к : u (A) -» К with k(0) = 0 and k(X) > 0 for some λ £ u (A) ; 
and, for к £ С (Г), the bargaining situation 
< A,a,u ,u ,...,u ,k „ u ,u ,...,u > £ BS is denoted К (Г). We say 
that К (Г) arises from Г by the replacement of player 1 by a more risk averse 
player. 
η η ^ η 
Definition 30.1. Let С с В and С с CS (cf. notation 10.2). An η-person 
bargaining solution φ : С -»К is called risk sensitive on С if, for all 
1, 3 £ N with 1 / 3, Г £ С, к 1 £ С^Г) with К 1 (Г) £ cs n, we have 
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φ (S ι,
Γ
. ) S φ (ST,) . If С = BS (and С = В ) , then φ is called risk sensi-
tive. 
(Risk sensitivity : RS) 
η ^ 
Definition 30.2. Lot С and С be as in Def. 30.1. An n-person bargaining 
solution φ : С -> R has the worse alternative property on c, if, for each 
ι e Ν, г = < A.â.u^u2 , . . . ,un> e с, к1 e cNn with κΝπ e cs n, л e ait (ψ, η , 
m e а Ш ф , ^ ^ ) ) , we have Ъі~{I) > Eu1(m) . If С = Bs" (and c" = ВП) , φ is 
said to have the worse alternative property. 
(Worse alternative : WA) 
We shall denote by BSC the family of η-person bargaining situations 
such that all Pareto optimal outcomes xn the corresponding bargaining games 
represent riskless alternatives, i.e. 
BSC := {Γ = < A,a,u ,u ,...,u > e BS : for every χ £ P(S„), 
there exists an a £ A with χ = (u (a),u (a),...,u (a))} . 
2 
Note that BSC = BSC (see section 23). 
We now give two results, the first of which is the n-person analogue of 
Lemma 23.5 : it says that bargaining situations Γ in BSC "behave nicely" 
under transformations k xn С (Г). The second result is the n-person analogue 
of the "impossibiblity" Theorem 23.6, and says that no weakly Pareto optimal 
and individually rational solution is risk sensitive or has the worse alter­
native property (that is, on BS ). Both results can be proved in the same 
way as the corresponding results in section 23. 
Lemma 30.3. Let Г = < A,a,u ,u ,. . . ,un> 6 BSc", ι € N, k1 e С 1 (Г) . 
For χ £ P(S
r
) let χ € Η denote the poxnt with i-th coordinate k (x ) and 
]-th coordinate χ (for every 3 ^  1)1 and let Ρ := {χ : χ £ P(Sp)}. 
Then S K l ( r = com(P) and
 ρ ( Ξ
κ
ι ( Γ ) )
 c p
· 
Theorem 30.4. Let φ : В -»Ж be a weakly Pareto optimal and individually 
rational n-person bargaining solution. Then φ is not risk sensitive, and 
does not have the worse alternative property. 
Also the proof of the next lemma is omitted : cf. Lemma 23.7. 
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Lemma 30.5. Let φ : Β -»Κ be a Pareto optimal η-person bargaining solution, 
% η ^ ^ 
and С с BS . Then, if φ satisfies RS on С, φ also satisfies WA on С. 
Lemma 30.5 says that, on any subclass of BS , RS implies WA; Theorem 30.4, 
however, destroys our hope of finding "reasonable" bargaining solutions which 
have the worse alternative property (on BS ). Consequently, we shall in most 
cases restrict attention to (bargaining solutions on) BSC , just like we did 
in chapter 8. 
The following theorem describes a property which, for Pareto optimal 
bargaining solutions on BSC , is equivalent to the worse alternative property. 
Theorem 30.6. Let φ : В -»К be a Pareto optimal η-person bargaining 
solution. Then the following two statements are equivalent : 
(ι) φ has the worse alternative property on BSC . 
(il) For every Γ € BSC , ι Ε Ν, к £ С (Γ), we have 
(For this notation, see section 28, before Def. 28.4.) 
Proof. Suppose φ satisfies WA. Let Γ = < A,a,u ,u ,...,u > £ BSC , ι € Ν, 
к
1
 € С
1(Г), and take a,b € A with a e alt(φ,Г) and b £ alt(φ,Κ1(Γ)). This 
is possible because Γ £ BSC , φ is Pareto optimal, and in view of Lemma 30.3. 
Then, by WA, u (a) è u (b). Since both (u (a),u (a),...,u (a)) and 
(u (b),u (b),...,u (b)) are in P(Sr) by PO of φ and Lemma 30.3, this inequality 
implies Ο (φ,Ξρ) = {x Nw ι : x £ S. ,x = u (a)}<= {х„\г ι : x £ Sp,x = u (b) } = 
0
 ίΦ'
3
τ,ΐίΓ\)· The last equality follows from Lemma 30.3. We have proved 
-ι К ( 1 ) 
(ι) -» (n) . The implication (n) •» (i) follows by reversing the argument. • 
Inspired by the equivalence in Theorem 30.6, we introduce the following 
property. 
η ^ 
Definition 30.7. Let С and С be as in Definition 30.1. An η-person bargaining 
solution φ : С -»К has the risk profit opportunity property on C, if, for 
each Г £ С, ι £ Ν, к 1 £ С1(Γ) with К1(Γ) £ CS n, we have 
Ο (φ,5
Γ
) <=• О (φ,S „ ). If С = BS n (and С П = в") , φ is said to have the 
risk profit opportunity property. 
(Risk profit opportunity : RPO) 
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Thus, if a solution has the risk profit opportunity property, then the 
set of utility (n-1)-tuples in an η-person bargaining game S, available for 
the players j ^ ι if player ι receives φ (S), does not decrease if player ι 
is replaced by a more risk averse player. A further explanation of the 
expression "risk profit opportunity" is given by the observation that (with 
notations as in Def. 30.7), if φ is Pareto optimal, then 
0_
і
(ф,3
г
) с 0_
ι
(φ,5
κ1 ) implies either φ (Sj,) = φ (5 κι ( Γ )) f o r a 1 1 3 Φ ^· 
or φ (S
r
) < φ ( S i p ) for at least one ] Φ ι. This observation also indica-
3 1 J К ( 1 ) 
tes that RPO can be seen as an extension of the 2-person risk sensitivity pro­
perty, different from (and weaker than) η-person risk sensitivity. Summariz­
ing some relations between several risk properties for Pareto optimal solu-
2 
tions, we have : on BSC = BSC, WA, RS, and RPO are equivalent (Theorems 
30.6, 23.12); on BSC , WA and RPO are equivalent and implied by RS (Lemma 30.5 and 
Theorem 30.6), and also, RPO is properly weaker than RS if η > 2, as will 
appear in the sequel when we study IIA-solutions. 
The next theorem corresponds to Theorem 23.13. 
Theorem 30.8. Let φ : В -> H be a Pareto optimal and consistent n-person 
bargaining solution which has the risk profit opportunity property on BSC . 
Then φ is scale transformation invariant. 
Proof. Let S £ В , k € Ж . We have to prove : 
(30.1) ф(к5) = кф(8) . 
Let Г be the trivial bargaining situation corresponding to S (see Example 9.6). 
Then Г G BSC . Denote by к £ С (Г) multiplication by к . Since also the 
inverse function of к , i.e. dividing by к , is in С (Γ), we have by double 
application of RPO : 
(30.2) 0_
ι
(φ,5
Γ
) = Ο ^ ' Φ ' ^ , η ' f o r every ι ε N. 
Now (30.2), the linearity of k 1, and PO, imply [к φ (З
г
)=]к1(ф (S )) = 
φ (S д-р. ) for every ι £ Ν, hence 
ι К ( i ) 
(30.3) к Φ (Sj,) = φ ((l,l,...,l,k ,l,...,l)S
r
) for every ι ε N. 
From (30,2), (30.3), and CONS of φ, we obtain 
k^jtSp) = ф1((к1,1,...,1)5г) and φ (Sp) = φ ( (kj , 1,. .. ,1) Sj,) for all ] ¿1 . 
Repeating the whole argument (n-1) more times, we find кф(З
г
,) = ф(кЗ
г
), pro­
ving (30.1). • 
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Remark 30.9. By a small modification of the proof of Theorem 30.8, one can 
show that in that theorem, CONS and RPO may be replaced by one property : RS. 
Remark 30.10. We give an example of a solution which satisfies RPO on BSC 
(and PO), but neither CONS nor STI nor RS on BSC . We leave the verification 
of the^e claims to the reader. (He may use, among other things. Theorem 24.1.) 
3 3 3 
That solution φ : В -» R is defined by φ (S) := maxíx : χ £ S Π К } , and 
t 1-t 3 
(φ (S) ,φ (S) ) maximizes χ χ on {χ £ S Π R : χ = φ (S) } where 0 < t < 1 
-1 2 is such that t(l-t) = φ (S) . 
Now that we have established some elementary relations between risk pro­
perties and properties like Pareto optimality and scale transformation inva­
riance, we proceed by considering risk properties of η-person IIA-solutions 
(cf. section 28). Our first main result is the following theorem, which is an 
2 
extension of Theorem 24.1, in view of the equivalence of RPO and RS on BSC 
(Theorems 30.6 and 23.12). 
Theorem 30.11. Let φ : В -* Ж be a bargaining solution satisfying IR, PO, 
STI, and IIA. Then φ satisfies RPO on BSC . 
Proof. Let I £ ΒΞ η, ι £ N, k 1 € С 1(Г). Let ζ := φ(3
Γ
), ζ := φ(Ξ ,
 Γ
 ). We 
1 Κ ( 1 ) 
want to prove : 
(30.4) 0_
ι
(φ,3
Γ
) с:0_
і
(ф,8
к і ( Г )). 
First suppose that ζ = 0. Then 0_ (φ,S χ _ ) = {χ .г -, £ Ж : χ £ Sp 
with χ = θ} in view of Lemma 30.3, from which (30.4) follows immediately. 
Next suppose ζ > 0. In view of Lemma 30.3 there is a (unique) point у in 
P(S
r
) with у = ζ for every 3 ^ 1. Since φ satisfies STI, we may suppose 
(30.5) z i = к
1(у
і
) = yi,z = y. 
The concavity of k 1, (30.5), and к (0) = 0 , then imply : 
(30.6) For all λ for which к is defined, we have 
к
1(Х) δ λ if λ € [O.y ], kNX) < λ if λ > y . 
Now suppose that ζ > ζ (ä 0) and let 
1 1 
Τ := comv{0,z,z,a 1 } 
η 
£ Ж is so small tha 
++ 
ζ £ Sj, by (30.5), Τ с S K 1 Г since ζ £ $кі,Т) by (30.6). So by IIA, 
where a.  t αϊ £ S„ D S , ,„> . Then Τ £ Β , Τ с S- since 
η Γ К-ЧП Γ 
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φ(Τ) = ζ = ζ, contradicting our assumption ζ > ζ . Hence, ζ S ζ , and then 
1 1 i l 
(30.4) follows from (30.5) and Lemma 30.3. • 
A consequence of Theorem 30.11 and Lemma 28.θ (li) is, that for every 
Ν Η 
weighted hierarchy Η € Η , the corresponding solution φ has the risk profit 
η Η 
opportunity property on BSC . We now present two examples of solutions φ 
which are not risk sensitive on BSC , for n=3. 
Example 30.12. (See Fig. 30.1.) Let Γ € BSC be such that S = S where 
Ξ := comvíd,0,0) ,(0,1,0) ,(0,0,1) ,(1,0,1)}. 
Then P(S) = conv{(0,1,0),(1,0,1)}. Let k3 £ C3(I) be defined by к (λ) = ^ 
for all λ e [0,1]. Then P<S з
 r
 ) = {(α,1-α,\/α) : α € [0,1]}. 
il 2 λ} (ι) Let Η = <{1/2,3},Ш> G И ' '~ . Straightforward calculations show : 
Η Η — 1 Η 
ω + ω = Φ , ^ Ρ ) > Φι ( 3
κ
3 ( Γ 1> = (
2wj + ω )(2-ω )" , so φ is not risk sensi­
tive on BSC . 
(li) Let Η' = <{2,3},{ΐ},ω> Ç. φ1 · 2 ' Ъ '
 ι
 so ω > 0, ω 2 + ω = 1, ω = 1. 
Η ' Η ' 
Again, straightforward calculations show : ω = φ (S
r
) > φ (S з/гО = 
_ 1 UI τ 
ω (1 + ω ) , so also φ is not risk sensitive on BSC . 
(0,0,1) 
(0,1,0) 
a = φ (S
r
) 
b = φΗ'(5
Γ
) 
c^'W)) 
а
" *
Н , (
 (Г)) 
Η = <íl,2,3}f(j.j,j) > 
H' =<{2,3},{l},(l,|-,y) > 
(1,0,0) 
Figure 30.1, 
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We use Example 30.12 in the proof of the following theorem. 
N 
Theorem 30.13. Let H = < ...,ω> Ε Η . The following two statements are 
equivalent. 
(ι) φ is risk sensitive on BSC . 
(11) There is a permutation π of N such that either 
Η = <{π(1)},{ττ(2)),...,{π(η)},1 > 
η 
or 
н = <{π(1)},{π(2)},...,{π(η-2)},{π(η-1) ,π(η)},ω>. 
Proof. We first show the implication (11) ^  (i) . Let Γ € BSC . Let li be a 
permutation of N. If Η = <{π(1)},{π(2)},...,{π(η)},1
η
>, then, if a player 
(say) π(ι) for ι € N, is replaced by a more risk averse player, by definition 
Η Η 
of φ the solution outcome changes only (possibly) for player тг(і). So φ 
is risk sensitive on BSC . IfH=<{n(l)}, ДтНп-г) },{ιτ(η-1) ,ττ(η)},ω> , 
then, if a player π(ι) with ι й η - 2 is replaced by a more risk averse 
Ц 
player then the solution outcome assigned by φ changes only (possibly) for 
player тг(і). If player ïï(n-l) [ιτ(η) ] is replaced by a more risk averse player, 
then the solution outcome does not change for all players тг(]) with ] á η - 2, 
and changes for player Щ п ) [ir(n-l) ] only to that player's advantage (cf. 
Theorem 24.1, or Theorem 30.11 for n=2 since then RS and RPO are equivalent). 
So also this φ is risk sensitive on BSC . 
Next , we prove the implication (i) =» (ii) . Suppose that Η is not as in (ii) . 
1 2 Л 
Let Η = < N ,N , . . . ,N ,u>>. The assumption that f] is not as in (ii) implies 
that either 
Case 1 : Some class N ( 1 ¿ h £ i.) contains at least three players 
Case 2 : Each class contains at most two players, and some class 
N (1 S h < i) contains exactly two players. 
Firstly, suppose that H is as in case 1. We may suppose w.l.o.g. that 1,2, 
and 3 are in N . Let S, Γ and к be as in Example 30.12, and let 
Τ := com(E (S)). Then P(T) = { E (z) : ζ £ P(S)}. The same calculation as in 
Η Η Ν 
Example 30.12 (ι) shows that φ (Τ) > φ (com(E ( S ^ / T O ) ) / which can be seen 
to imply that φ is not risk sensitive on BSC , e.g. by looking at underlying 
trivial bargaining situations. Similarly, Example 30.12 (ii) can be used to 
show that also in case 2, φ is not risk sensitive on BSC . • 
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Theorem 30.13 shows that only a relatively small subclass of 
{φ : Η € И } consists of solutions which are risk sensitive on BSC . 
This subclass consists of n! "dictatorial" solutions and a family of 
"almost-dictatorial" solutions each one determined by a number in (0,1) and 
an ordered partition of N out of — (n!) possible ones. 
Next, we consider n-person IM-solutions (cf. section 29). Recall Theorem 
29.14 which tells us that {π : λ € Λ } is the family of all solutions defined 
on the class G which satisfy PO, STI, and IM. Note that, if Γ € BSC with 
S„ 6 Gn, ι ε Ν, к 1 ε С 1(Г), then also Ξ χ ε G n. We have : 
1 К ( 1 ) 
Theorem 30.14. Every solution IT : G -» Ж (λ ε Л ) is risk sensitive on 
{r ε Bscn : s
r
 ε G n}. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 24.3. • 
So far our discussion of risk properties of bargaining solutions on BSC . 
Just as in the 2-person case, less nice results can be obtained if we extend 
our attention to the general case of bargaining games with also risky Pareto 
optimal outcomes; cf. Theorem 30.4. Still, some statements can be made, com­
parable to a few results obtained in section 26 for 2-person bargaining solu­
tions; we refer the reader to Peters and Tijs (1985), where also the other 
results of this section were published. 
Finally : Nielsen (1983) shows that the 3-person, symmetric "Nash-solution" 
H 1 1 1 
(the solution φ with Η = <{1,2,3},(—,—,—) > in our notation) is not risk 
sensitive, but does have some property like the worse alternative property; 
he also shows that the n-person "Kalai - Smorodmsky - solution" (the unique 
symmetric solution in Theorem 30.14) is risk sensitive (; all these results 
hold on BSCn or {Γ ε BSCn : Sp ε G " } ) . 
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CHAPTER 10 
DIAGRAMS 
In the only section of this chapter, we summarize the main relations 
between properties of bargaining solutions, as established in this monograph, 
with the aid of a few diagrams. 
31. SOME DIAGRAMS 
In the first series of diagrams, we summarize the main relations between 
properties of 2-person bargaining solutions defined on B, as established in 
sections 10-27. As far as risk properties are concerned, we suppose these 
to hold for a solution on BSC, unless stated otherwise. Before we can present 
these diagrams, we have to extend the results of section 25 (which were stated 
and proved for В ) to the class B. We start with some extensions of old defi­
nitions, and the definition of a new property. 
2 . . 
Definition 31.1. We call a solution φ : В -» R twist sensitive (TS) if its 
restriction to В is twist sensitive (cf. Def. 25.1) . We say that φ has the 
slice property (SL) if its restriction to В has the slice property (cf. Def. 
25.4). 
2 
Definition 31.2. We call a solution φ : В -» R independent of non-individually 
rational outcomes if φ(3) = φ(Ξ ) for every S £ В. 
(Independence of non-individually rational outcomes : INIR) 
The main results of section 25, can now be modified to hold for solutions 
on B, as follows. 
2 
Theorem 31.3. Let φ : В -» Ж satisfy PO and STI. Then, for φ, we have : 
(i) TS implies SL. (n) TS and INIR together imply RS. ( m ) RS and SL to­
gether imply TS. (iv) IIA implies TS. (ν) IM implies TS. 
Proof. (ι) By Theorem 25.5. (il) By Theorem 25.3. (in) By Theorem 25.6. 
(iv) By Theorem 25.11. (v) By Theorem 25.12. • 
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Remark 31.4. A word of caution in reading the now following diagrams is in 
order. Whenever a combination of properties implies a solution φ to belong 
to some family of solutions, it is supposed that solutions m this family 
have those properties; but, of course, they do not necessarily satisfy also 
stronger properties. For instance, in Fig. 31.3, PCO, PO, RA, STI, and IR, 
imply φ £ Ν : but if φ £ Ν, then it does not satisfy SA. In other words, if 
a φ would exist with the properties PCO, PO, SA, STI, and IR, it would bc in 
Ν : but solutions in N are not super-additive. 
φ=Ν 
Th.11.4 Τ 
I I 
Φ e И 
Th.11.8 Ι Ί Th.12.7 
± M f 
AN fV. ΞΥΜ WPO SIR H A STI IR PO U E CC 
Ex.10.8 
ТЪ.11.5 
|>=N (t fi 0,1) 
UJ 1 
Th.12.5 
Φ e Ν 
Figure 31.1 : Main results of sections 10-12, for φ : В -» Ж . 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
ф = 0 ,D¿ ф = 0 ,D ф = 0 ,D 
I I 
С . 1 5 . 1 6 I C . 1 6 . 1 0 
IIA 
c i le.16.10 j 
IM 
φ = ΚΞ 
T h . 1 5 . 4 Τ Th 
φ = π 
is.isf 
Π 
= ψ 
Ir 
T h . 1 6 . 9 
SYM WPO STI 
L . 1 5 . 1 0 
RM PO 
IM PO STI IR G IM /ч J L.15.7 
. , L . 1 5 . 9 
INIR 
F i g u r e 3 1 . 2 . : Mam r e s u l t s of s e c t i o n s 15-16, f o r φ : В -» К . 
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Φ e Ν = Er 
Th.20.2 te.18.9 i-гт С.18.6 
Ρ^-Γ-ΓΊ 
IR 
PCO PO RA « SA STI IR WPO
 н
ом PSA 
С.18.11 
φ =E ( 1' 0 ),E ( 0' 1 ) = E 
Figure 31.3 : Mam results of section 17-20, for φ : Β -» К . 
L . 1 8 . 2 
T h . 1 8 . 4 SA 
Ρ 
T h . 2 4 . 5 
Іть.гз.із l> 
I il îî 
I I A STI 
II 
RS t — WA 
T h . 2 3 . 1 2 
IM IR GIM 
Th.24.1 Th.24.3 
Figure 31.4 : Main results of sections 23-24, for a PO-solution on B. 
IIA IM 
Th.26.1 
RS on В S 
Ι Γ^^^-^Ι L.15.9 
RS SL \ TS Th. 31.3 I N I R 
Th.31.3 I Th.3i.; 
,,Th.27.3 
φ(Δ)-monotonicity 
Figure 31.5 : Main results of sections 25-27, for a PO-STI-solution on B. 
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In this monograph, most attention was paid to 2-person bargaining 
solutions. For η-person bargaining solutions, the mam results are Theorems 
28.23 and 29.14 which give characterizations of IIA- and IM-solutions, res­
pectively, but on different classes of bargaining games. Further, Theorems 
30.13 and 30.14 are on risk sensitivity of such solutions. Other results of 
section 30 are summarized in Fig. 31.6. There, whenever risk properties are 
concerned, these are supposed to hold on BSC . 
RS 
Th.30.5 
Th.30.13 
WA 
IIA 
Th.30.6 
RPO 
Th.30.11 
CONS 
IR 
Th.30.8 
STI (___ RS 
R.30.9 
Figure 31.6 : Mam results of section 30, for a PO-solution on В (n>2) 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert verbanden tussen eigenschappen van oplossingen 
voor het onderhandelingsprobleem, zoals dat door Nash in 1950 geformuleerd 
werd. Onder meer gebeurt dit door middel van karakteriseringen van onderhan-
delingsoplossingen door hun eigenschappen. Onderhandelingstheone is een on-
derdeel van de speltheorie, in het bijzonder van de coöperatieve theorie der 
spelen zonder zijdelingse betalingen. 
Hoofdstuk 1 is inleidend. Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt enige ingrediënten der 
nutstheone welke in dit proefschrift gebruikt worden : de von Neumann -
Morgenstern nutstheone in § 4, risico-afkerigheid in § 5, additieve en mul-
tlplicatieve nutsfuncties in respectievelijk § 6 en § 7. § 4 vormt een basis 
voor het hele proefschrift, § 5 voor hoofdstuk θ en voor § 30, waarin het gaat 
om risico-eigenschappen van onderhandelingsoplossingen. De resultaten van 
§ 6 en § 7 worden gebruikt in hoofdstuk 6 (over additiviteitseigenschappen) en 
§ 12 (over karakteriseringen van zogenaamde Nash oplossingen). 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de centrale concepten van dit proefschrift geïntro-
duceerd : onderhandelingssituaties in § θ, onderhandelingsspelen in § 9, en 
onderhandelingsoplossingen in § 10. 
Hoofdstuk 4 houdt zich vrijwel uitsluitend bezig met de (2-persoons) on­
derhandel ingsoplossing van Nash en de met-symmetrische uitbreidingen daarvan. 
In § 11 staat de zgn. onafhankelijkheid van irrelevante alternatieven (Nash) 
centraal, in § 12 spelen de eigenschappen genaamd onafhankelijkheid van irre­
levante uitbreidingen (Thomson) en conventie-consistentie (Binmore) de belang­
rijkste rol. Alle genoemde eigenschappen van onderhandelingsoplossingen wor­
den in karakteriseringen gebruikt. In § 13 worden verbanden gelegd tussen het 
niet-cooperatieve oplossingsconcept competitief evenwicht voor een eenvoudig 
markt-model, en onderhandelingsoplossingen, in het bijzonder Nash oplossingen. 
§ 14 behandelt een tweede niet-cooperatief model, waarbij met-symmetrische 
Nash oplossingen een belangrijke rol spelen. In de beide laatstgenoemde para­
grafen worden interpretaties gegeven van de parameter van een niet-symmetrische 
Nash oplossing. 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een karakterisering van een familie van niet-symmetri-
sche uitbreidingen van de (2-persoons) Kalai-Smorodinsky oplossing (in § 15) 
en van de (2-persoons) Kalaι-Rosenthal oplossing (in § 16) ; de belangrijkste 
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daarbij gebruikte eigenschappen zi]n respectievelijk individuele monotonie en 
globale individuele monotonie. 
Hoofdstuk 6 houdt zich bezig met additiviteitseigenschappen van 2-регзоопь 
onderhandelingsoplossingen. In § 17 wordt er een nutstheoretische onderbou­
wing gegeven voor het gebruik van dergelijke eigenschappen, waarbij het resul­
taat van § 6 toegepast wordt. § 18 geeft een karakterisering van de familie 
van zgn. proportionele oplossingen (Kalai), m.b.v. de (partiele) additivi-
teitseigenschap. In § 20 wordt de familie van met-symmetrische Nash oplos­
singen gekarakteriseerd met behulp van de zgn. beperkte-additiviteitseigen-
schap. § 19 is een intermezzo over (Pareto-) continuïteit van onderhande-
lingsoplossingen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 bekijkt twee andere benaderingswijzen van het onderhandelings-
probleem : multi-oplossingen en probabilistische oplossingen. Een multi-
oplossing voegt aan ieder onderhandelingsspel een deelverzameling van mogelij-
ke uitkomsten toe. Een probabilistische oplossing voegt aan ieder onderhan-
delingsspel een kansverdeling op de verzameling van mogelijke uitkomsten toe. 
In § 21 worden 2-persoons multi-oplossingen bekeken welke voldoen aan een 
versie van de onafhankelijkheid van irrelevante alternatieven; zodoende wordt 
er een uitbreiding verkregen van het belangrijkste resultaat van § 11. Tevens 
worden er multi-oplossingen bestudeerd met de beperkte-monotome eigenschap 
en wordt er een uitbreiding verkregen van de karakterisering van § 15. In 
§ 22 worden twee versies van onafhankelijkheid van irrelevante alternatieven 
voor probabilistische oplossingen besproken; ook nu weer wordt de karakteri-
sering van § 11 uitgebreid. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bestudeert risico-eigenschappen en verbanden tussen nsico-
eigenschappen en andere eigenschappen van 2-persoons onderhandelingsoplossin-
gen. Het fundament voor de definitie van deze risico-eigenschappen is gelegd 
in § 5. In § 23 worden hoofdzakelijk de risicogevoeligheidseigenschap en de 
slechter-alternatief eigenschap besproken, en in § 24 de verbanden tussen 
deze eigenschappen en andere eigenschappen, zoals onafhankelijkheid van irre-
levante alternatieven en individuele monotonie. In § 25 wordt er een verband 
gelegd tussen risicogevoeligheid, draaigevoeligheid, en de zgn. schaafeigen-
schap. De meeste resultaten, tot aan § 26, gelden voor spelen waarin elke 
Pareto optimale uitkomst risicoloos is : in § 26 wordt het geval bekeken 
waarin een Pareto optimale uitkomst soms slechts te verwezenlijken is door 
een loterij. Tot § 27 luidt de belangrijkste vraag die in hoofdstuk 8 gesteld 
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wordt, als volgt : welke invloed heeft het vervangen van een speler in een 
onderhandelingsspel door een meer risico-afkerige speler, op de oplossings-
uitkomst ? In § 27 wordt, heel summier, de strategische kwestie bekeken of 
het voor een speler voordelig kan zi]n zich meer of minder risico-afkerig voor 
te doen, voor zover de regels van het spel een dergelijk gedrag toelaten. De 
zgn. b-monotome eigenschap, geïntroduceerd in § 13, speelt daarbi] een be-
langrijke rol. 
In hoofdstuk 9 worden enkele resultaten uit de hoofdstukken 4, 5, en 8, 
uitgebreid naar n-persoons onderhandelingsspelen en -oplossingen. In § 28 
worden oplossingen bestudeerd welke onafhankelijk van irrelevante alternatie-
ven en consistent zijn, in § 29 worden individueel monotone n-persoons oplos-
singen op een deelklasse der n-persoons onderhandelingsspelen bekeken, en in 
§ 30 worden risico-eigenschappen van n-persoons oplossingen bestudeerd. 
Hoofdstuk 10 tenslotte geeft (in § 31) een overzicht van de belangrijkste 
in dit proefschrift aangetoonde verbanden tussen eigenschappen van onderhan-
delingsoplossingen, met behulp van enkele pijldiagrammen. 
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STELLINGEN 
bij het proefschrift "Bargaining Game Theory" van H.J.M. Peters 
Stelling 8.6 in [I], over uniciteit van evenwichtspri]zen m het daar gefor­
muleerde lineaire ruilmodel, is onjuist. Een ander priTsevenwicht voor het 
voorbeeld in §8.6, is: ^  = (γ|,0,0), y 2 - (0,1,0), y 3 = (γ|,0,1), bl] de 
primen ij = j|, ï2 = 1, ïïj =-¿_ 
[l] D. Gale: The Theory of Linear Economic Modelb. McGraw-Hill, New York, 
1960. 
Indien, voor het lineaire ruilmodel genoemd in stelling I, extra wordt ver-
ondersteld dat een consument slechts dat goed of die goederen koopt waarvan 
het nut per geldeenheid maximaal is, zijn de evenwichtspnjzen wél uniek. 
Wiskundig geformuleerd, wil dat zeggen dat formule (1) op blz. 288 in [l] 
als extra veronderstelling wordt toegevoegd. Deze formule correspondeert met 
de, in een andere context geformuleerde, formule (3) m [2]. 
[2] E. Eisenberg and D. Gale: Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The 
Pari-Mutuel Method. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30, 165-168, 1959. 
Ill 
Onder de Pareto-rand van een met-lege compacte convexe verzameling S in R 
verstaan we de verzameling P(S) := íx t S: als y e S en y è χ, dan y = χ} . 
P(S) hoeft niet gesloten te zijn (7ie [3]). Er geldt: P(S) is gesloten dan en 
slechts dan als er voor géén punt χ van de afsluiting van P(S) een punt y van 
S bestaat met y S χ en y = χ voor precies één coördinaat ι. 
1 1 
[3] K.J. Arrow, E.W. Barankin and D. Blackwell: Admissible Points of Convex 
Sets. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (eds. H.W. Kuhn and A.W. 
Tucker), Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, 07-91, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1953. 
IV 
Zi] 0 φ Τ с: R en zij к : Τ -» R een begrensde functie die concaaf is, dat wil 
zeggen k(Z ,p t ) Ì Î .ρ k(t ) voor elke convexe combinatie Σ ,p t van 
" i=l ι 1=1 ι i=l ι 
elementen van Τ welke zelf ook een element van Τ is. Dan bestaat er een concave 
functie к : conv(T) -» R ¿o dat k(t) = k(t) voor elke t in T. 
V 
De stelling van Anscombe en Aumann ([4]) voor beslissen bij onzekerheid, en 
ook sommige stellingen over additief ontbindbare von Neumann-Morgenstern 
nutsfuncties op Cartesische producten (zie [5], of [6, Stelling 5.1]), zijn 
eenvoudig te verkrijgen als coronaria van Stelling V in [7j. 
[4] F.J. Anscombe and R.J. Aumann: A Definition of Subjective Probability. 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 34, 199-205, 1963. 
[5] P.C. Fishburn: Independence in Utility Theory with Whole Product Sets. 
Operations Research 13, 28-45, 1965. 
[6] R.L. Keeney and H. Ralffa: Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences 
and Value Tradeoffs. Wiley New York, 1976. 
[7] J.C. Harsanyi: Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal 
Comparison of Utility. Journal of Political Economics 63, 309-321, 1955. 
VI 
De conclusie van Stelling 6 in [8] is onjuist. Deze conclusie is wel juist 
wanneer eigenschap 4 in deze stelling vervangen wordt door eigenschap 7, zoals 
gedaan is in [9]. 
[8] A.E. Roth: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Springer Verlag, Heidelberg. 
1979. 
[9] R.E. Kih]strom, A.E. Roth and D. Schmeidler: Risk Aversion and Solutions 
to Nash's Bargaining Problem. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics 
(O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, eds.), 65-71, North-Hoiland, 1981. 
VII 
In de vele economische leerboeken die speltheoretische onderwerpen als nulsom-
spelen en het prisoner's dilemma behandelen, zouden ook andere onderwerpen 
uit de speltheorie moeten worden opgenomen. 
Vili 
Voor werknemers die het verrichten van onbezoldigd overwerk als vanzelfspre-
kend beschouwen, is loonsverlaging een meer passende benaming voor datgene 
wat met arbeidsduurverkorting aangeduid wordt. 
IX 
Het verdient aanbeveling de wiskunde op een probleemgestuurde manier te onder-
wijzen. 
X 
Dank zij het moderne Nederlandse liberalisme kan het woord "partijgenoten" 
nu ook als voltooid deelwoord gebruikt worden. 
[10] Vrijende WD'ers m de Tweede Kamer. Playboy, april 1986. 



